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 INTRODUCTION 
 
Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACs), as their name suggests, are companies with 
no assets but cash that are listed in regulated markets with the only aim to find a target firm 
during a specified period of time (18 or 24 months) and merge with it. At the end of this 
operation, the result is to get listed the target company. 
 
These companies were born in U.S. in the 90s, after the failure of blank-check companies in the 
80s, mainly used for fraudulent schemes.  
This particular structure of investment vehicle was rediscovered from 2003 in the U.S. and then 
adopted in other countries. In 2005, the first SPACs got listed in European markets.  
During the years, special purpose acquisition companies have become an important 
phenomenon and, in 2011, the first SPAC joined in the Italian market. From that year (to 
November 2017), 18 SPACs got listed in Borsa Italiana, 10 of which already completed the 
business combination with a target firm.  
 
Literature is mostly focused on U.S. SPACs and only a few papers analyse European and Italian 
SPACs. The main result of U.S. and European literature state that the stock returns of companies 
are poor (and in most cases negative) even if operating performances might improve.  
In fact, according to them, only less-performing and highly leverage firms used SPACs to enter 
into public markets, while companies with a positive financial background, sustainable 
financial structure, and a good competitive advantage used the direct way to get listed, the IPO.  
 
The scope of this thesis is to perform an empirical analysis on Italian SPACs and their target 
firms in order to understand if these particular investment vehicles can help Italian firms to get 
listed and raise new capital through the public market, increasing their size and profitability. 
According to literature, in fact, special purpose acquisition companies are considered as a 
secondary way to access the public markets.  
The empirical analysis is performed by examining operating and stock performance before and 
especially after the business combination between SPACs and their target firms, trying to 
understand the reasons behind this choice. 
The thesis, then, compares results with those of other papers in the academia. 
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Special purpose acquisition companies are an interesting topic not only because is a recent new 
type of investment, but also because it’s becoming a large phenomenon in Italy.  
Moreover, in December 2016, the Italian government introduced a new rule that encourages 
investments in Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs), by eliminating taxation on interest and 
capital gain on long-term investments. This has increased the demand for companies’ stocks 
which might push more firms to get listed, that now can choose to use the IPO or a SPAC. 
During the first ten months of 2017, in Borsa Italiana, the Italian stock exchange, there were 23 
new initial public offerings (IPO), which 7 were Italian SPACs (30% on the total).  
 
 
In this thesis, in chapter 1 are presented the main characteristics of a SPAC and regulations that 
in the past brought to the creation of this particular investment vehicle.  
Chapter 2 and 3 discuss the differences between SPACs and private equity funds and Initial 
Public Offerings, and the relative literature. 
Chapter 4 presents the main models of analysis for operating and stock performance used in the 
literature, in particular Ignatyeva, Rauch, and Wahremburg (2013), Lewellen (2009), and Kolb 
and Tykvová (2016). 
Finally, in chapter 5, all Italian SPACs listed in the market (AIM Italia or MIV) are briefly 
analysed with a particular focus on those which completed the business combination with a 
target until 2015. In fact, in these cases, it’s possible to analyse also post-acquisition 
performances to understand if SPACs can increase the value of firms. 
Following models of literature, this analysis tries to investigate what are the performance before 
the business combination and especially after.  
The analysis will focus on revenues, total assets, EBITDA and measure of profitability of the 
companies such as return on invested capital (ROIC) and return on assets (ROA), both 
calculated excluding goodwill and other similar intangibles.  
 1. What is a Special Purpose Acquisition Company? 
 
The argument of this thesis is Special Purpose Acquisition Companies or, as more often referred 
with the acronym of SPACs.  
They are essentially public companies which are listed on stock exchanges through Initial 
Public Offerings and have only cash as asset side of their balance sheet. The only purpose of 
these companies is to find a privately-held firm and merge with it. In this way, after the 
transaction, the target firm become listed and can use the cash to boost growth (both internally 
or through Mergers & Acquisitions) or to repay debt. 
Founders of these particular companies are typically managers with experience in the private 
equity industry, corporate finance or are expert in management, restructuring, valuation or in 
specific industries in which the single SPAC is interested.  
Once they created the company, they have typically from 18 to 24 months to complete the 
business combination with a potential target.  
If they don’t find a suitable target within the agreed period of time, the company is liquidated 
and almost all proceeds raised through IPO are distributed pro-rata to shareholders.  
In case of liquidation of a SPAC, founders are not compensated for their work and so they do 
not receive any money. This is an incentive for the management to work efficiently and do their 
best to find a suitable target to merge but also is a strong incentive to complete a business 
combination even if the target company is not the best available. 
 
SPAC lifecycle 
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SPACs are often compared with private equity funds and IPOs because of the similar 
characteristics they share. A complete explanation is provided in chapters 2 and 3. 
 
1.1 Regulation and history of SPACs 
The literature on Special Purpose Acquisition Companies is quite recent. First vehicles aimed 
at getting listed privately-held companies appeared in the United States in the ‘80s, called 
‘blank check’ companies. The name ‘blank check’ derives from the fact that investors virtually 
write a blank check to sponsors of the vehicle because neither sponsors nor investors know in 
advance what is the object of the investment.  
In the ‘80s blank check companies were typically very small in term of side but, according to 
the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC), they could issue ‘penny stock’ (for this reason 
they were also called ‘penny stock companies’).  
SEC is the independent agency of the government of United States of America that is 
responsible for the security of U.S. stock exchanges (in Italy, the equivalent authority is the 
CONSOB). The mission of the SEC is “to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient 
markets, and facilitate capital formation”.  
SEC defines penny stocks as securities issued by small companies that are exchanged at a price 
below $5. Usually, penny stocks are quoted over-the-counter, for example in the OTC Bulletin 
Board or OTC Link.  
These markets are less regulated than main stock exchanges, sometimes illiquid and prices can 
be highly volatile due to low volumes. Prices of securities in OTC markets are more inclined to 
be manipulated if there are no specific regulations to prevent this.  
Penny stocks were first regulated by the Security Act of 1933, introduced after the stock market 
crash of 1929 to ensure that buyers would have received enough information before the 
purchase of securities. 
In the ‘80s however, black check companies were associated with fraudulent behaviour of 
managers and investors that used pump-and-dump schemes to fraud other investors. 
Pump-and-dump schemes consist in a voluntary inflation of stock prices by disclosing fake 
news or misleading statements. Beneficiaries of this scheme were owners of stocks who could 
sell their investments at a higher price (that didn’t reflect its fundamental value). 
Notwithstanding prices of these securities were low and the issuing companies had a tiny market 
capitalization (compared to companies in regulated markets), these schemes caused financial 
frauds in term of millions of dollars. Moreover, even if investors recognized the presence of a 
fraud, they could find difficulties in selling stocks due to a possible illiquid market. 
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After this kind of scandals came to light and SEC understood the need of a regulation to prevent 
them and to protect investors, Penny Stock Act was indeed introduced in 1990 and, in 1992, 
SEC changed also the Rule 419 of the Security Act (1933). By introducing this regulation, the 
SEC didn’t prevent the creation of cash shells but it made them safer and more legitimate.  
Rule 419 regulates ‘blank-check companies’ having the following characteristics:  
- the company has to be in the development stage  
- the company issue penny stocks  
- the company has not a business plan or a specific purpose, or its only purpose is to 
merge with a not yet identified firm. 
- The company has not more than $5 million in assets (or it’s planning to raise less than 
$5 million). 
Main features of the new regulation to which blank check company must comply with are:  
(i) Gross proceeds must be deposited in an escrow (at least 90% minus underwriting 
commission) 
(ii) Stocks issued during the IPO must be deposited in an escrow as well 
(iii) The merger must be completed within 18 months from the IPO (otherwise all the 
money in the escrow are distributed among investors) 
(iv) After having received all relevant information, shareholders must vote and agree 
about the target company to which merge 
(v) The fair value of the target company must be at least 80% of funds raised. 
 
It’s easy to understand how the SEC increased investors’ protection and the transparency of the 
blank-check vehicles. Firstly, requiring that almost all proceeds raised and stocks issued 
through the IPO are deposited in an escrow, it prevents frauds, inappropriate usage of the 
investors’ money and, in case of stocks, it prevents also abusive trading (short sellers, 
rumourmongers, and pump-and-dump schemes). In addition, the requirement of the minimum 
fair value of the target company found was set to prevent the improper usage of the money 
raised. Secondly, the time horizon gives investors that either a merger will be accomplished or 
they will receive their money back.  
Lastly, before the approval vote, a blank-check company must prepare a document containing 
all relevant information about the deal on which investors are going to vote. This document is 
similar to a listing prospectus, and need to be approved by the Security and Exchange 
Commission.  
Another additional reform was adopted in June 2005 in which SEC defined a ‘shell company’ 
as a company with no or nominal assets (other than cash) and no or nominal operations.   
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This reform requires that shell companies completing a business combination (or whenever 
there is a change in control) must publish, among other information, target firm’s audited 
financial statements for the previous two years within four days from closing instead of seventy-
one days. This obviously increased transparency of these vehicles.  
The 2005 regulation is important because it makes clear that, even if a company without assets 
but cash is not subject to Rule 419, it need to disclose important information about its business 
combination before it happens, in order to provide timely reporting to investors. 
 
Normally companies which want to be listed in a regulated market use the Initial Public 
Offering process but other different methods are available. One alternative way to be listed is 
to be acquired by a listed company and subsequently merge with it through a ‘reverse merger’.  
According to Cumming et al. (2014), a reverse merger can be performed with two vehicles: 
natural shells and cash shells. The former are companies having sold their assets and operations 
after being bankrupt whereas the latter are companies created with the only intent of merging 
with a privately-held company.  
Natural shells typically have very few assets and almost no cash available, so they are only 
suitable for private companies that seek to be listed fast and do not need to raise external funds 
for growth or restructuring.  
On the other hand, cash shells have available liquidity that target firms can use to pursue growth 
initiatives or give the possibility to initial shareholders of the target firm to cash out their 
investment.  
 
Floros and Sapp (2011) highlight that ‘reverse mergers have become a popular way for a firm 
to go public in recent years while avoiding the delays and expenses of the traditional IPO 
process’. They identity five major advantages of reverse mergers over IPOs:  
1) Avoiding the stock exchange regulation process for being listed (which can be lengthy) 
2) Lower direct and indirect costs (such as underpricing) 
3) Stocks are traded immediately after the merger (avoiding the risk from worsening 
market condition) 
4) Firm’s managers focus more on operations (and not on road shows) 
5) Owners maintain a higher stake in the resulting public company.  
 
Despite these advantages, authors suggest that going public with a secondary route ‘have 
acquired a bad reputation, due primarily to their lower listing requirements’. These shell 
companies, in fact, are listed in less regulated markets or in over-the-counter-markets.  
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Since they are not required to disclose all information about their governance and performances, 
the quotation of their stocks is characterized by asymmetric information, conflict of interests of 
management and (sometimes) very high risk for investors.  
In this context, Special Purpose Acquisition Companies resolve the main disadvantages of 
going public through a reverse merger. As further explained in the chapter 3, when a SPAC get 
listed, it need to file a prospectus to the relative stock exchange regulator in which are stated 
who are the founders, how much of their time founders can spend in searching for a suitable 
target, available time to find the target and if shareholder need to approve the merger with the 
target and the relative voting threshold.  
 
From a regulatory point of view, a special purpose acquisition company is different from a 
blank check company because as soon as the SPAC raise more than $5 million, it is exempted 
from the Rule 419. However, in order to attract investors, a SPAC needs to protect their interests 
and so setting for itself a well-structured bylaw.  
Sometimes, and especially in first years of this century, they were also called specified purpose 
acquisition companies because they have the pre-defined - or specified - objective of merging 
with a private firm.  
 
The concept of the actual structure of special purpose acquisition companies was created by 
David Nussbaum who is currently chairman of the board at EarlyBirdCapital, a boutique 
investment bank in New York.  
Even if SPACs are not subject to very strict regulation, Nussbaum decided to voluntarily adopt 
some provisions of Rule 419 to increase transparency of management team, to attract more 
investors and to obtain the positive opinion of the exchange commission.  
Thus, even if not legally required, Nussbaum’s new ‘blank check company’ deposited all 
proceeds raised in an escrow, with the exception of a relatively small amount to be used for 
operating expenses and for paying underwriting commissions. Managers had a limited period 
of time to identify a target company, as in Rule 419, but with the different limit of 24 months. 
Another important feature that Nussbaum took from Rule 419 was the requirement for the 
approval of the proposed target company by ordinary investors.  
Tradable shares and warrants were an important difference which characterized the SPAC with 
respect to blank-check companies.  The possibility to buy additional shares or dispose of them 
gave to shareholders the ability to change their investment strategy whenever they wanted.  
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When investors put money in a SPAC, they buy units which are composed by one share and 
one or many warrants: they give to investors the possibility to purchase additional shares later 
(usually after the effectiveness of the reverse merger). 
Moreover, in Nussbaum mind, each SPAC should have focused on a different sector in finding 
the right firm, which required a management team not only with experience in corporate 
finance, mergers and acquisitions or private equity, but also with a past in the specific focus 
industry.   
 
Summarizing, the new generation of special purpose acquisition companies, appeared in the 
market from 2003, embedded from one side the investors’ protection provided by the Rules 419 
but also allowed shares and warrant to trade freely in regulated markets.  
 
1.2 Characteristics of a SPAC  
Millstream Acquisition Corporation was the first modern Special Purpose Acquisition 
Company (i.e. a SPAC with the characteristics of the actual ones) appeared in the U.S. in 2003. 
This company was founded by the investment bank Early Bird Capital that was the pioneer and, 
nowadays, the leader in special purpose acquisition vehicles.   
In Europe, Metal Enterprises Inc. was the first SPAC incorporated, quoted in the London 
Alternative Investment Market (AIM) and in 2007 Pan European Hotel Acquisition Co. was 
the first SPAC quoted in a regulated market (Euronext in Amsterdam).  
In December 2007, Liberty Acquisition Holdings Corporation was the first SPAC (IPO 
underwriters was Citigroup and Lehman Brothers) raising more than 1 billion dollars.  
In Italy, the first special purpose acquisition company was Italy 1 Investment S.A., founded in 
2011 by Vito Gamberale, Carlo Mammola, Gianni Revoltella, Roland Berger, Florian 
Lahmstein, Gero Wendenburg and incorporated in Luxemburg.  
 
Special Purpose Acquisition Companies, as their name suggest, are created with the only 
purpose to acquire a private firm and, through a reverse merger, make the latter being listed in 
the public market.  
It’s possible to distinguish four main periods during a SPAC’s life, as Lewellen (2009) and 
Cumming, Haß and Schweizer1 (2014) suggested. 
Periods are segmented by the most important event characterizing a special purpose acquisition 
company.  
                                                
1 See figure in the next page. 
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The first stage is called ‘No Target’ which last from the IPO date until the day when the target 
company is announced.  After the individuation of the target company by managers, the SPAC 
enters in the ‘Target Found’ phase, which ends on the day of the shareholders meeting. In this 
day, shareholders are called to vote on the approval of the business combination between the 
target company and the SPAC. The result of the vote decides which phase follow. If the business 
combination is approved, the SPAC enters in the ‘Acquisition Completed’ stage. On the other 
hand, if the result of the vote is negative, SPAC returns in the ‘No Target’ or ‘Acquisition 
Withdrawn’ phase, depending on the time available. In fact, only if there is enough time to let 
managers find another target company, a new ‘No Target’ period occurs. 
 
 
Characteristics and performance of each phase will be explained better in chapter 4.  
 
SPACs are not subject to specific rules governing their functioning but, reading their prospectus 
filed to stock exchange authority in the IPO process, it’s possible to identify more or less the 
same characteristics and format. 
 
PROMOTERS 
First prerequisite to create a special purpose acquisition company is the presence of a group of 
people promoting the foundation of the company by underwriting the company equity. 
After its creation, sponsors obtain the management of the SPAC. 
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Founders, promoters, sponsors are terms used in this thesis to refer to individuals which create 
the company. Managers, instead, are those individuals that sit in the board of directors and 
manage the company (which in some cases are not founders and for this reason they have not 
invested a significant stake in the SPAC).  
Promoters are usually individuals but can also be legal persons, such as law firms, consulting 
firms, investment banks or holding companies.  
Analysing special purpose acquisition companies, Berger (2008) found out that ‘sponsors tend 
to have demonstrated a track record of success and a proprietary edge, which gives to investors 
confidence that they can source and execute a value-creating transaction’.  
The experience of promoters is fundamental for the SPAC initial public offering because it’s 
the only valuable assets on which public investors can rely on2.  
In the listing prospectus in fact it’s clearly stated which are past experiences of each promoter 
and who they are. Lakicevic, Shachmurove and	 Vulanovic (2014) found that on average, 
SPACs are founded by 5.91 individuals, and they are on average 50.59 years old at the time of 
filing.  
 
Berger identified four different type of sponsors: 
(i) Accomplished operating executives who are seeking for larger financial opportunity 
and more independence with respect to be managers of a private equity fund 
(ii) Unfounded financial sponsors, deal-maker with a large network of contacts and 
experience that allow them to create good deal and transactions 
(iii) Alternative asset managers, such as hedge funds and private equity funds, which 
invest in non-core opportunities in order to have the possibility to diversify their 
portfolio 
(iv) Corporates, which can benefit from SPAC’s profits with investments that are 
outside of the corporate business but might have strategic relevance in the future.  
 
Promoters are required to buy shares or warrants of the SPAC before the IPO, during a private 
placement. Typically they buy about 20% of outstanding shares at a nominal price. In some 
cases, proceeds arising from the private placement are deposited into a trust and are not 
available until shareholders meeting vote in favour of the business combination or the company 
is liquidated. In other cases, these proceeds are used (at least in part) to cover the expenses of 
managing the company.  
                                                
2 See paragraph 1.3 “SPACs as a proxy to valuate human capital of managers”. 
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Thus, if the business combination is approved, the compensation of promoters is given by a 
stake in the company that they cannot sell until the expiration of a lock-up period.  
Important in this mechanism is the effect: if the SPAC fails to find a suitable target for the 
business combination or if ordinary shareholders reject the proposal, promoters will lose all 
their investments. This practice is known as ‘skin in the game’ because managers risk their own 
money in the ‘game’ of investing in the company. 
Obviously, it is a mechanism to align the promoters’ interests and those of investors but also a 
strong incentive to find a target company in any case, even if it’s not the best choice and the 
deal would not increase the value of the target company. 
If managers do not risk their own capital in a SPAC, they could have the incentive not to fully 
commit their time in searching the optimal target company for the merger, but spending their 
time in other ways. However, even in the best scenario, they usually do not spend all their 
working time in searching for targets and managing the special purpose acquisition company 
because they have their own job. It’s common for sponsors of SPACs to be employed in other 
jobs because they need to have a secure inflow of cash in the case the SPAC doesn’t find a 
target and it’s liquidated, giving no compensation to its managers. 
To protect investors, the possible conflict of interest of managers is clearly stated in the listing 
prospectus. For example, reading the prospectus of ‘EPS Equita Pep’, an Italian special purpose 
acquisition company listed in AIM Italia in August 2017, it’s possible to read that:  
 
“Si segnala che tutti i membri del consiglio di amministrazione dell’Emittente esercitano 
attività imprenditoriali e/o professionali ulteriori rispetto all’attività svolta presso l’Emittente 
e, pertanto, sono portatori di interessi inerenti ad attività professionali non connesse a EPS. 
Gli stessi, inoltre, svolgono […] attività simili a, ovvero potenzialmente in conflitto con, quelle 
dell’Emittente.” 
 
During the IPO, promoters are given also the possibility to buy additional shares at the same 
price and with the same right of ordinary shareholders. Sometimes shares bought by managers 
during or after the IPO allow managers to vote in the shareholders meeting for the approval of 
the business combination, whereas in other cases it doesn’t happen. For example, the prospectus 
of ‘EPS Equita Pep’ states:  
 
“Si segnala che la politica di gestione dei conflitti d’interesse adottata dalla Società in data 13 
luglio 2017 prevede che i Promotori e/o i soci e/o gli amministratori della Società non 
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esercitino il diritto di voto inerente alle Azioni Ordinarie da essi eventualmente acquistate 
nell’assemblea chiamata ad approvare l’Operazione Rilevante.” 
 
In this case, even if managers buy shares directly in the open market, they do not have the 
possibility to influence the vote in the shareholder meeting for the approval of the business 
combination.  
Contrarily, SPACs in which managers are not prohibited to vote for shares bought in the open 
market, sometimes experience an increase in stock price just before the shareholder meeting 
because managers try to buy shares from ‘no voting’ investors in order to make the business 
combination happen (and so receiving their compensation).  
 
UNITS 
SPACs offer to investors units, composed of shares and warrants. They are bought together but, 
after the quotation of the company in the stock exchange, they trade separately.  
This characteristic offers to investors the possibility to dispose in different ways of the two 
instruments. The most interesting case occurs when a shareholder disagrees about the proposed 
target company for the business combination: for example he can sell his shares, liquidating his 
position, but holding warrants in the case in which his forecast about the business combination 
would results wrongful. In that situation, he will convert his warrants in shares, realizing at least 
part of total profits. 
After the IPO, almost the entire amount of proceeds raised are transferred to a trust or a 
restricted account which is managed by an underwriting bank. The percentage of money 
transferred here is typically from 95% to 100%. During the last years, SPACs increased the 
percentage of proceeds transferred to the restricted account to increase investors’ protection.  
Lakicevic, Shachmurove and	Vulanovic (2014) compared all U.S. special purpose acquisition 
companies from August 2003 and August 2012, dividing them into three sub-periods: 2003-
2006, 2006-2009 and 2009-2012. Referring to the percentage of proceeds deposited in a trust, 
they found data as reported in the following table. 
 
 
 
As shown in the table, the average proceeds in trust of U.S. SPACs have increased through 
time. 
Period
Obs. Mean Std. D. Min Max Obs. Mean Std. D. Min Max Obs. Mean Std. D. Min Max
Unit offer price 78 7.06 1.41 6.00 10.10 84 8.64 1.25 6.00 10.00 21 9.52 1.25 6.00 10.00
Proceeds in trust 78 0.93 0.05 0.85 1.03 84 0.99 0.01 0.95 1.03 21 1.01 0.01 1.00 1.03
2003-2006 2006-2009 2009-2012
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In Italy, almost all SPACs (from 2011 to 2017) transferred 100% of proceeds raised during IPO 
in a trust.  
Even the unit offering price is increasing through time. Cumming, Hab and Schweizer (2014) 
suggested that in the first decade of the 2000s, U.S. SPACs issued units in IPOs at a price ranged 
between around $6.00 to $8.00. However, in recent years, prices have reached up to $10.00.  
In Italy, all SPACs listed in the market offered their units at a price of €10.00.  
Money in the trust is typically invested in risk-less assets such as government bonds. This is the 
reason why, before the announcement of the target firm, SPAC’s yield should reflect those of 
treasuries bonds. 
Warrants guarantee to shareholders the possibility to buy additional shares at an established 
price, called ‘strike price’, but only after the success of the business combination. Normally, 
the strike price is lower than the offering price of the share, i.e. the warrants are in the money.  
 
To run day by day operations of the company, managers can only use proceed raised in private 
placement and interests deriving from proceeds deposited in the restricted account. 
  
At the time of the initial public offering, usually SPACs are subjected to a lower underpricing 
effect with respect to traditional IPOs. 
Jog and Sun (2007) analysed 62 U.S. SPACs in the period between 2003 and 2006: the result 
for underpricing was a mean of 1.9%. According to Jay R. Ritter, professors of Finance at the 
University of Florida, the average first-day return of U.S. IPOs during 2003-2006 was 11.6%. 
These numbers are not surprising because, at the time of the IPO, a special purpose acquisition 
company is essentially formed only by cash, there is no operating history and the value of the 
stocks reflect mainly the pro rata value of the trust.  
As suggested by Jog and Sun (2007), a possible explanation of SPAC’s underpricing could be 
the underwriting bank’s mis-valuation of demand for units which cannot be satisfied after 
exercising the overallotment option. Another interpretation was provided by Kim (2009), who 
explained that the underpricing of a SPAC can be the market valuation of the quality of 
management team (see paragraph 1.3).  
 
INVESTORS 
Investors of a special purpose acquisition company can be hedge funds, private equity funds, 
investment banks, family offices, high net worth individuals (HNWI) and companies.  
One main advantage between a SPAC and a private equity fund is the possibility of retail 
investors to buy shares of SPAC while there is no possibility for him to invest in a private equity 
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fund. In fact, even if markets in which SPACs get listed are less regulated and (for some aspects) 
riskier than principal markets, retailer investors are admitted buying and selling shares.  
Individuals can invest in SPACs through funds as well, which in turn buy shares of a SPAC in 
the open market.  
Investing in SPAC is a very interesting opportunity because gives a potentially high return with 
a limited downside scenario. In the case in which management is not able to find a suitable 
target or shareholders disagree about the business combination and they reject it, they will 
receive the pro-rata value of proceeds deposited in the trust.  
Thus, as Lewellen (2009) wrote, “investors essentially own a riskless zero-coupon bond with 
an option on future acquisition”. 
 
As briefly illustrated, shareholders have the possibility to vote on the business combination with 
the target company proposed by SPAC’s management team. The right of voice is another 
advantage of a special purpose acquisition company over a private equity fund.  
Investors can either vote, positively or negatively, or sell their shares in the open market. When 
they vote against the business combination they will eventually receive the pro-rata value of 
the trust while when they sell their shares they receive their market value. For this reason, as 
Lewellen (2009) and other suggested, SPACs should never trade below the discounted pro rata 
value of the trust or the restricted account in which proceeds are deposited. 
 
The business combination is approved if the following situations happen: 
(i) A majority of the shareholder meeting approve the acquisition. 
(ii) An important part of shareholders decides not to redeem their shares (typically 70%). 
 
Those thresholds are only regulated by the bylaw of a SPAC and for this reason they can be 
different between companies.  
In case in which the aforementioned requisites are not satisfied, the SPAC is liquidated or, if 
there is available time to find another possible target company, the management team should 
continue searching for accomplishing a deal.  
When managers do not find a suitable target during the period of life of the SPAC (usually 24 
months), and thus there is no time left, the company is liquidated and all proceeds deposited in 
the trust or restricted account after the IPO are distributed pro-rata to shareholders. 
If this happens, managers are not remunerated for their (incomplete) work done. 
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TARGET 
The scope of a special purpose acquisition company is to find and merge with a privately-held 
firm. In fact, target companies of SPACs are mainly private firms seeking to go public in 
regulated markets. Those firms are interested in merging with a special purpose acquisition 
company because it doesn’t require a time and financial consuming traditional IPO process.  
Referring to the first decade of the 2000s, literature pointed out that companies choosing to go 
public merging with a SPAC had less operating performance, carried more debt, invested less 
and had less growth opportunity with respect to their industry peers and to contemporaneous 
IPOs3.   
Others suggested that SPACs are vehicles to access the public markets in situations in which 
traditional IPOs are not possible4.  
SPACs can be the solution to get listed for example for companies with high debt (since SPAC 
have lots of money available), growth opportunity but with no great past history (required for 
a traditional IPO) or in situations of negative market conditions, for example in bear markets.  
Moreover, a SPAC can contribute to enhance growth opportunities, to optimize the capital 
structure of the firm (thanks to skills and expertise of SPAC’s management team) and to provide 
an exit strategy in the case where there are no strategic buyers interested in acquiring the target 
company.  
 
Lewellen (2009) argued that “like most private equity firms, SPACs typically acquire private 
companies within industries or geographies in which the management team has (often 
substantial) expertise.”  
One example is the Italian SPAC ‘Glenalta Food’, which has been created with an investment 
focus on the food business. In the listing prospectus, it’s clear the focus: 
 
‘Glenalta Food si propone di indirizzare la propria attività di investimento principalmente 
verso società italiane di medie dimensioni (con un equity value compreso tra Euro 100 milioni 
e Euro 250 milioni), non quotate, ad alto potenziale di crescita operanti, sia a livello nazionale 
sia internazionale, nel settore alimentare italiano e in particolare nei settori Food & Beverage, 
Consumer e Retail.’ 
 
From the prospectus, it’s also easy to understand that three out of four executive directors in 
the Board of Directors have a past in food industry. More specifically, Gino Lugli was Sales 
                                                
3 In particular, Datar, Emm and Ince (2012). 
4 In particular, Berger (2008). 
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Director in the Parmalat Group, then General Manager and CEO at Ferrero S.p.A. and from 
2015 is a member of the board of directors of Ferrero S.p.A. and vice-president of Ferrero Food 
Service Luxembourg. Luca Fabio Giacometti was co-founder and Managing Director of 
‘Nutequity’, an investment fund supported by Ferrero family (devoted in particular to food 
products), and then was co-founder and executive director of two Italian SPACs, ‘Made in Italy 
1’ and ‘IPO-Challenger’ (the latter merged with two wine producers). Stefano Malagoli was 
firstly product manager of fresh product in ‘Ferrero Belgio’, member of Monitoring Committee 
and then he focused on the investment banking sector, being an expert in corporate finance, 
debt restructuring and M&A. Silvio Marenco is Corporate Service Director and professor at the 
Business School ESCP Europe in Turin and an expert in strategic and industrial planning and 
in corporate restructuring, especially in food, manufacturing, retail and textile industries.  
 
LIKEHOOD OF A SPAC ACQUISITION 
Kolb and Tykvová (2016) tried to understand what are factors that influence the choice of a 
firm to enter in a public market through a SPAC rather than with a traditional initial public 
offering. 
Analysing 127 U.S. special purpose acquisition companies during the period 2003-2015, they 
identified nine variables, grouped in three categories: 
(i) Market-specific variables 
(ii) Deal-specific variables 
(iii) Firm-specific variables. 
Authors used them to model the probability of success of a SPAC acquisition using a logistic 
regression.  
For the first category (i), authors analysed market volatility and cost of debt: the former variable 
was positive meaning that, in higher volatile markets, firms were more likely to access the 
public market with a SPAC while the latter variable was negative meaning that with lower cost 
of debt there were more SPAC deals. These findings are not surprising: in general, SPACs are 
less vulnerable to turbulent market conditions when completing the deal with respect to 
traditional IPOs since they have already raised cash. Moreover, when the cost of debt is low, 
SPACs can use additional external funds to acquire a company, giving them more flexibility in 
searching the most suitable target firm.  
Deal-specific variables (ii) that authors analysed were cash out and time to resolution. The first 
variable was positive meaning that original shareholders of target companies could quickly and 
more easily convert their shares into cash in SPACs rather than in traditional IPOs. The second 
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variable was positive as well, suggesting that a SPAC took more time to complete an acquisition 
(time from the announcement of the deal and the effectiveness of the business combination).  
Last finding might seem counterintuitive: one expects that the process of going public is faster 
using a SPAC than using the traditional IPO process since there are no roadshows, no 
presentations and money are already available. However, using a SPAC, the acquisition must 
be approved by shareholders, a process that could take a long time.  
Last category, firm-specific variable (iii), were composed by return on assets (ROA), market-
to-book asset ratio, debt ratio, size and venture capital involvement. 
Return on assets measured current profitability but was statistically insignificant in the model; 
market-to-book asset ratio measured growth opportunity and had negative sign meaning that, 
on average, firms using SPACs to get listed had weak growth opportunity; debt ratio variable 
was positive, suggesting that only high levered firms chose SPACs; size variable was negative, 
in line with literature which stated that only small firms enter in public market through a SPAC; 
lastly, venture capital involvement was a dummy variable which had a negative sign, suggesting 
that if venture capitalists were involved in the original shareholder base, firms were less willing 
to use a SPAC. In fact, even if with a SPAC venture capitalists can cash their investments faster, 
they usually prefer using traditional IPO process because it reduces information asymmetries 
and it is associated to more prestigious.   
In the model analysed by Kolb and Tykvová, all deal and firm-specific variables had a great 
impact in the likelihood of a SPAC acquisition.   
 
Their results are in line with the literature: SPAC acquisitions are possible alternative solutions 
to IPOs for getting listed in public markets for firms with lower growth opportunity, more debt 
or in difficult periods when traditional IPOs are not feasible.  
 
RETURN OF MANAGERS 
An important topic in analysing special purpose acquisition companies is the return that 
investors and founders obtain after the merger between the special company and its target firm. 
According to literature, there is a huge difference in return between ordinary shareholders and 
sponsors of a SPAC. 
Jog and Sun (2007) analysed 62 SPACs that raised capital during the period 2003-2006. The 
result of their analysis was that shareholders earned an average annualized return of -3% while 
management obtains a return of 1,900%. This is why they argue that ‘it looks like the investors 
wrote a blank check to management’.  
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This huge return for management is explained by the fact that sponsors of a SPAC are given 
the possibility to buy special shares during a private placement (before the IPO) at a high 
discount. In other cases, like happen in Italian SPACs, sponsors buy special shares at the same 
price of ordinary shareholders but they are rewarded in different moments with additional 
shares. For example, taking the case of the Italian SPAC ‘Equita EPS PEP’, its listing 
prospectus states that, provided the rewarding exchange ratio between special shares (400,000) 
and ordinary shares is 1:6, the conversion will happen in the following cases:  
 
Event 
Special shares 
to be 
converted 
% of special shares 
to be converted on 
total 
Exchange 
ratio 
Shares after the 
conversion 
Business combination 
is effective 
66,667 5/30 1:6 400,002 
Price > €115 80,000 6/30 1:6 480,000 
Price > €125 120,000 9/30 1:6 720,000 
Price > €135 133,333 10/30 1:6 799,998 
TOTAL 400,000  1:6 2,400,000 
 
From this table, it’s easy to understand that managers hugely benefit from the successfulness 
of the business combination, especially in the best case in which the price of the SPAC increase 
at least by a 30% in three years (€13), signalling a value-creation deal.  
It’s also easy to understand the high incentive for management to find a suitable target firm for 
the SPAC and to complete the business combination. Indeed, even if the deal is value-
destroying – and so the stock price decrease – managers obtain (at least part of) their investment. 
In the worst scenario, when the business combination is rejected, managers lose their 
investments obtaining (at minimum) a return of -100%. 
 
1.3 SPACs as a proxy to valuate human capital of managers 
As previously explained, the management team is the most important asset that a special 
purpose acquisition company have when approaching the market in an IPO. Investors can only 
rely on experience, networks and competences of managers when deciding whether to invest or 
not. 
Even after IPOs when companies raise their proceeds, what really differentiate a SPAC from 
another are mainly skills of its managers.  
                                                
5 Price must be equal or greater of that amount for at least 15 days out of 30 consecutive days in which stock exchange is 
opened, within 36 months from the effectiveness of the business combination. 
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The listing prospectus of a SPAC contains all important information about every single 
manager: their education, past experience, important role covered, particular companies in 
which they worked connected to the industry focus of their SPAC and other relevant 
information of their life or career. In this way, investors can have an idea of the appropriateness 
of managers to run a SPAC. 
However, this is only a qualitative method to ‘valuate’ the overall quality of management team. 
 
Kim (2009) in his ‘Essays on management quality, IPO characteristics and the success of 
business combinations’ tried to individuate a quantitative method to evaluate skills of managers.  
He used the phenomenon of underpricing, typical of traditional IPOs. In fact, during the first 
day of trading in the stock exchange, typically prices of new stocks rise. The literature states 
that underpricing phenomenon could be the result of asymmetric information between the 
company and its investors. Firms have incentives to provide all information to investors in the 
IPO process because underpricing is costly for them (companies sell their shares at a lower 
price). 
However, there are always some investors who are more informed than other and who valuate 
more a company and thus, more underpricing could mean more performing companies6.  
Kim’s intuition is the following: in traditional IPOs, the phenomenon of underpricing can be 
used to infer the quality of companies but, when a SPAC get listed, it has no assets and no 
history behind it. Thus, in the case of a SPAC, only the quality of management team can explain 
the phenomenon of underpricing.  
This implies that in SPACs, the underpricing experienced in the first day of trading can be a 
proxy for the quantitative valuation of the quality of management. In particular, the author used 
the following formula:  𝑀𝑉#$,& +	𝑃𝑇𝐴& = 	𝐶𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒& 
where MVmq,i is the market value of the management quality of the SPAC i, Cpricei is the first-
day unit closing price for each SPAC i, and PTAi is the value per share of proceeds deposited 
in the trust for each SPAC i.  
It’s easy to understand that, in the first day of trading in the public market, the difference 
between the closing price and the value of the pro-quota cash in the trust can be the market 
value of the quality of managers per share.  
This finding is important because it explains that market can value also non-quantitative 
characteristics of a stock. 
                                                
6 See Zheng and Stangeland (2007). 
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Moreover, Kim’s analysis also pointed out that in SPACs there were more experienced 
managers and were involved more outside directors than in traditional IPOs.  
 
 
1.4 Status of SPACs 
In this paragraph are presented some general statistics about U.S. and Italian special purpose 
acquisition companies and their actual status: ‘successful’ means that a SPAC completed the 
business combination with its target, ‘pending’ refers to SPACs which have already announced 
their targets but are waiting for shareholders’ approval, ‘developing stage’ phase include 
companies searching for their targets and ‘liquidated’ are companies which were not able to 
find any targets and were liquidated.  
 
- Italian SPACs from 2011 to October 2017 
 
Total deals 18 100% 
Successful 9 50% 
Pending 1 6% 
Developing stage 8 44% 
Liquidated 0 0% 
 
 
- U.S. SPACs from 2003 to October 20177 
 
Total deals 274 100% 
Successful 150 55% 
Pending 10 4% 
Developing stage 35 13% 
Liquidated 79 28% 
 
 
 
                                                
7 Data taken from [www.spacanalytics.com]. 
 2 SPAC and Private Equity: similarities and differences 
Special Purpose Acquisition Companies are often associated with private equity funds because 
of their similar characteristics with respect to their role in the market. 
The main characteristic is that both SPAC and private equity fund (PE) are created with the role 
of acquiring (with a minority or majority stake) a private company, or only in the case of PE, a 
company in the delisting phase, with the objective of enhancing performance of the target and 
then make it public through an IPO or a reverse merger.   
Some authors, in fact, say that SPACs are a public form of a one-shot private equity fund.  
 
According to Invest Europe8 (formerly known as European Venture Capital Association), 
“private equity is a form of equity investment into private companies not listed on the stock 
exchange. It is a medium to long-term investment, characterised by active ownership.  Private 
equity builds better businesses by strengthening management expertise, delivering operational 
improvements and helping companies to access new markets. In particular - venture capital is 
a type of private equity focused on start-up companies. Venture capital funds back 
entrepreneurs with innovative ideas for a product or service who need investment and expert 
help in growing their companies.” 
 
There are various types of private equity funds which invest in specific companies in depending 
on their lifecycle period.  
 
 
 
                                                
8 ‘Invest Europe represents the European private equity industry, from venture capital-backed start-ups to the largest private 
equity firms and investors such as insurers, family offices and pension funds’, www.investeurope.eu. 
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Venture Capital funds typically invest in early-stage companies, such as start-ups. The aim of 
these funds is to buy early promising companies when they are (reasonably) cheap and gain 
from their divestiture, realising 5 or 10 times the fund’s investment. Divestiture usually occurs 
when the target company goes public or is acquired by an industrial investor or another fund. 
 
Buyout private equity funds, on the other hand, have different targets. They typically buy 
companies in mature industries that generate steady and positive cash flows, net from 
investments. 
As Rodriguez and Stegemoller (2011) suggest, these positive cash flows in mature companies 
could be a risk in the principal-agent problem between shareholders and management. 
Managers could use these free cash flows for their own interests rather than use for better 
managing the company or to increase value for shareholders (their principals). 
In this contest, buyout funds can solve this risk by buying mature companies using debt. This 
‘leverage buyout’ eliminate the possibility to use the excess cash available in the company 
because, after the acquisition, it can be only used to repay the debt (essentially a mortgage with 
the company itself as a collateral).  
 
Distress investing is the last category of private equity funds. They invest in companies which 
are suffering financial distress or have already filed for bankruptcy. These particular funds 
invest in companies’ debt and, during the financial restructuring, they swap the debt into equity 
obtaining the control of the company indirectly. The objective of the management of these funds 
is to buy what they think is an undervalued debt for the purpose of selling the company after 
the plan for restructuring it at a higher price. These funds are a particular kind of investments 
because it involves very high risk: for the success of the restructuring plan is required that all 
company’s debtholders agree to the plan and that management (or the new management 
appointed by the fund) is able to restore the company’s going-concern. 
 
Notwithstanding the different focus of private equity funds, they all have the same functioning 
structure. Typically a PE fund is structured as a limited partnership managed by general 
partners. In this context, investors are limited partners (identified also as ‘LPs’) because they 
do not assume any liabilities whereas managers of the fund are called general partners (‘GPs’) 
because they are involved in the management of companies acquired by the fund and for this 
reason they are responsible for the investments done.  
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Limited partners have no voice right in the investment process nor in managing companies 
acquired. They commit a certain amount of money to the fund which the general partners can 
call when they need them to make an investment.  
Even if LPs do not have to disburse their money at the beginning of their investment, they are 
not allowed to withdraw their committed money from the fund. To be more specific, sometimes 
cash can be withdrawn but with the approval of general partners and provided that the fund 
does not need that money or the LP need to find another investor. In other cases, the exit from 
the fund is forbidden and, if happen, it triggers a penalty. 
 
The lack of exit and voice rights imply that investors of private equity funds can only be 
institutional investors (such as pension funds, hedge funds, banks), corporates, family offices 
and high net worth individuals (HNWI).  
The investment in such funds is focused on a medium-long period, typically from 5 to 10 years. 
This is one of the reasons why private equity investments are not easily convertible in cash, 
along with the fact that these funds invest in private firms not listed in regulated markets (it’s 
more difficult to find another buyer for exiting investor’s shares). 
General partners use fund’s money to invest in start-up companies, private firms, mature 
companies, distress firms or even public companies. In the latter case, private equity funds 
usually acquire a company in the delisting phase with the objective of enhancing the 
performance of the target and then make it public through an IPO or selling it to an industrial 
buyer.  
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Given that the normal time horizon of a fund is 10 years, usually general partners invest fund’s 
money in the first half of the period in order to have enough time to implement the business 
plan for increasing the value of the target company.  
Private equity funds generally create more funds and companies acquired by a single fund form 
its portfolio.  
Normally funds tend to focus on a specific industry, geographic area and in company stage of 
development when they start investing (venture capital, buyout, distressed firm). 
Private equity funds, and in particular those focalized in venture capital investments, are very 
active in pharmaceutical and technology industry.  
One of the world’s most important venture capital fund active in the technology sector is 
‘Sequoia’, which invested in famous companies such as Airbnb, Apple, Cisco, Dropbox, 
Google, LinkedIn, Oracle, WhatsApp, Yahoo!. 
 
General partners of funds are managers who experienced a past in private equity, corporate 
finance, or they are accountants, portfolio managers or experts in the specific focus sector of 
funds.  
 
After having briefly described how a private equity fund works, the main similarities and 
differences between private equity funds and special purpose acquisition companies are 
presented in the following paragraphs. 
Similarities comprise the role of managers’ reputation, time horizon of the two investment 
vehicles, the participation of the general partners or promoters in the investment (called ‘skin 
in the game’) and the investment focus. 
 
With regard to the first point, as explained before describing SPACs and private equity funds, 
the reputation of the managers is fundamental for both vehicles because it’s the only ‘asset’ on 
which investors can rely when investing their money.  
Investment focus is strictly connected to the background of managers.  
Some private equity funds and SPACs, in fact, specify their focus in acquiring their targets 
because management team might be composed by experts in a specific industry or having 
valuable business relations in specific geographic area.  
Example of Italian SPACs with a clear focus in searching their targets are ‘GreenItaly1’ and 
‘Glenalta Food’. The former was created with a focus on the green economy while the latter in 
the food business.  
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Moreover, the two investment vehicles have a limited time horizon, even if it’s different. The 
scope of a private equity fund is to buy a company and after (usually) 10 years to sell it to the 
public through an IPO or to an industrial buyer whereas the scope of a SPAC is to find within 
(usually) 24 months a target company and merge with it.  
As previously described, SPAC’s life can be segmented in many periods and the most critical 
event is the identification of the target company for the business combination.  
Private equity fund’s life can be segmented as well. There are two main periods: the first, lasting 
from 3 to 7 years (typically 5) called investment period, in which the fund makes investments 
while the second last until the end of the fund and it focuses more on managing and divesting 
all portfolio companies. Despite the agreed end of the fund, it’s possible to postpone that date 
for two or three years (so-called ‘grace period’) only if the majority of limited partners agrees 
and the divestiture process is not yet concluded. 
 
To try to align managers’ interests with those of investors and to ensure that general partners 
and promoters manage their companies on a best effort basis, SPACs and private equity funds 
require managers to invest a meaningful part of their wealth along with limited partners and 
ordinary shareholders in companies.  
Hence, they will not only profit from the increase in the value of the fund/SPAC if things go 
well, but they will suffer losses in a downside scenario.  
This practise is known as ‘skin in the game’ because managers risk their own money in the 
‘game’ of investing. 
In case of SPAC’s promoters, they buy special shares before the IPO and proceeds raised are 
usually available to management to cover expenses in running the company since SPAC’s 
prospectus ensure that a large fraction of IPO proceeds (from 98% to 100%) is deposited in an 
escrow and can be used only after the approval of the business combination. 
As previously explained, if managers do not find any target company or shareholders meeting 
refuses it, managers do not obtain any compensation. 
Consequently, managers have strong incentives to find the optimal target company.   
 
Notwithstanding the scope of the two vehicles is similar, there are important differences that 
characterize them. 
The more obvious differences of a SPAC respect to a private equity fund is the presence of 
tradable shares and the method by which the two vehicles raise money.  
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Proceeds raised by private equity funds are the result of a private placement whereas SPACs 
offer their shares directly to the market through an initial public offering.  
Going public through an IPO requires SPACs to issue a listing prospectus which contains the 
most important characteristics of the company seeking to go public, such as the total number of 
shares and warrants offered, who are managers, underwriting bank, all functioning information 
of the company and what are risks for shareholders. 
Listing prospectus allows SPACs to be more transparent and protect more their shareholders.  
Private equity funds instead invest in private companies and so are not required to provide some 
information to limited partners. 
 
Another important difference correlated to the previous one is the exit strategy. 
SPAC’s investors can decide whenever they want to liquidate their investments selling shares 
in the open market where the company stocks trade.  
However, there is a technical limitation for investors in exercise this exit right. SPAC’s shares 
are typically listed in less regulated market than principal stocks exchanges – for example the 
AIM market in London or AIM Italia in Milan. Finding a counterparty willing to buy SPAC 
shares here can be difficult since these markets are usually characterized by low daily volumes 
and negotiations are allowed only to institutional investors. 
In any case, the exit from the investment in a SPAC is simpler than from an investment in a 
private equity fund.  
 
Moreover, investing in a special purpose acquisition company, shareholders can decide to 
pursue investments with short-term as well as long-term perspective depending when they 
decide to liquidate their stake.  
On the contrary, limited partners in a private fund can only pursue a long-term investment 
gaining from the difference between the price paid to acquire portfolio companies and their 
selling price. 
The investment strategy is another difference. As is known, private equity funds are 
characterized by diversification, since portfolios are composed of many companies.  
In SPACs this (almost) never happen because one single special company is used to merge with 
only a single target firm. 
In Italy one case can be associated with this special case. ‘Space 2 S.p.A.’ decided to split into 
‘Space 3 S.p.A.’ before the business combination with ‘Avio S.p.A.’. After only two months 
from the creation of the new SPAC, in June 2017 it disclosed that its target company would be 
‘Aquafil S.p.A’. Even if it’s not exactly the case, one can think that proceeds raised by a single 
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SPAC (Space 2) were used to get listed two different target companies (‘Avio’ and ‘Aquafil’). 
This particular case will be further analysed in the fifth section of the thesis. 
 
Another difference concerns the time when investors need to physically inject money in the 
vehicle. In SPAC shareholders have to give their money to managers, which cannot use them 
but they have to deposit (almost) the entire proceeds raised in a trust. The money will be 
available only after shareholders meeting approves the business combination proposed.  
In a private equity fund, limited partners need only to commit to invest a certain amount of 
money but they have to ensure to provide cash at general partners’ request. This happens 
because GPs can invest in different moments during the fund’s life.  
 
Next important difference refers to shareholders’ rights. Shareholders of SPACs have a voice 
right, that is the right to express their approval or not about the appropriateness of the proposed 
target company for the business combination. As already described, this is a very powerful tool 
to protect investors that do not agree with SPAC’s founders and, if investors vote against the 
business combination, they will receive their relative share of proceeds deposited in the trust.  
In private equity investments limited partners do not have any voice right in investment strategy 
and they only receive their money back when the fund is closed. 
 
In this contest, another positive feature of SPACs is precisely the limited downside scenario.  
If promoters want to pursue what ordinary shareholders think is a value-destroying deal, the 
latter can limit their losses by voting against the deal and receiving back what they invested. 
For this reason, Lewellen (2009) considered a SPAC as a riskless zero-coupon bond with an 
option on a future acquisition.  
 
Next point that should be addressed is the compensations of managers for their work.  
In this thesis, the latter it is not considered nor as a similarity nor as a difference between private 
equity funds and SPACs. The final compensations of the two types of managers are comparable 
but the mechanisms behind it are different. 
Rodriguez and Stegemoller in ‘Exit, Voice, and Reputation: The Evolution of SPACs’ (2011) 
refer to managers compensation of the two vehicles as ‘The Magic 20’.  
This number in fact well describe the percentage of compensation of general partners and 
promoters.  
It’s no secret that typically managers of PE funds are paid with 20% of realized profits, derived 
from selling of portfolio companies to industrial buyers or through a public placement. 
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Moreover, an annual management fee from 1,5% to 2,5% of the total value of the fund is paid 
to managers as a fix compensation.  
Special purpose acquisition companies have a different mechanism to compensate their 
promoters. Firstly, companies do not pay any management fee to them. As already analysed 
describing the main characteristics of SPACs, this is a strong incentive for promoters to find a 
suitable target firm and do their best in order that the business combination is approved by the 
shareholders meeting. If this is not the case, promoters worked for free because they do not 
receive any (or very few) money of investors’ proceeds deposited in the trust.  
Secondly, promoters receive around 20% of the future merged company (after the approval of 
the business combination). Sponsors, in fact, have the possibility to buy shares of the SPAC at 
the nominal value before the public offering, and these ‘special shares’ are deposited in an 
escrow and released only after the acquisition of the target company is completed9.  
The percentage of the company that sponsors received is not always exactly 20%. In their paper 
Rodriguez and Stegemoller found a sample of 260 U.S. special purpose acquisition companies 
from 1st January 2003 to 31st December 2011. In their sample, in 211 of 260 SPACs, “sponsors 
received exactly 20% of the company in the form of pre-IPO share sales”, corresponding to an 
81% on the total. 
Their results are summarized in the chart below10: 
 
To be more precise, 224 SPACs give to promoters from 20.0% and 20.9% of the company 
shares (corresponding to 86% on the total sample). In addition, 11 firms give to them 16-19.9% 
and 8 firms give them 21-24.9%. 
The result of this analysis is that more than 90% of U.S. SPAC compensate their promoters 
with a more or less 20% of the value of the company.  
 
                                                
9 In other cases (for example in Italy) sponsors buy special shares at the same price of public investors but they have the right 
to convert them with more ordinary shares for each special share after the business combination.  
10 RODRIGUEZ, U., STEGEMOLLER, M., 2001, Exit, Voice, and Reputation: The Evolution of SPACs. 
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Managers compensation is very important in order to solve the conflict of interests between 
general partners and limited partners in private equity firms and between promoters and 
shareholders in SPACs. 
Even if the compensation for the two types of manager is similar the event triggering the 
payments are very different. In private equity funds, general partners are paid an annual ‘salary’ 
to compensate for their job and, after the liquidation of the fund, they receive around 20% of 
total profits (if any).  
On the contrary, in SPACs, promoters receive their compensation mainly for having pursued 
an acquisition and not on the basis that they realize profits for shareholders in the long run. 
In SPACs (as already mentioned) promoters could have the interest to quickly find a target 
company in order to be rewarded for the business combination.  
For this reason, prospectus of all SPAC IPOs explicitly address this issue warning investors:  
 
“Si segnala che in caso di scioglimento della Società a seguito della mancata realizzazione 
dell’Operazione Rilevante entro il Termine Massimo: (i) non si verificheranno i presupposti 
per la conversione delle Azioni Speciali in Azioni Ordinarie; e (ii) le Azioni Speciali saranno 
postergate alle Azioni Ordinarie in sede di ripartizione dell’attivo nell’ambito del processo di 
liquidazione [..]. Per tali motivi, i membri del Consiglio di Amministrazione potrebbero versare 
in una situazione di possibile conflitto di interesse nel valutare l’opportunità di una particolare 
Operazione Rilevante e la corrispondenza di termini e condizioni della stessa al migliore 
interesse della Società, soprattutto nell’ipotesi in cui la relativa target sia stata individuata in 
prossimità della scadenza del Termine Massimo.” 
 
This advice allows investors to be aware of the fact that, in some cases (especially if the 
individuated target firm is announced next to natural end of the SPAC) managers can act 
according to their own interests rather than those of investors. In this case, investors should 
evaluate accurately the deal and exercise their vote accordingly: if investors suspect that the 
proposed business combination would not increase the company value, they can reject the deal 
in the shareholders meeting and they will receive their money back. 
A partial solution for founders’ conflict of interests is given by linking their compensation with 
SPAC performances (see paragraph 1.2, ‘Return of Managers’).  
 
For all similarities and difference above described of the two investment vehicles, Ignatyeva, 
Rauch and Wahrenburg (2013) consider a SPAC as a ‘one-time-liquid’ private equity fund. 
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Summarizing, SPAC can be seen as a PE fund in which managers seek to accomplish only one 
deal, shares are listed in regulated markets so shareholders can sell their investments whenever 
they want and investors have the right of voice, i.e. they can decide about the appropriateness 
of the proposed deal.  
 
 
MINORITY PRIVATE EQUITY 
One significant characteristic of private equity funds that can help better analyse the difference 
between them and special purpose acquisition companies is whether private equity funds obtain 
the control or not of the target firm. 
This is an important distinction because, according to the share of ownership acquired, different 
restructuring approaches can be used, leading to different results in performance.  
Indeed, a private equity fund can:  
(1) acquire the majority of the capital, obtaining the control of the firm 
(2) acquire the minority of the capital. 
While in majority deals private equity funds become the controlling shareholders and typically 
appoint a new CEO and change the composition of board of directors, minority deals do not 
change the control of the firm but enter in the board of directors with consultants.  
In the latter case, the entrepreneurship of the previous owner is not removed, not compromising 
the original view of the business and the implementation of the business plan but rather, a 
minority investment could provide additional expertise in corporate finance and experience in 
M&A for increasing the efficiency of the firm and for possible external source of growth.  
 
Theoretically, majority deals bring to the target company a large amount of debt so efficiency 
would only be possible by cutting costs whereas, being typically less leveraged, minority deals 
could create value by increasing capital expenditure and pushing sales. 
 
According to Battistin and al. (2013), minority private equity investments increase profitability, 
sales and employment of a firm more than majority investments do.  
To prove their thesis, they analysed a sample of 191 Italian deals in the period 1995-2004 and 
compared target firms before and 3 years after the new investor came in: 101 was minority 
investments and 90 was majority investments.  
Their results suggested that, on average, majority deals were much more leveraged than 
minority deals; in both cases private equity funds boosted growth by increasing capital 
expenditure in the target firm but the effect was much more evident in minority investments.  
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The effect of private equity funds in increasing Earning Before Interests, Taxes, Depreciation 
and Amortization (EBITDA) was more than 3 times higher in minority than in majorities deals 
and the effect on sales growth was 2 times higher as well.  
Neither minorities nor majorities improve working capital management, meaning than in both 
cases the efficiency was unchanged after 3 years of private equity governance. 
 
Authors argued also that there were no substantial differences in firms, before the acquisition 
by private equity funds, in cases of majority or minority investments. The choice should 
probably be attributed on whether the family or the previous owner is willing or not to sell the 
control of the firm. This is plausible because, over 191 deals analysed, 164 were family or 
privately-held company and it’s no secret that Italian small and medium enterprises are reluctant 
to sell the control of their firms.   
 
Summarizing, between 1995 and 2004, minority investments in private firms were more 
effective when private equity funds appointed ‘monitoring’ members in the board, rather than 
substituting the company chief executive officers. 
 
These findings are important in studying the performance of special purpose acquisition 
companies, especially in Italy.  
Firstly, SPAC managers will obtain around 20% of shares of the target firm so the previous 
owner will usually remain the controlling shareholder.  
Secondly, Italian SPACs are on average smaller than those incorporated in other countries: the 
average proceeds raised in Italy in the period 2011-2017 was €109.4 million, in the U.S. the 
average was $172,4 million, while in Europe in 2005-2011 the average was €489,4 million.  
In the U.S. however, the average proceeds raised are increasing every year: in 2016 was $269.2 
and from only January to August 2017 was $310.7 million.  
 
Thus, in Italy, the scenario of SPACs is different from the United States and Europe: Italian 
SPACs’ target firms are typically smaller than U.S. and European ones and probably they are 
family-owned.   
Since costs of a traditional IPO can be very high for a relative small Italian firm, a SPAC can 
be a valid substitute to get listed in regulated markets, being less time and money consuming. 
In addition, it’s common knowledge that Italian entrepreneurs are typically reluctant to lose the 
ownership of their companies but they can gain from the expertise of SPAC managers, boost 
growth and increase the export outside Italy, without losing the control of the company. 
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For these reasons, Italian SPACs can behave more like minority investments by private equity 
funds rather than U.S. and European SPACs and, despite international literature pointing out 
the poor performance of European and US SPACs, in Italy they could have different results and 
be a positive push for growth and internationalization of Italian firms. 
 
 3 SPAC and Initial Public Offering: similarities and differences 
The principal aim of a special purpose acquisition company is to help a firm to get listed on a 
regulated market. This is exactly the same purpose of an initial public offering (IPO).  
In this chapter, firstly are analysed the main characteristics of a traditional IPO process and then 
are presented the main advantages and disadvantages for a firm in going public with a SPAC 
rather than with an IPO. 
 
An initial public offering is a way for a privately-held firm to raise capital on public and 
regulated markets. As the name suggests, in an IPO a firm sells its shares for the first time to 
the general market by issuing new shares. On the contrary, secondary offerings are used when 
a large block of shares (already listed on a stock exchange) are sold to other investors: typically 
these shares for sale are owned by large investors or institutions. The main difference between 
initial and secondary offering is the role of the issuing firm in the transaction. 
In the secondary offering, the transaction is between the old owner of the shares and the new 
investor, whereas in an initial public offering the company sells new equity to the market and 
all the money raised (less underwriting fees and legal costs) are available for any purposes.  
 
The initial public offering has several benefits for firms but also costs which can be huge given 
that some of them are fixed and do not depend on the amount of the capital increase.  
Benefits are: 
- Raising public equity for financing growth opportunities or reducing net financial 
position 
- Increase the company’s reputation and recognition 
- Liquidity for shares 
- Possibility of an exit strategy for actual shareholders  
- Make easier M&A operations 
 
For a firm, entering the public markets contributes to raise capital at a relatively low cost and 
to avoid borrowing money which has to be paid back to debtholders. Moreover, being listed 
increase the reputation of the company (since for sure it passed all strict requirements of the 
stock exchange commission) and the transparency to market investors. This positive status 
gives the company the possibility to increase leverage in the future at a lower cost of debt and 
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create the possibility to pay future merger and acquisition deals not only with cash but also with 
shares.  
After an IPO, actual shareholders have the possibility to cash out their investments in the 
company directly in the market. For example, private equity funds try to get listed their portfolio 
companies when they need to liquidate their positions and there are no industrial buyers or no 
other investors willing to acquire them.   
 
Although these benefits there are also direct and indirect costs relating to the IPO process and 
other recurring costs. Direct costs are mainly underwriting fees and legal costs at the time of 
the IPO. Indirect costs are the underpricing phenomenon and time spent and effort of 
management team during the IPO process: in particular they concentrate their attention for road 
shows, marketing, book-building rather than on daily operations of the firm. In addition, there 
are some on-going costs that a firm has to sustain from the time it become public, like for 
example costs for supplying regularly information to investors and to the market as a whole, 
and a costlier corporate governance (stock exchange regulators usually set a minimum number 
of independent members of the board and a more efficient management control system and 
internal auditors).  
In addition to costs, a company seeking to be listed need to fulfil stringent legal requirements 
by the stock exchange authority: in the U.S. the responsible for the regulation of the relative 
securities market is the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) whereas in Italy is the 
‘Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa’ (CONSOB).  
 
The most important document in an IPO is the listing prospectus, where are contained all 
relevant information about the firm’s past performance, its governance, its management team, 
its auditors, the investment bank (or banks) responsible for the underwriting process and, most 
important, the reason why the firm is seeking to get listed and how it is going to use proceeds 
raised.  
Before the final prospectus, usually it’s issued a preliminary prospectus and then the 
management team of the company along with investment bankers usually conduct a marketing 
campaign in order to promote the company and its stocks. Besides they conduct a due diligence 
and a ‘roadshow’ to the most important cities in the world, presenting the company to potential 
institutional buyers that have the possibility to discuss and ask questions directly to 
management.  
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In this phase, both investors and, most important, underwriters come out with their valuation of 
the company: eventually, underwriters value company’s stocks and communicate the price to 
the market. The whole IPO process can last from 6 to 12 months.  
 
In the first day of trading typically there is an increase in the stocks’ price, due to a higher 
valuation by the market. This phenomenon is known as ‘underpricing’ and can have different 
causes. In literature there are several explanations of the underpricing effect on stock prices and 
four main theories can be distinguished11: asymmetric information, institutional reasons, 
control considerations and behavioural approaches.  
The most established cause affirms that underpricing is due to asymmetric information. Key 
parties of an IPO transaction are the issuing firm, the underwriting bank and investors: the 
aforementioned theory suggests that one of these parties is more informed than others. Some 
authors argued that the most informed party is the underwriters because it knows more about 
the demand for stocks than the issuer, leading to a principal-agent problem; some authors 
argued instead that the issuing firm is better informed about its true value whereas others 
suggested that some investors can be better informed about the issuing price than others.  
The second theory considers institutional reasons. For example, underpricing can be caused by 
price stabilization and for this reason the issuing price is lower in order to avoid future price 
drop, or for tax advantage purposes or, eventually, the firm wants to sell its shares at a lower 
price in order to avoid lawsuits from investors disappointed with the post-IPO performance.    
The third category of theories is control considerations and it mainly refers to the possibility of 
underpricing in helping to shape the shareholders base, reducing the intervention by outside 
investors when the company is listed because of the higher stock price. 
Lastly, behavioural approaches assume the presence of ‘irrational’ investors who buy firms 
stocks, even if their prices are above the fundamental value.  
 
In dollar terms, IPO firms appear to leave lots of billions ‘on the table’ every year (i.e. to 
investors and not to firms) due to the underpricing phenomenon, as shown in the next table12.  
According to Ritter (2017), the average first-day return of US IPOs during 2003-2010 was 
10.66%.  
He collected data from a sample of IPOs with an offer price of at least $5.00 which stocks were 
listed the principal stock exchanges in the U.S. (Amex, NYSE, and NASDAQ). 
 
                                                
11 LJUNGQVIST A., 2007, Chapter 7 of Handbook of Corporate Finance Vol. 1, ‘IPO Underpricing’  
12 https://site.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/files/2017/08/IPOs2016Statistics.pdf 
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Year Number of IPOs 
Average first 
day return 
Aggregate 
proceeds 
(billion) 
Aggregate 
amount left 
‘on the table’ 
(billion) 
2003 63 11.7% $9.54 $9.96 
2004 173 12.3% $31.19 $3.86 
2005 159 10.3% $28.23 $2.64 
2006 157 12.1% $30.48 $3.95 
2007 159 14.0% $35.66 $4.95 
2008 21 5.7% $22.76 $5.63 
2009 41 9.8% $13.17 $1.46 
2010 91 9.4% $29.82 $1.84 
2001-2016 1,735 14.0% $430.00 $54.84 
 
Other than formal requirements imposed by the stock exchange authority, firms should provide 
also substantial prerequisites. To be admitted to the stock exchange and to attract investors, a 
firm need to have a value proposition which creates value not only for shareholders but also for 
all stakeholders, a good market and competitive positioning, and growth opportunity for the 
future. Furthermore, in order to present a financially sustainable business plan, a firm needs to 
show increasing profitability (return on invested capital, ROIC) and an adequate financial 
structure that allows to increase leverage in the future without any negative impact on the firm.  
From the legal point of view, sometimes companies have to reorganize itself or the group 
structure and they need to adopt the appropriate accounting standards for annual reports, where 
not yet applied.  
 
The valuation of a company during the IPO process consists of many phases.  
Typically, the first valuation method applied is multiple analysis, which allows the firm and the 
nominated investment bank to know how the market values it with respect to comparable firms. 
The result of this preliminary valuation is usually a range of prices.  
A point estimation is then calculated by applying the discounted cash flows method (DCF), 
where the enterprise value is based on discounted cash flows that the firm will produce in the 
future. 
In any case, at the end, who really prices the firm is the market: if the demand for its stocks is 
high, probably the price (and so the entire valuation) will be higher. That’s why the marketing 
phase and the road-show are so crucial.  
 
As already analysed, the most common way to go public for a company is through an IPO, 
selling its new and/or existing shares in regulated markets. In addition to IPO, other methods 
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are available, one of which is through a reverse merger that can be accomplished by using a 
SPAC.  
Before presenting main advantages and disadvantages of using special purpose acquisition 
companies rather than a traditional IPO process, some statistics representing the actual IPO and 
SPAC market in Italy and in U.S. are presented in the next paragraphs. 
 
The following table describes the number of SPAC deals and IPO in the Italian stock market at 
October 2017. The source of data in the table is ‘Borsa Italiana’, which is the only stock 
exchange in Italy, based in Milan and part of the London Stock Exchange Group since 2007.    
 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
SPACs 2 0 3 0 3 2 713 
IPO 4 4 15 26 23 12 16 
Total 6 4 18 26 26 14 23 
% 33% 0% 17% 0% 12% 14% 30% 
 
In the United States of America there are more than one stock exchanges and the most famous 
and internationally recognized are New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and National 
Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation (NASDAQ).  
The following table14 presents the number of SPAC deals and IPO in the US stock markets at 
October 2017. 
 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
SPACs 16 9 10 12 20 13 25 
IPO 81 93 168 232 132 85 95 
Total 97 102 178 244 152 98 120 
% 16% 0.1% 0.6% 0.5% 13% 13% 21% 
 
Next table exhibits the amount in million euros or dollars raised by SPAC deals at October 
2017.  
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Italy (€) 200 0 215 0 439 150.5 83315 
U.S. ($) 1,100 491 1,447 1,750 3,902 3,499 7,789 
 
                                                
13 Not including ‘Space 3’, creating by available proceeds not used for the business combination between ‘Space 2’ and ‘Avio’. 
14 Source: ‘spacanalytics.com’, ‘EDGAR’ database by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and ‘Quarterly Review’ 
of U.S. IPO market by Renaissance Capital. 
15 Not including €152.85 million of ‘Space 3’. 
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From previous tables, it’s easy to understand that the Italian SPAC market is tiny with respect 
to the American one but, in proportion to the relative financial market, they are comparable.  
 
Datar, Emm and Ince (2012) analysed the main feature of traditional and SPAC IPOs in U.S. 
between 2003 and 2008. The following table summarizes their findings:   
 
 
Average proceeds raised by traditional IPO firms and SPACs were quite the same, but 
traditional firms experienced a higher variation (1.40 – 17,864.00 million dollars compared to 
SPAC’s range of 51.60 – 1,035.00 million dollars). The same applied to unit prices: SPACs 
offered their shares and warrants at a price ranging from $5 to $9.75 whereas traditional firms 
offered their shares from a minimum price of $3.25 to a maximum of $85.00.  
These results suggested that traditional IPO firms are more heterogeneous but, on average, they 
are able to raise more money in the market at a higher price.  
 
Jog and Sousa (2009) individuated six characteristics which characterize SPACs over 
traditional IPO:     
(1) A small group of senior management raise capital in advance and then search for a target 
(2) Indirect way for small investors to get into a hedge fund type investment 
(3) Since a SPAC do not have any history, articulated or specific business plan a part of the 
declaration that proceeds raised will be used for an acquisition in 18/24 months, the 
listing process is easier and quicker (and also prospectus is easier) 
(4) More transparent listing prospectus  
(5) Explicit statements about their conflict of interests 
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(6) Approval by shareholders and at least 70/80% of them need to approve otherwise the 
company is liquidated. 
The last is probably the more distinguishing characteristic of a SPAC with respect to an IPO.  
 
Notwithstanding SPACs and IPOs fulfil the same object, there are some advantages for a firm 
using a SPAC rather than the traditional process to get listed. 
The first advantage is the time spent by the management team of a firm to complete the listing 
process. Being already listed and having already completed the road-show phase, a SPAC 
allows targets companies to concentrate more on day-by-day operations rather than marketing 
or long and time-consuming due diligence (Kolb and Tykvová, 2016). 
Even if before the shareholder meeting the SPAC need to release most important information 
about the deal and, in general, about target company (such as certified financial statements of 
last years), there are less legal requirements imposed by the stock exchange commission to be 
provided, making this process less costly in terms of time and money.  
In addition, the IPO process that a SPAC needs to follow is easier because assets comprise only 
cash and there is no history to analyse. Underwriting fees are usually lower than traditional 
IPOs because of the faster company valuation and price setting.  
 
One debated advantage of going public through a SPAC is the length of the process from the 
target company perspective.  
In the first decade of the 2000s, literature suggested that using a SPAC to get listed took less 
time than traditional IPO process but in recent years, Kolb and Tykvová argued that the 
presence of the shareholders’ vote in order to approve the business combination could lengthen 
the whole process.  
 
An important benefit of using a SPAC is the minor exposure to market conditions. A SPAC is 
already listed on a regulated market and it already raised proceeds so cash is immediately 
available after the business combination, irrespective of the current market environment. 
In periods of high market volatility, companies do not want to start a long and costly IPO 
process and then abort it because investors changed their mind or because prices fell.  
In analysing the likelihood of success of a SPAC, Kolb and Tykvová (2016) found that 
increasing market volatility by 1%, the probability of going public with a SPAC increased by 
0.77%16.  
                                                
16 They use a sample of 127 SPACs and 1128 IPO firms between 2003 and 2015. 
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Thus, as Boyer and Baigent (2008) suggested, special purpose acquisition companies can be 
the solution for going public in periods when the IPO market may not be especially robust. 
 
Another difference between the initial public offering of a SPAC and of a normal firm is the 
underpricing. This phenomenon implies that stocks of a company are offered at a lower price 
to investors but, on the first day of trading in the secondary financial market, the price will 
typically rise. This has the negative consequence for the issuing firm’ owners of receiving less 
money from investors than what the market is willing to pay.  
As before analysed, causes of underpricing can be for example asymmetric information 
between the issuing company, underwriting banks and investors, inability of underwriters to 
predict the demand for stocks, condition of the market and excitement of the market (‘irrational’ 
investors want to buy the shares even if the price is above the fundamental value).  
 
Special purpose acquisition companies suffer the underpricing phenomenon as well, but with 
different magnitude. Jog and Sun (2007), Boyer and Baigent (2008), Murray (2011) and other 
authors found that SPACs have very low average underpricing with respect to traditional IPOs.  
Theoretically, the effect on these particular vehicles should be higher than normal firms because 
the uncertainty about the future of the company is at the maximum level. Moreover, even if in 
a SPAC’s listing prospectus are presented lots of information not provided during a traditional 
IPO process (such as conflict of interests), there are very few information which characterizes 
each single SPAC.  
Despite this, the protection of investors’ money plays an important role in SPACs. The 
mechanism of depositing almost all proceeds raised from investors in a trust protects them, 
limiting losses in case of undesired deals. Thus, even if there is asymmetric information 
between the firm, underwriter and investors, and the future of the company is unknown, 
investors can always receive their money back by only voting contrarily to the proposed 
business combination. Moreover, the valuation of a SPACs is quite simple since there are no 
critical assets in the company other than cash.  
One possible explanation of underpricing phenomenon in special purpose acquisition 
companies is the market valuation of the quality of management team proposed by Kim (2009) 
(see paragraph 1.3). 
 
Murray (2011) quantified the underpricing of U.S. SPAC IPOs during the period 2003-2010, 
gathering data on first day returns of companies listed on the principal regulated markets in 
U.S. (AMEX, NYSE, and NASDAQ) and on non-regulated market (OTC).  
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OTC Average first day return 
Minimum 
return 
Maximum 
return Std. dev. # of IPOs 
2003 2.33% 2.33% 2.33% - 1 
2004 1.23% -0.83% 8.33% 2.59% 11 
2005 1.54% -6.25% 12.50% 4.12% 20 
2006 4.48% -2.67% 23.33% 6.93% 15 
2007 1.59% -1.25% 7.50% 2.42% 16 
2008 2.24% 1.83% 3.13% 0.57% 5 
2009 -0.40% -0.40% -0.40% - 1 
2010 0.04% 0.00% 0.10% 0.05% 5 
AMEX      
2005 -0.41% -1.67% 0.00% 0.69% 6 
2006 1.62% -4.75% 13.33% 4.33% 18 
2007 0.36% -1.63% 3.60% 1.16% 50 
2008 -0.90% -3.10% 1.20% 1.48% 10 
2009-2010 - - - - 0 
NYSE      
2008 0.80% 0.80% 0.80% - 1 
2009-2010 - - - - 0 
NASDAQ      
2008 1.50% 1.50% 1.50% - 1 
2009 - - - - 0 
2010 -0.10% -0.20% 0.00% 0.14% 2 
 
As shown in the table, the average underpricing of SPACs IPOs is very low in all American 
stock exchanges compared to traditional IPOs. During the period 2003-2010, American SPACs 
suffered an average underpricing of about 1-2% whereas traditional IPOs more than 10%. 
 
Since now, lots of advantages were presented for a privately-held company in going public with 
a special purpose acquisition company rather than the traditional IPO process and one might 
ask himself why all firms do not choose these vehicles to get listed. 
The reason is that there are important disadvantages which prevent big and robust companies 
using special purpose acquisition companies.  
First, a firm which seeks to be listed with a SPAC needs obviously to find such company. Even 
if the existence of a special purpose acquisition company can be well-known in the market, a 
firm aiming to be listed through it may be in competition with other firms with the same scope.  
Managers of the SPAC will obviously choose the best firm to present to its shareholders in 
order to increase the possibility of deal’s approval, making firms competing with each other. If 
 48 
a firm is not attractive for the market, typically neither SPAC managers nor the stock exchange 
commission will help it to get listed.  
 
Another characteristic which might prevent a firm to get listed with a SPAC is the mandatory 
shareholder vote to approve the business combination. It’s true that SPACs reduce the market 
uncertainty of the IPO process since the company is already listed but some uncertainty remains 
in any case because the listing on the stock exchange is subordinated to the approval of SPAC 
shareholders. In addition, existing shareholders of the target firm might fear a dilution in their 
shares because of the presence of ‘in the money’ warrants which can be used by SPAC investors 
(Lakicevic, Shachmurove and Vulanovic, 2014).  
 
Trading volume is another possible risk for investors. Typically, the majority of SPAC are listed 
in less regulated market with tiny trading volume which can prevent large firms in using these 
special vehicles. However, there are examples of target firms that, once they got listed through 
SPAC, they ask for entering in main stock markets.  
 
The literature on SPACs pointed out that usually only privately-held firms with poor 
performance use these special vehicles to enter in stock exchanges. There is no doubt that firms 
which completed successfully the listing process and enter in the stock exchange have a positive 
reputation and are better considered not only by investors but also by customers, suppliers, and 
banks (which might grant credit lines at a lower price).  
In this situation, market can negatively consider private firms that choose a secondary 
alternative in going public, thinking that these firms probably won’t satisfy the stringent 
requisites of stock exchange commissions.  
For example, Kolb and Tykvová (2016), analysing the likelihood of a SPAC acquisition through 
a regression, found that the variable ‘market-to-book asset ratio’ had a negative sign meaning 
that the more growth opportunity a firm had, the less was probability that it would have merged 
with a SPAC. Thus, SPAC targets tend to be of lower quality and with weak growth 
opportunities (see chapter 4). 
 
However, one important point raised by Datar, Emm and Ince (2012) is that in various analyses 
of SPACs and traditional IPOs there might be a selection bias. Firms which got listed on stock 
exchanges are, by definition, those with the best performance and future perspective in order to 
attract as more investors as possible and be evaluated at a higher price. 
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Typically, these firms were in the past and are currently over-performing peer companies 
because, if their operating performances declined significantly or something else of negative 
happened, probably IPO candidates would have postponed or cancelled the public offering.  
In addition, even if firms which entered in the IPO process have not solid fundamentals, they 
have strong incentive to show and inflate their results until the offering is completed to better 
present themselves to the market. 
Thus, companies listed on stock exchange are (at least on the paper) the best performing in their 
industry and above the average in terms of sales, growth opportunities, cash flows and are less 
leveraged.  
In this context, private firm can choose SPACs to get listed either because they are unable to 
outperform their industry peers or they are unwilling to present to the markets and to regulators 
inflated or biased accounting figures. 
The result of the selection bias is that only bigger companies, which have better future growth 
opportunity and with a relatively low amount of debt, use the traditional IPO process to get 
listed while less performing, with less future perspective and more leveraged small and medium 
firms (SMEs) use other ways to go public.  
 
Concluding, although most of the literature depicts a negative picture of SPACs, Berger (2008) 
suggested that these vehicles might help private firms to access to the public markets in situation 
in which the traditional IPO cannot. In particular, this is possible because the negotiations are 
held by two parties17 rather than including the whole market. 
The author individuated six possible characteristics that a merger between a firm and a SPAC 
usually exhibit:  
(1) Complicated situations that are not suitable for a traditional IPO 
(2) Available cash that can improve the firm’s capital structure 
(3) Experienced managers that can provide peculiar insights 
(4) Collaborative transaction structures that align the target’s interests with the public 
shareholders 
(5) Solutions for target companies for which the valuation is complicated (no research 
coverage in their industry and they have few or no comparable companies to benchmark 
the target’s firm valuation) 
(6) Exit opportunities where there are no strategic buyers for the target company.  
In order to better explain some of these elements that a SPAC typically have, Berger (2008) 
presented the example of ‘Aldabra Acquisition Corp.’, founded by Nathan Leight and Jason 
                                                
17 Or, at least, a small fraction of the market, i.e. shareholders of the SPAC.  
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Weiss which raised $55 million in its IPO in February 2005. In January 2007 it merged with its 
target firm ‘Great Lakes Dredge & Dock’, the largest provider of dredging services in U.S.  
There are three main reasons why this firms would not have had the possibility of going public 
through a traditional IPO. Firstly, the private firm had not a past positive story because in 
2003/2004 it experienced the decline of public funds in dredging activities and, since most of 
its dredging contracts were signed with public entities, the firm was forced to defer its projects. 
This obviously reduced its revenues and the firm suffered financial difficulties. Secondly, since 
the firm was the leader in dredging services, having a 40% market share in the U.S., there was 
no strategic buyer in the industry willing to merge with the firm. Lastly, research was not 
available for the dredging industry, making less attractive a traditional IPO path due to lake of 
experienced analysts and comparable companies on which to base the firm valuation.  
The business combination of ‘Great Lakes Dredge & Dock’ with the special purpose acquisition 
company ‘Aldabra Acquisition Corp.’ gave the necessary cash to the firm, making possible to 
regain the financial flexibility to increase capital expenditures, make acquisitions and pay 
dividends.  
 
 4 Analysing the performance of SPACs 
 
Before entering in the empirical analysis of Italian special purpose acquisition companies, in 
this chapter of this thesis are presented the most important studies of SPACs’ performance 
available in the literature.  
 
A complete analysis on special purpose acquisition companies is probably the one performed 
by Ignatyeva, Rauch, and Wahremburg (2013).  They collected data on 19 special purpose 
acquisition companies listed in European public markets which completed the business 
combination with their targets firms within the period 2005-2011.  
In particular they analysed the main features of European SPACs themselves, the ownership 
structure and operating and stock performance of their target firms in the medium-term period 
(which most of the literature didn’t).  
They found that European SPACs quoted mainly on the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) 
of the London Stock Exchange (13 company over 19), probably because it is a less regulated 
market and therefore it has less listing requirements which allow for a less expensive and less 
complicated market listing process.   
For what concern the ownership structure of European SPACs, they found that before the 
acquisition, founders on average owned 22.2% of the company, institutional investors 39.1% 
and other off-record shareholders (free float) owned 38.7%.  
Things changed after the success of the business combination: founders reduced their ownership 
to 17.2%, institutional investors increased their ownership to 55.3%, free float counted for 
25.5% and the management of the target firms received 2.2% of the SPAC.  
Their analysis suggests that founders decreased their ownership after the acquisition, probably 
to partially convert into cash their shares, while institutional investors increased their 
ownership. However, authors highlighted that, during their observation period, the group of 
institutional investors who invested in a SPAC almost completely exited the company, selling 
their shares to other institutional investors. This suggests that different investor groups may be 
interested in becoming shareholders and investing in different lifecycle phases of SPACs.  
 
To analyse the success of managers in choosing SPACs’ target firms, Ignatyeva, Rauch, and 
Wahremburg (2013) collected data on the most important financial indicators before and after 
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the business combination for the purpose of studying the operating performance of SPAC’s 
targets in the long run.  
In particular they used financial data of the year in which the acquisition was completed and 
the change of the same indicators in periods surrounding the acquisition (two years after the 
acquisition and from two years before to two years after the acquisition). 
Moreover, to obtain an accurate analysis, they compared each target firm performance with that 
of its industry-specific benchmark (ICB), data implemented in Thomson Datastream.  
Their results are presented in the following exhibit (data in € thousand). 
 
 
The difference between the means and the medians suggest a considerable heterogeneity in the 
data set. In fact, in their analysis there were some outliers which increased, for example, the 
average of revenues and especially earnings per share.  
Compared to their industry peers, at the time of the acquisition SPACs’ target firms were larger 
in terms of revenues (+€208.6 million) and slightly more profitable in terms of return on assets 
(+3.3%). These numbers suggest that SPACs’ managers chose financially sound medium-size 
firms, on average larger than the industry peers. This also means that managers chose firms that 
could, in theory, go public without the acquisition by the special purpose acquisition company 
or could have access to other sources of financing.  
 
However, the most important result is the evolution of financial indicators after the business 
combination, because it highlighted if target firms were able to improve their profitability and 
financial structure, increase revenues, especially compared to their industry peers.  
To do so, the authors analysed financial performance in two different periods: from the 
acquisition to two years after it and from two years before to two years after the acquisition.  
For the two years after the acquisition, on average they found a strong negative development of 
profitability in terms of net income (-€36 million), return on assets (-12%) and profit margin 
(five times less). Despite this, SPACs’ target firms increased in size: on average, revenues grew 
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by €810 million, total assets by €5,168 million and also long-term debt increased by €2,528 
million. 
In those years, Europe was hit by the sovereign debt crisis which could have had a negative 
impact on the financial strength of all companies; in this case, SPACs’ target firms should have 
the same underperformance of their industry peers.  
However, they performed worse than their industry peers; in particular, after two years from 
the business combination, SPACs’ target firms on average decreased their return on assets 
(almost four times less) compared to their industry peers.  
This means that, even after accounting for the macroeconomic environment, SPACs’ target 
firms decreased their profitability both in absolute term and compared to similar firms. The 
same reasoning hold for the five years surrounding the acquisition (from two years before to 
two years after the business combination). 
The strong increase in revenues, total assets, and long-term debt suggest that probably target 
firms focused more on increasing their size rather than improving profitability.  
This medium-term analysis of financial performance is interesting primarily for medium firms 
seeking to go public. With special purpose acquisition companies, they can be listed in regular 
markets reducing the expenses and the risk connected to the initial public offering process, 
obtaining new capital to be invested in the companies’ growth.  
 
On the other hand, analysing stock performance is useful for investors who aim at a financial 
return in the long-run.  
In literature, many authors addressed this topic using different analyses of the stock 
performance of SPACs and their target firms, but they eventually arrived quite at the same 
results.  
 
Recalling from paragraph 1.2, different behaviour can be seen in the four phases of a special 
purpose acquisition company, which are: 
(i) No Target 
(ii) Target Found 
(iii) Acquisition Completed 
(iv) Acquisition Withdrawn. 
 
In the first phase, the company is still without any assets but cash, and there is no operating 
business.  
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The volatility of the stock in this phase is low and usually there is low trading volume. Prices 
and returns should reflect those of Treasury or Government bonds because proceeds raised in 
the IPO are deposited in trusts and are usually invested in risk-less instruments.  
 
Lewellen (2009) calculated the premium and discount at which a SPAC’s stock price18 trade 
with respect to the pro-rata value of the trust in the four phases. He used a sample of 97 SPACs 
that completed a merger transaction from 2003 and 2008.  
According to the author, in their life SPACs’ stocks quoted on an average daily basis discount 
of 0.20% on the trust value.  
When SPACs are in the ‘No Target’ stage, they traded at a discount on average of about 3.9%. 
This might seem counterintuitive since the stock price of a SPAC should never trade below the 
value of the trust. As already explained, the fundamental value of a special purpose acquisition 
company can be seen as a zero-coupon bond (which pay the trust value at the maturity or, in 
this case, the liquidation of the company) with embedded an option on a future acquisition. 
According to this, two different situations can happen, both inconsistent with the theory of 
efficient markets. (1) The option value is negative in SPAC during the first phase or (2) the 
option value is priced correctly but the shares trade below the discounted value of the trust.  
The author tried to verify empirically if transaction costs, noise trader risk or liquidity could be 
possible reasons for this mispricing but he didn’t find a positive result.  
 
On the contrary, in the ‘Target Found’ phase, on average SPACs traded at a premium of 8.6% 
with respect to the pro-rata value of the trust. 
In the announcement date, SPACs analysed traded on average at a premium on the trust value 
of 0.48%. However, this value was very different depending on whether the SPAC later 
completed or not the acquisition: those which successfully complete the business combination 
reacted trading at an average premium of 2.25%, while those which rejected the deal traded at 
an average discount of 0.41%.  
Approaching the day in which shareholders were asked to vote on the acquisition, the average 
premium on the trust value was more than 9%, suggesting that, on average, the market believed 
in the positive vote and therefore in the success of the deal. Again, this number greatly differed: 
SPAC which later completed the acquisition traded at an average premium of about 14%, 
whereas others showed a very tiny market reaction. 
Last results explain that shareholders vote positively only on deals which they expect will 
increase the value of the company. Moreover, results are also consistent with the literature’s 
                                                
18 He considered the stock price only before a SPAC completed the business combination. 
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theory stating that a SPAC market price should never trade below its trust value. By voting 
against the acquisition, shareholders perfectly know that they will receive their money back, so 
shares should not trade at a high discount with respect to the pro-rata value of the trust.  
 
All detailed findings are reported in the following table19: 
 
 
 
Other than stock performance during the life-cycle of a SPAC, it’s important to analyse what is 
the long-run stock performance of target companies after the business combination. 
Most authors in the available literature on special purpose acquisition companies focused their 
attention on the performance of target firms for maximum two years20. Significant is the 
contribution of Kolb and Tykvová (2016), who expanded the analysis including five years of 
target firms’ stock performance after U.S. SPACs’ acquisitions.  
                                                
19 From ‘SPACs as an Asset Class’, Lewellen (2009). The sample period is August 2003 to June 2008. Prices and returns are 
taken from CRSP and Bloomberg. Trust values are taken from investment bank reports and SEC filings. Averages in Panel B 
are calculated using the closing price on each respective date.  
20 In particular: Lewellen (2009), Jenkinson and Sousa (2011), Datar et al. (2012), Ignatyeva et al. (2013), Lakicevic and 
Vulanovic (2013), Rodrigues and Stegemoller (2014). 
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They individuated two possible outcomes of long-term stock performance: (1) if the target of a 
SPAC is a low-quality firm, it probably underperforms even after the acquisition or (2) if the 
target has ‘hidden potential’ that the acumen of SPAC sponsors individuated, notwithstanding 
actual poor performance, it should show superior performance in the future with respect to peer 
firms.  
Kolb and Tykvová referred to the latter as a ‘frog’ that will turn into a ‘price’ in the future.  
To verify which case applied most in the reference period (2003-2015), they calculated buy-
and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) of stocks of U.S. SPACs’ target firms (127 SPACs) as the 
difference between SPACs’ returns and returns of a benchmark portfolio in the same period. 
‘Market adjusted’ values were obtained from the difference between SPACs’ returns and the 
return of the Russell 2000 index, the U.S. index representing the small-capitalization stock 
market. They also calculated BHARs of all U.S. IPOs during the same period and, to have more 
comparable results, they selected, among all U.S. IPOs, those that are most similar to analysed 
SPACs in term of size, age and industry (‘Matched sample’).  
Their results, summarized in the following table21, are in line with the literature. 
 
 
 
Authors found that, even if both U.S. IPOs and SPACs underperformed with respect to the 
market and their peer firms, special purpose acquisition companies showed the worst 
performance in all calculated periods. More interesting is also the fact that performance of U.S. 
special purpose acquisition companies decreased over time: taking as an example the 
                                                
21 From ‘Going public via special purpose acquisition companies: Frogs do not turn into princes’, Kolb J., Tykvová T., 2016. 
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comparison between SPACs and market abnormal returns, after 12 months on average SPACs’ 
prices underperformed by 46% while after five years SPACs’ prices underperformed on average 
by 102%. 
These results suggest that SPACs (at least in U.S. during this period) allowed firms to get listed 
in public markets in difficult time and that those firms were less performing than those which 
entered the market with a traditional IPO process.  
Thus, as other authors suggested, firms entering the public markets through a SPAC typically 
carry more debt, have fewer growth opportunities, are smaller and invest less than peer 
companies in the market. That’s why Kolb and Tykvová (2016) stated that in going public with 
a special purpose acquisition company, ‘frogs do not turn into princes’. 
 
As already mentioned, in the period lasting from the IPO to the announcement of the target 
company, there is no significant fluctuation in SPAC’s stock price which reflects (more or less) 
the trust value per share. 
On the contrary, in the day in which the SPAC announce its target, the stock price starts to 
move reflecting the investors’ opinion about the value of the deal.  
In the paper “Why SPAC investors should listen to the market”, Jenkinson and Sousa (2009) 
analysed 58 SPACs from 2003 to 2008 and they found out that market investors well forecasted 
the value of the deal and for this reason, all shareholders (including managers) should react 
accordingly.  
Provided that the stock price should never trade far below the trust value per share, there are 
two possible outcomes: (1) if the SPAC share trade at a price equal or slightly below the trust 
value, it means that market evaluate the proposed deal as value-destroying for shareholders and, 
if investors are rational, the SPAC should be liquidated or should search another target company 
or (2) if the shares quote above the trust value per share, market’s opinion is positive and the 
deal should go through. Thus, market prices of SPACs are informative and, the simple rule of 
voting according to the market reaction when the target company is announced, allows 
shareholders to avoid losses.  
Jenkinson and Sousa proved this theory by diving companies in two groups: ‘Good SPAC’ are 
those which experienced an increase in market prices on the announcement day, whereas market 
prices of ‘Bad SPAC’ stay flat. After 26 weeks, Good SPACs produce an average return of          
-6% and Bad SPACs produce an average return of -34%.  
Furthermore, authors deal with a possible reason why Bad SPACs were not liquidated, causing 
losses among investors: there is indeed a strong incentive for sponsors of SPACs to buy shares 
of investors who are unwilling to vote positively for the deal. By doing so, sponsors can alter 
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the decision in the shareholder meeting, making the merger happen and, eventually, they can 
receive compensation for their work.  
 
Another contribution in the literature for what concerns the analysis of the stock performance 
of special purpose acquisition companies is provided by Ignatyeva, Rauch, and Wahremburg 
(2013). The main difference between the analysis of these authors and those of others is that, 
analysing 19 European SPACs in the period 2005-2011, they reported raw SPAC returns (table 
below), while other compared the results with the market return or with trust value.  
 
 
Pre-
announcement 
period 
Pre-
voting 
period 
+ 6 
months 
+ 12 
months 
Average   0.60% 3.00% -11.00% -14.40% 
 
They suggested that the post-acquisition period of European SPACs was characterized by 
negative returns (-14.40% after one year), even if they performed better compared to U.S. 
SPACs: Jog and Sun (2007) found an annualized return of -17.34% and Jenkinson and Sousa 
(2011) found a -55% after one year.  
 
 
 
 5 Italian Special Purpose Acquisition Companies 
 
Born in 2011, Italian SPACs are becoming more popular especially after the new regulation on 
Italian government in December 2016 that introduced incentives for investments in Italian small 
and medium enterprises (SMEs). 
At October 2017, 18 special purpose acquisition companies were listed in Italian stock markets. 
Stock markets in which they were listed are the ‘Alternative Investment Market Italia’ (AIM 
Italia) and, in the case of Space, Space 2 and Space 3, the ‘Market of Investment Vehicles’ 
(MIV), create on purpose for investment companies, funds, and SPACs. 
In this chapter, they are firstly presented an overview of the Italian stock market, the new 
regulation introduced by the Italian government in December 2016 as well as some descriptive 
statistics about all listed Italian special purpose acquisition companies until October 2017. 
Secondly, the first five Italian SPACs which completed a business combination are described 
and analysed more in detail, following the models proposed in the literature. Results are 
summarized in paragraph 5.3. 
 
5.1. Italian market: AIM Italia and PIR regulation 
According to the Italian stock exchange (Borsa Italiana), companies should be listed in order to 
finance their growth, increasing their competitive advantage, diversify their source of financing, 
increasing power against suppliers and clients, facilitate the transfer of the business to the 
younger generation and make the equity liquid.  
As previously introduced, Borsa Italiana is divided into segments dedicated to different types 
of companies since different are requirements to be admitted in each of them.   
The main regulated Italian market is the ‘Mercato Telematico Azionario’ (MTA) which is 
dedicated to medium and large capitalization companies, in line with the best international 
standards of other countries stock markets. Exchanges in this market are opened to institutional, 
professional and retail investors.  Inside this market, there is the segment STAR, conceived for 
medium capitalization companies and emphasising on liquidity, information transparency, and 
corporate governance.  
Another regulated market of Borsa Italiana is the ‘Mercato degli Investment Vehicles’ (MIV), 
which is dedicated to various types of investment vehicles such as investment companies and 
real estate investment companies, private equity funds, real estate funds, and Special Investment 
Vehicles (SIV) like special purpose acquisition companies (SPAC) and specialized funds or 
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multi-strategy funds. In general, MIV is open to institutional and retail investors while only 
institutional investors can buy shares of special investment vehicles.  
These regulated markets are subject to the supervision of the Italian stock exchange authority, 
CONSOB.  
 
The other segment of the Italian stock exchange, ‘Alternative Investment Market Italia’ (AIM 
Italia), is subject only to the Borsa Italiana regulations and for this reason is classified as a non-
regulated market. Requirements to be admitted in this market are gauged on the needs of small 
companies.  
The following table summarized the main requirements that companies need to comply in order 
to be admitted in the relative segment of the Italian stock exchange.   
 
 MTA MTA STAR MIV AIM 
Floating 25% 35% 25% (35% for SIV) 10% 
Market cap22 €40 mil €40 mil – max €1 bn €40 mil / 
Certified F/S 3 3 3 (if any) 1 (if any) 
Accounting 
standards  IAS IAS IAS 
IAS or Italian 
GAAP 
Investors Institutional and retail 
Institutional and 
retail 
Institutional and 
retail (SIV only 
institutional) 
Institutional, 
retail only after 
the IPO 
Prospectus Yes Yes Yes Only listing prospectus 
Advisor Sponsor (Global Coordinator) 
Sponsor (Global 
Coordinator) 
Sponsor (Global 
Coordinator) Nomad 
 
From the previous table, it’s easy to understand that the AIM Italia segment is less regulated 
and require less stringent requirement in order to be admitted to the stock exchange.  
Another critical aspect to underline is the role of the Nominated Advisor (NOMAD), required 
only for companies to be listed on the AIM segment.   
A Nominated Advisor is a key figure and for this reason must be approved by Borsa Italiana. It 
can be a bank, a financial intermediary or a corporate finance advisor.  The main role of the 
Nominated Advisor is to assess the appropriateness of the company seeking to be admitted to 
the market, supporting it in maintaining an adequate profile of transparency, and helping the 
company to comply with the rules deriving from being listed on AIM Italia. 
Moreover, according to the regulation of the AIM Italia market, main duties of a Nominated 
Advisor are to evaluate whether a company is eligible for the admission to the market by 
performing a due diligence; to handle the listing process, coordinating all parties involved, 
                                                
22 Minimum market capitalization required to be admitted.  
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supporting the company in the preparation of the listing prospectus; to assists the company 
throughout all the period in which it is listed on the AIM Italia.  
From tables at pages 62 and 63 summarising all Italian special purpose companies listed until 
October 2017, it can be noted that SPACs mainly chose the AIM Italian instead of the MIV 
(created on purpose for them) probably because of the less stringent regulations to comply with, 
making their Initial Public Offering easier and less expensive than IPO in other regulated 
markets.   
 
In 2017, there has been an increase in special purpose acquisition companies’ IPOs in Italy.  
One possible reason of this could be the new investment law, regulating the ‘Piani Individuali 
di Risparmio’, better known as PIR. On 11 December 2016, the Italian government introduced 
it with the ‘Legge di bilancio n. 232’, art. 1, commas 100-114.  
These ‘piani individuali di risparmio’ are savings programs which, according to this new 
regulation, are not subject to taxation if:  
- individuals invest in funds managed by banks or other intermediaries  
- funds must invest at least 70% of their money in financial instruments (even if not listed in 
regulated markets, e.g. AIM Italia) issued by Italian or European companies (different from 
real estate companies) 
- at least 30% of the 70% must be invested in companies not listed in FTSE MIB index or in 
other similar European indexes.  
Moreover, a fund cannot invest more than 10% of the total money in a single company.  
To benefit from the de-taxation, individuals must maintain the investment for at least five years 
and cannot invest more than €30,000 per year, for a maximum of €150,000.  
This regulation has been considered the main cause of the increase in IPOs on AIM Italia (and 
also the increase in the number of SPACs listed) along with the positive economic scenario in 
Italy, that is recovering from the adverse economic and financial crisis of the past years.   
 
5.2. Italian deals – CASE STUDIES 
Before analysing in details the first five Italian special purpose acquisition companies and their 
target firms, in the following two tables are presented the most important information of all 
Italian SPACs and their target firms, in order to offer a complete picture of the Italian SPAC 
market.   
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Analysing the main features of Italian special purpose acquisition companies, it’s easy to note 
that the average proceeds raised in Italy are two times less than the one raised in U.S., according 
to Datar, Emm and Ince (page 44). In fact, in Italy, the average is €108.1 million while in U.S. 
$210.82 million. However, in U.S. the maximum amount raised was $1.035 billion, suggesting 
that there are big American companies which can use this kind of vehicles to get listed. In Italy, 
on the contrary, there are only a few big companies (usually already listed) but there are lots of 
small and medium enterprises (SMEs).  According to a statistic made by ‘Confcommercio’ in 
2009, in Italy 99.9% of the firm were SMEs.  
Moreover, compared with the result of Datar, Emm and Ince (2012), Italian SPACs took more 
time on average to find a suitable target firm (461 days compared to 395.5), more time from the 
shareholders’ approval to the effectiveness of the business combination (78 days compared to 
2.5) but Italian SPACs were on average faster asking the vote of shareholders (56 days 
compared to 216.1).  
 
  EXHIBIT 1: ITALIAN SPACs STATISTICS         
 Mean Median Min Max 
     
Days from IPO to announcement  461 446 273 696 
Days from IPO to approval 517 489 343 732 
     
Days from announcement to approval 56 43 33 105 
Days from approval to business combination 78 75 34 130 
Days from IPO to business combination 595 585 419 833 
     
Amount raised (€ Million) 108.1 98 35 308 
Unit price (€) 10 10 10 10 
     
 
In the following table by Datar, Emm and Ince (2012), they refer to the announcement date as 
‘agreement’ date; the day when the business combination was effective as ‘consummation’; the 
day of the shareholders’ meeting as ‘approval’; and the day in which a SPAC announced a 
target firm that would have been refused by investors as ‘terminated agreement’.  
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Comparing Italian special purpose acquisition companies with those listed in all European 
public markets, differences widen.  
In fact, Ignatyeva, Rauch, and Wahrenburg (2013) suggested that European SPACs between 
2005 and 2011 raised on average €489.4 million (the median value was €275), which was larger 
than American gross proceeds, and therefore larger than the Italian one.  
 
 
Although at October 2017 there are 9 SPACs which completed the business combination 
successfully, only for the first five can be analysed operating and stock performances for a quite 
long period after the acquisition of a target firm. In fact, in order to have a reasonable 
comparison with European and U.S. analyses, only SPACs which completed their acquisition 
before 2016 can be considered.  
Data of Italian SPACs and their target firms were taken from the companies’ websites, listing 
prospectus, EIKON database by Thomson Reuters, AIDA database by Bureau van Dijk and, 
for the missing information in financial statements, data were taken from ‘Registro delle 
Imprese’. 
 
ITALY 1 INVESTMENT S.A.  
Italy 1 Investment was the first SPAC listed in an Italian regulated market. It was formed on 26 
August 2010 in Luxemburg (that’s why it was a ‘Société Anonyme’) by Vito Gamberale, Carlo 
Mammola, Gianni Revoltella, Roland Berger, Florian Lahmstein, Gero Wendenburg. The 
purpose of such company was ‘acquiring one company or operating business through a merger, 
share exchange, share purchase, asset acquisition, reorganization or similar transaction (a 
“Business Combination”). The Company intends to focus on the completion of a Business 
Combination with relevant business operations in Italy’23.  
It offered to the market 15,000,000 units at a price of €10.00, which comprised one market 
share and one warrant. 
Warrants gave investors the right to buy an additional market share for a price of €9.30: they 
were exercisable after the business combination (or from one year after the IPO if the business 
combination was completed before) and they expired five years from the listing date. 
                                                
23 From the listing prospectus of Italy 1 Investment S.A. 
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Founders of this SPAC received 3,750,000 special shares for a price of approximately €0.0093 
(€35,000 was the total proceeds raised by this private placement), representing 20% of the total 
outstanding shares. Moreover, founders bought 5,000,000 warrants at a price of €1.00.  
On 27 January 2011 market shares were admitted to trading in MIV at Borsa Italiana. 
 
 Number of shares % Proceeds % 
Founders 3,750,000 20% €5,035,000 3.2% 
Investors 15,000,000 80% €150,000,000 96.8% 
TOTAL 18,375,000 100% €155,035,000 100% 
 
From this table, it is easy to understand the dilution effect that market shareholders needed to 
suffer in favour of founders.  
 
At the time of the publishing of the listing prospectus, the average age of the member of the 
board was 59 years.  
The prospectus ensures that SPAC’s directors ‘have an extensive network of relationships from 
which to identify and generate acquisition opportunities. They believe the combined experience 
of the management team in advising, investing in and operating businesses across sectors, and 
their proven track record of delivering attractive investment returns and senior managerial and 
operational expertise within the sectors will contribute to the success of the Company’s 
strategy. The Directors have extensive management experience working with public and private 
corporations.’ 
The Chairman Vito Alfonso Gamberale has working experience of over 40 years including 
working with Italian public and private corporations (for example Autostrade S.p.A., now 
Atlantia), Italian State-controlled entities (Telecom Italia and Eni), private equity firms and 
companies held by prominent Italian families (21 Investimenti, private equity fund owned by 
the Benetton family).  
Prof. Dr. h.c. Roland Berger, the Co-Chairman and Executive Director of the board, is the 
founder and Chairman of ‘Roland Berger Strategy Consultants GmbH’, based in Munich 
(Germany). He was also a member of various supervisory and advisory boards of national and 
international companies, foundations and organizations, like for example Fiat (now FCA), 
Telecom Italia, RCS MediaGroup, but also Sony Corporation and Blackstone Group. 
Carlo Giovanni Mammola, CEO of the SPAC, is a Founding and Managing Partner of Argan 
Capital Advisors LLP, a pan-European private equity fund and CEO of ‘Fondo Italiano 
d’Investimento’. He was also a member of the Board of Directors of the European Private 
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Equity and Venture Capital Association (EVCA, now ‘Invest Europe’). He worked at PAI 
Partners, where he was Managing Director and Partner and Sopaf S.p.A. Currently, he is 
professor of Management at Bocconi University in Milan. 
Florian Lahnstein, co-CEO and Executive Director of the SPAC, is a Managing Director at 
Siguler Guff. He was founder and joint CEO of RiverRock European Capital Partners. He 
worked at UBS as Head German Investment Banking Division and at Merrill Lynch Investment 
Banking as Head of German TMT. Mr. Lahnstein holds a Master in finance and marketing at 
the University of Cologne.  
Gero Wendenburg, Executive Director of the SPAC, is Head of Corporate Finance at equine 
Bank AG (a German investment bank) and Partner at MountainPeak Capital AG. He was 
Managing Director at Oddo BHF-Bank AG and Bear Stearns International Ltd.  He also worked 
at RiverRock European Capital Partners as Managing Director.  
Currently, he holds a degree in Business Administration from the University of Passau. 
In addition, Mariano Ermanno Frey, Christoph N. Kossmann, and Guido Rossi are part of the 
board of directors of Italy 1 Investment as independent non-executive directors. 
 
It’s worth noting that Berger and Lahnstein were founders of the Berger Lahnstein Middelhoff 
& Partners LLP, investment company based in London: in July 2008, they create ‘German1’, 
a special purpose acquisition company focused on the German market and listed on Euronext 
in Amsterdam where it raised €250 million. In September 2009, the SPAC merged with ‘AEG 
Power Solution’.  
 
As in all U.S. and European SPACs, investors of Italy 1 Investment had to approve the 
acquisition of the proposed target firm with the majority of market shareholders24 and, in order 
for the business combination to be successful, less than 35% of market shareholders could 
exercise their redemption right. If such conditions were not satisfied, the company would have 
been liquidated or it would continue searching for a target company if enough time were 
available. Important is to underline that market shares held by founding shareholders and 
directors would vote in favour of the business combination.  
The liquidation of the SPAC would also trigger if after 24 months from the IPO managers were 
still not able to identify a suitable target or, having identified it, within additional 12 months, 
they were not able to complete the business combination.  
 
                                                
24 In the first meeting, in order to approve the acquisition, shareholders representing at least 50% of issued market shares had 
to be present and at least 2/3 had to vote positively; in a second meeting, no quorum was required. 
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The listing prospectus also contained the amount of underwriting commissions, legal and 
accounting fees and other expenses, which are summarized in the following table.  
 
 € % 
Underwriting commission €7,500,000 5.0% 
Legal and accounting fees and expenses €600,000 0.4% 
Stock exchange supervision €40,000 0.0% 
Miscellaneous expenses €750,000 0.5% 
TOTAL OFFERING EXPENSES €8,890,000  
GROSS OFFERING PROCEEDS €150,000,000  
 
Banca IMI and J. P. Morgan Securities, as underwriting banks, decided to defer €4,125,00 of 
their underwriting commission (which equals 2.75% of the gross offering proceeds) until 
completion of the business combination.  
Including these deferred expenses, €1.5 millions of planned working capital, plus €5 million 
raised from founding shareholders placement, the total amount of cash deposited in the trust 
were €148,735,000, equal to 99.2% of gross market offering proceeds (€9.92 per share).   
 
The focus of Italy 1 Investment was to enter into a business combination with an Italian family-
owned firm, a portfolio company of private equity funds or corporate spin-offs.  
Besides the SPAC set some characteristics that its target firm needed to have: 
- an established company with a proven track record;  
- a company with strong free cash flow characteristics;  
- a strong competitive industry position;  
- an equity value between approximately €300 million and €1,000 million;  
- an experienced management team;  
- and a diversified customer and supplier base.  
The investment strategy was mainly to acquire more than 50% of the outstanding equity 
interests or voting power of one target business. To do this the company could increase its 
leverage with both senior secured debt as well as subordinated debt.  
 
Target company: IVS Group S.A. 
After 13 months, on 2 March 2012, the SPAC announced to have found its target: ‘IVS Group 
S.p.A.’. Now, the firm is Italian leader in the vending machines industry, with a market share 
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of 12% (in this industry the market is highly fragmented). It is also present in Spain and France, 
being the third operator in Europe in its industry.   
Founded in 1972 by Cesare Cerea and Piero Gualdi with 
the name of ‘Bergamo Distributori’, the firm can be 
considered as the pioneer in the Italian vending industry. 
At the time of the acquisition, in 2012, it was already the 
Italian leader and generally recognized as best practice in 
the European vending machines market.  
The vending business unit is vertically integrated: the company prepare and test new vending 
machines but also revamp them at clients’ sites.  
In 2017 IVS manages a network of approximately 185,000 vending machines and office coffee 
service machines, located at corporate offices, institutions and public places, through which we 
sell a broad range of products, including hot and cold beverages, in-between meals, snacks, and 
confectionary.  
IVS also has a second business unit, called “Coin Services”, which is related to coin 
management with operations based only in Italy.  
The firm has significant economies of scale compared to its competitors in personnel expenses 
(27% of the turnover) and exercises power over suppliers. 
Innovation has always been an important factor in IVS: it continuously improves technologies 
used and software installed in vending machines, products, and logistics. 
Thanks also to the cash provided by the special purpose acquisition company, IVS in the last 
ten years completed more than 150 acquisitions rapidly increasing sales and decreasing costs. 
In fact, the major part of SPAC proceeds were used to make new acquisitions. Moreover, in 
2013 IVS issued a bond of €200 million listed in Luxembourg Stock Exchange and another of 
€240 million listed in MTA in Italy. 
Remarkable is the partnership with the famous coffee capsules maker ‘Nespresso’, which 
allows the exclusive distribution of its products in offices and automatic coffee distributors.      
At the beginning of 2017, IVS completed the acquisition of ‘Grup Ibervending’, one of the 
most important players in the vending machines industry in Spain (becoming the third biggest 
company), and ‘Demomatic’, a Swiss vending machines company.  
 
Next tables present a summarized restated income statement and balance sheet of IVS Group. 
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EXHIBIT 2 IVS GROUP: Restated Income Statement  
          
 € thousand 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Revenues 259,779 270,441 269,719 278,366 297,800 312,600 321,500 347,700 362,300 
Revenues growth  4.1% -0.3% 3.2% 7.0% 5.0% 2.8% 8.1% 4.2% 
Operating costs -134,872 -142,171 -130,614 -136,314 -149,000 -158,400 -163,300 -173,500 -181,100 
Personnel expenses -71,767 -79,359 -80,811 -81,726 -85,200 -87,900 -92,500 -95,900 -99,400 
EBITDA 53,140 48,911 58,294 60,326 63,600 66,300 65,700 78,300 81,800 
EBITDA margin 20.5% 18.1% 21.6% 21.7% 21.4% 21.2% 20.4% 22.5% 22.6% 
D&A -32,407 -36,483 -37,556 -35,531 -38,318 -38,611 -38,517 -39,468 -39,604 
EBIT 20,733 12,428 20,738 24,795 25,282 27,689 27,183 38,832 42,196 
EBIT margin 8.0% 4.6% 7.7% 8.9% 8.5% 8.9% 8.5% 11.2% 11.6% 
Net income -7,112 135 5,240 3,598 -14,018 7,089 2,883 -18,368 18,496 
 
In 2012, the Group suffered a loss mainly because of expenses and fees deriving from the 
merger with the special purpose acquisition company. 
In the two years after the business combination revenues have increased with a higher growth 
rate but profitability of the company has been almost unchanged (both EBITDA and EBIT). In 
the subsequent years, the profitability increased (EBITDA margin +2.1% in 2015) along with 
revenues. Probably, management of the company focused more on growth than profitability in 
the first years after the business combination. 
The net loss in 2015, instead, was attributed to an accrual of provision for risks and charges 
related to an Italian Antitrust Authority investigation (for €28,575 thousand) and to the early 
repayment of the senior secured notes (which expenses amount to €10,367 thousand).    
 
 
EXHIBIT 3 IVS GROUP: Restated Balance Sheet 
          
 € thousand 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Net working capital -6,081 -32,660 -19,034 -1,271 -27,040 -6,018 -21,300 -33,561 -23,313 
Operating fixed capital 147,317 158,860 147,460 149,439 197,137 196,137 199,737 199,237 207,637 
Other non-current operating 
assets and liabilities 1,874 6,367 6,329 18,098 15,600 15,400 29,300 16,900 -5,700 
Goodwill and other similar 
intangibles 259,337 284,620 285,622 295,928 314,800 318,100 339,500 347,400 356,500 
Non-operating assets -1,283 -1,661 -1,966 -3,596 -19,937 -17,137 -13,437 -2,437 -3,437 
Total funds invested 401,164 415,526 418,411 458,598 480,560 506,482 533,800 527,539 531,687 
          
Net financial position 343,153 356,905 353,847 389,452 175,760 196,082 232,000 245,639 233,087 
Debt equivalents 6,267 7,753 9,325 9,428 6,700 6,600 8,700 8,200 8,700 
Shareholders' equity 51,743 50,870 55,238 59,718 298,100 303,800 293,100 273,700 289,900 
Total source of financing 401,163 415,528 418,410 458,598 480,560 506,482 533,800 527,539 531,687 
          
ROIC 13.58% 3.64% 10.33% 11.78% 13.76% 14.54% 11.86% 19.60% 18.68% 
ROA adjusted 9.56% 5.32% 9.18% 8.73% 7.39% 6.94% 6.64% 6.01% 9.92% 
ROE -13.74% 0.27% 9.49% 6.02% -4.70% 2.33% 0.98% -6.71% 6.38% 
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As a result of the business combination, the Group received new cash for €114,359 thousand.  
This cash allowed IVS Group to improve its net financial position and to boost revenues by 
new acquisitions.  
 
Return on Invested Capital and Return on Assets (which measure the profitability of the 
company’s assets) were computed by excluding ‘goodwill and other similar intangible’ because 
the next step of the analysis is to compare the SPAC’s target firm with a peer company in the 
same industry. It’s worth to recall that, excluding goodwill and other similar intangibles from 
ROIC and ROA has the advantage of comparing companies, in the same industry, that have 
different business strategies (external growth generates goodwill while internal growth not).  
Moreover, by definition, ROIC does not consider non-operative assets too.  
 
Following the model of the analysis conducted by Ignatyeva, Rauch and Wahremburg (2013) 
in studying the operating performance of SPAC’s targets, in the following table are presented 
the most important indicators in the year in which the business combination was completed and 
the change of the same indicators in periods surrounding the acquisition.   
To compare results of IVS Group, a competitor was chosen: ‘Gruppo Argenta’. It is an Italian 
company, covering 9% of the market, which operates in Italy through 60,000 vending machines, 
19 branches, and 1,400 employees.  
 
EXHIBIT 4 IVS Group: Performance             
 € thousand At acquisition 
Change 
0/+1 
Change 
-1/+1   
Change 
-2/+1 
Change 
-2/+2 
       
Revenues 297,800 14,800 34,234  42,881 51,781 
Revenues growth  4.97% 12.30%  15.9% 19.2% 
EBITDA 63,600 2,700 5,974  8,006 7,406 
EBITDA margin 21.36% -0.15% -0.46%  -0.40% -1.18% 
EBIT 25,282 2,407 2,894  6,951 6,445 
EBIT margin 8.49% 0.37% -0.05%  1.17% 0.77% 
Net income -14,018 21,107 3,491  1,849 -2,357 
       
Total assets 656,700 60,600 137,317  205,767 237,167 
Net financial position 175,760 20,322 -193,370  -157,765 -121,847 
Shareholders’ equity 298,100 5,700 244,082  248,562 237,862 
       
ROIC 13.76% 0.78% 2.76%  4.21% 1.53% 
ROA adjusted 7.39% -0.46% -1.79%  -2.24% -2.54% 
ROE -4.70% 7.04% -3.69%  -7.15% -8.50% 
       
Diff. Revenues from competitor 100,058 15,754 38,418  25,089 39,370 
Diff. Revenues growth competitor  15.74% 14.38%  5.96% 12.26% 
Diff. EBITDA from competitor 22,057 2,599 5,273  4,444 5,869 
Diff. EBITDA marg. from competitor 0.35% -0.30% -1.25%  -0.29% -0.60% 
Diff. ROA adjusted from competitor -1.85% -1.00% -1.82%  -0.63% 0.58% 
Diff. ROE from competitor -10.89% 12.01% -12.88%  -21.07% -18.18% 
Diff. Earnings from competitor -16,716 23,197 -363  -4,363 -5,498 
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Focusing on the target company, it’s clear that the effect of the merger with the SPAC was an 
increase in revenues and in total assets while the EBITDA margin remained almost unchanged 
(-0.15% in the year following the acquisition).  
Return on invested capital (ROIC), excluding goodwill and other similar intangibles, also 
remained almost unchanged in the year after the business combination but, considering the 3 
years surrounding the acquisition, it increased by 2.76%.  
Comparing with the competitor, at the time of the acquisition, IVS Group was larger in terms 
of revenues (+€100 million), has a slightly larger EBITDA margin (+ 0.35%) but it was less 
profitable by -1.85% in term of return on assets (excluding goodwill and other similar 
intangibles).  
Looking at the performance of both companies in the years surrounding the acquisition 
(especially in the period from two years before to two years after the acquisition), the difference 
in revenues growth become more evident, with IVS Group growing more than 12% than its 
competitor, while the profitability slightly worsens (EBITDA margin -0.60%). 
 
These number suggests that getting listed through the SPAC helped IVS Group to expand its 
sales, not compromising the profitability since the management of the company was not 
changed. Although the target company had positive benefits for being entered in this operation, 
it’s important to underline that, in 2011, it probably would not have been able to enter in an IPO 
process by itself because it was highly leveraged.  
 
From an initial investor point of view, the return on the SPAC’s stock was negative for the first 
four years after the business combination.  
According to the former CEO of the group, the huge drop in the stock price occurred in 
December 2012 was due to the absence of counterparties for founders of the SPAC willing to 
sell their shares (since the MIV is typically an illiquid market).  
On 3 June 2013, the company transferred its share to the main market, MTA.  
Here below is presented a graph which shows the price and volumes of the IVS’s stock on the 
left, while on the right side there is the comparison between normalized movements of the stock 
and the FTSE Italia Small Cap index (which contains companies with a small capitalization not 
part of the FTSE MIB and FTSE Italia Medium Cap). 
To ensure comparability between the two prices, normalization of the company’s stock and the 
market index was made by considering both values as ‘100’ at the date of the company’s IPO. 
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It’s clear that from 2013 the IVS’s stock has followed the Italian market trend and, after the 
increase in net income of 2016 and forecasted net income of 2017 and 2018, the price increased, 
outperforming the market. 
 
EXHIBIT 5 IVS GROUP: Stock performance 
Pre-
announcement 
period 
Pre-voting 
period 
6 months 
following 
12 months 
following 
24 months 
following 
36 months 
following 
48 months 
following 
60 months 
following 
-1.00% -1.31% -1.10% -36.00% -8.55% -26.05% -20.20% 26.50% 
 
 
 
 
MADE IN ITALY 1 
Made in Italy was the second Italian special purpose acquisition company founded by Luca 
Fabio Giacometti, Matteo Carlotti, and Simone Strocchi.   
The SPAC was listed on 27 June 2011 in the AIM Italia. 
The company offered 5,000,000 units, composed by one share and one warrant, at a price of 
€10.00. Warrants gave investors the possibility to buy additional shares according to the 
following formula:  3456785	#9:;<=>	?6&@5	A	B;6&C5	D6&@53456785	E9:;<=>	D6&@5	A	D6&@5  , where Price was equal to €0.10 and 
Strike Price was €9.50. Warrants were exercisable from one month after the effectiveness of 
the business combination and they expired five years after the shareholder’s meeting approving 
the acquisition or 30 days after the average monthly price would have been over €13.30.  
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Founders of the SPAC were given 150,000 special shares at a price of €10.00: these particular 
shares were not transferable until the business combination was completed and they didn’t carry 
the right to vote on the acquisition.  
Special shares are converted into 7 ordinary shares under the following conditions:  
- 50,000 special shares (1/3 on the total) were converted into 350,000 ordinary shares 
after 45 days of the shareholder’s meeting which approved the acquisition. 
- 100,000 special shares (2/3 on the total) were converted into 700,000 ordinary shares if, 
within 24 months from the business combination, the stock price is equal or higher 
€12,00 for 15 days over 30 consecutive days.  
If both conditions would be satisfied, founders obtained a total of €1,050,000 ordinary shares, 
corresponding to around 17% of the SPAC shares. Shares resulting from the conversion of 
founders’ shares were subject to lock-up for 18 months from the effectiveness of the business 
combination.  
 
 Number of shares 
after the acquisition25 % Proceeds % 
Founders 1,050,000 17% €1,500,000 2.9% 
Investors 5,000,000 83% €50,000,000 97.1% 
TOTAL 6,050,000 100% €51,500,000 100% 
 
The board of directors was composed by founders and by the independent manager Marco 
Reboa. 
Luca Fabio Giacometti, Chairman of the board of directors, started his career working in the 
Investment Banking division of Citibank and then as vice-director in Banca Commerciale 
Italiana (now Intesa San Paolo). From 1996 to 2002 he was Managing Director of GE Capital 
(now part of Banca IFIS) and in 2003 he was co-founder and Managing Director of Nutequity, 
investment fund promoted by the Benetton family.  
From 2007 he was partner of Capital Dynamics, an incubator for start-up, and from 2012 he is 
independent member of the board of directors.  
After the experience in Made in Italy 1, he was founder of other two special purpose companies, 
Glenalta Food (which on 13 February 2017 merged with Orsero S.p.A.) and Glenalta (currently 
searching for a suitable target firm).  
Matteo Carlotti started his career as Investment Manager of Chase Capital Partners Italia (then 
Chase Gemina Italia). Then from 1997 to 2009 we worked in Argos Soditic Italia S.p.A., where 
                                                
25 Considering the best scenario in which all special shares are converted in 7 ordinary shares. 
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he covered the role of Partner, Chairman, and CEO of the company. From 2009 he is a private 
equity consultant, being non-executive director in some companies, part of private equity funds.  
After Made in Italy 1, he founded other two special purpose acquisition companies, Green Italy 
1 (which on 23 December 2015 merged with Zephyro S.p.A.) and Sprint Italy (listed on AIM 
Italia on 21 July 2017).  
Simone Strocchi was textile product manager at Decathlon Italia and Deputy Director Financial 
Engineering Department at Banca Commerciale Italiana (now Intesa San Paolo). From 2002 he 
is founder and Managing Partner of Electra, company which offers deal structurer and M&A 
advises. Moreover, from December 2013 he is chairman of AISPAC, Italian association of 
SPAC’s promoters.  
After 2015, he created IPO Challenger and IPO Challenger 1, pre-booking companies 
considered the evolution of the SPACs.  
Marco Reboa is professor at the ‘Carlo Cattaneo’ university and a professional accountant and 
auditor. In his career, he was member of the board of directors of some Italian listed companies 
such as Luxottica, Indesit, Parmalat, Interpump, Mediobanca, ENI, and Saipem. 
 
Ordinary shareholders had to approve the acquisition and, to be successful, at least 30% of 
ordinary shareholders had not to exercise the right of withdrawing their shares. Moreover, 
dissenting shareholders could hold their warrants, which continue to trade in AIM Italia until 
the expiration date.  
In the case in which the vote would have been positive, the shareholders’ meeting would have 
modified the business purpose in order to let the target company operates.  
 
If the shareholder’s approval of the acquisition had not been before the 30 June 2013 (24 months 
after the IPO), the special purpose acquisition company would have had to liquidate.  
In case of liquidation, founder received the pro-rata value of proceeds deposited in the trust 
only after ordinary shareholders were satisfied.   
 
In the listing prospectus were also presented the amount of underwriting commission 
(€825,000, equal to 1.65% of the public offering) and other expenses connected to the listing 
process (€685,000). In addition, the company forecasted €250,000 of fixed yearly expenditures 
mainly related to accounting, auditing, and remuneration of independent managers and auditors.  
These expenses were covered with proceeds deriving from founders’ private placement and 
interests deriving from IPO’s proceeds, which were all deposited in the trust (i.e. 100%).   
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Parties involved in the listing process were Centrobanca S.p.A. as Joint Global Coordinator, 
Nominated Adviser and Specialist, and Intermonte SIM S.p.A. as Joint Global Coordinator. 
 
In the listing prospectus, Made in Italy 1 stated that it intended to merge with an Italian small 
or medium non-listed target company in which investing at least 70% of proceeds raised 
through the IPO. Besides, the acquisition could be financed with other sources of financing, 
whether they were debt or equity.   
Important to underline that the SPAC had not identified specific industries on which to focus 
but it excludes target firms operating in biotechnology, real estates, financial and renewable 
sectors as well as start-ups. The reasoning for this choice was to look for the best and most 
profitable firm in the entire Italian market.  
The SPAC would have focused its attention mainly to companies with an enterprise value of a 
range between 100 and 300 million euros.  
 
Target company: SESA S.p.A. 
After 15 months, on 15 October 2012, Made in Italy 1 announced that its 
target firm would have been ‘SeSa S.p.A.’.  
The company was founded in the 70s by Paolo Castellacci and Pero Pelagotti. It has grown 
from a company which only offered information technology advises to Tuscan firms, to 
provider of IBM personal computers. It also provided its own computer software, as well as 
support for both hardware and software.  
In the 90s, the SeSa Group started the subsidiary ‘Computer Gross’, which became the main 
supplier of IBM products and also commercialize Cisco, Microsoft, Lexmark and Lenovo 
products. In 2009 was created the second business units, VAR, which focuses on the software 
and system integration industry.  
During 2011 and 2012, the headquarter facility was expanded to create a new datacentre 
dedicated to the cloud business.  
Currently, SeSa Group is divided into three business units: VAD, VAR, and Corporate.  
The first one (VAR), is dedicated to software and system integration and supports small and 
medium enterprises in their information technology needs.  
The second one (VAD, value-added distribution) is formed by Computer Gross Italia S.p.A. 
and its subsidiaries, which sells to enterprises both software (proprietary and third-parties’ ones) 
and hardware.  
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The third business unit (Corporate) focuses on managing the entire group, which comprises 
administration, accounting, auditing, HR, information technology, investor relations and legal 
activities.  
 
At the time of the acquisition by the special purpose acquisition company, SeSa Group was the 
first Italian distributor of IBM, Microsoft, Oracle (only software) and Cisco and one of the most 
significant players in the software and system integration industry for small and medium 
enterprises. Revenues of the company came mainly from Italy.  
In 2012, SeSa had various competitive advantages with compared to other firms operating in 
the same industry:  
- it had a strong and stable business relationships with main international IT companies 
(which had the power to influence the global demand); 
- a customer portfolio, made of loyal resellers (17.5% of the total Italian resellers) for the 
VAD business unit and around 15,000 small and medium enterprises (6.35% of the 
total) for the VAR business unit; 
- technical know-how of employees for third-parties’ hardware and software (100 
individuals were certified directly by suppliers); 
- strong financial structure, mainly due to reinvested earnings; 
- active shareholders and managers which have experience in the sector. 
 
Following the acquisition, SeSa Group intended to use the capital provided by the SPAC to 
increase its market position of the two main business units (VAR and VAD), expanding the 
presence of its network in Italy through new branches, and investing more in the cloud 
computing business. During the period from the acquisition to April 2017, SeSa Group made 
five new acquisitions to increase the company’s market share. 
In October 2014, SeSa S.p.A. was the first company to successfully transfer its share from AIM 
Italia to the main segment of the Italian stock exchange, MTA (Mercato Telematico Azionario).  
Moreover, from March 2015 shares of the company are traded in the STAR segment of the 
MTA. 
In an interview, SeSa’s CEO Alessandro Fabbroni said that "Il passaggio al Segmento STAR 
rappresenta l'evoluzione di un percorso che ha visto l'approdo al listino AIM in data 1 febbraio 
2013, a seguito della fusione con la prima SPAC di diritto italiano Made in Italy 1 S.p.A. ed il 
successivo passaggio al mercato MTA nell'ottobre 2013. Tale percorso è stato caratterizzato 
da una progressiva crescita sia dei fondamentali del gruppo, dai ricavi, all'occupazione ed alla 
redditività operativa che della capitalizzazione di Borsa, con il raggiungimento di requisiti di 
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flottante in linea con quanto richiesto dal Regolamento di Borsa Italiana per l'ammissione al 
Segmento STAR". 
 
Next tables present summarized restated income statement and balance sheet of SeSa Group, 
which ends its fiscal year in April. 
 
EXHIBIT 6 SESA: Restated Income Statement 
        
 € thousand 04/2011 04/2012 04/2013 04/2014 04/2015 04/2016 04/2017 
Revenues 746,501 812,024 832,274 947,556 1,060,150 1,229,602 1,271,469 
Revenues growth  8.8% 2.5% 13.9% 11.9% 16.0% 3.4% 
Operating costs -680,974 -731,880 -744,706 -855,135 -963,657 -1,122,145 -1,149,730 
Personnel expenses -31,168 -38,857 -43,371 -47,866 -50,322 -59,004 -70,107 
EBITDA 34,359 41,287 44,197 44,555 46,171 48,453 51,632 
EBITDA margin 4.6% 5.1% 5.3% 4.7% 4.4% 3.9% 4.1% 
D&A -4,199 -5,106 -6,053 -5,313 -4,820 -4,769 -6,846 
EBIT 30,160 36,181 38,144 39,242 41,351 43,684 44,786 
EBIT margin 4.0% 4.5% 4.6% 4.1% 3.9% 3.6% 3.5% 
Net income 11,902 17,201 20,617 21,162 22,595 25,055 27,098 
 
From the year following the acquisition by the SPAC, the company started growing with higher 
rate its revenues. In 2017 revenues grew at a lower rate mainly because of the change in the 
business model of some of SeSa’s supplier of hardware.  
Net income increased every year (CAGR2014-2017 +8.6%), even if profitability is slightly 
decreasing compared with revenues (EBITDA margin from 5.3% in the fiscal year closed at 
April 2013 to 4.1% in April 2017). 
 
EXHIBIT 7 SESA: Restated Balance Sheet 
        
 € thousand 04/2011 04/2012 04/2013 04/2014 04/2015 04/2016 04/2017 
Net working capital 92,692 63,005 73,288 78,160 89,427 89,168 91,697 
Operating fixed capital  34,078 32,378 42,802 43,151 45,433 61,978 71,874 
Other non-current operating 
assets and liabilities 2,315 4,417 7,206 12,674 10,894 14,018 16,695 
Non-operating assets 6,385 5,132 4,641 4,158 4,975 1,804 -1,163 
Total funds invested 135,470 104,932 127,937 138,143 150,729 166,968 179,103 
        
Net financial position 61,416 13,166 -12,189 -16,148 -22,760 -28,282 -37,352 
Debt equivalents 6,257 7,712 10,224 10,308 13,057 15,836 17,427 
Shareholders' equity 67,797 84,054 129,902 143,983 160,432 179,414 199,028 
Total source of financing  135,470 104,932 127,937 138,143 150,729 166,968 179,103 
        
ROIC 18.74% 21.36% 25.19% 20.04% 19.72% 19.78% 18.42% 
ROA adjusted 8.46% 9.08% 8.16% 8.24% 8.08% 7.06% 6.48% 
ROE 18.00% 20.96% 16.20% 15.05% 14.48% 14.54% 14.17% 
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The merger with Made in Italy 1 improved the financial structure’s stability and net financial 
position, creating a solid basis for future expansion of the group. 
During 2013, proceeds from the SPAC were indeed used for making acquisitions and 
completing the new datacentre (about €15 million) and the remaining cash improved the net 
financial position (for approximately €25 million).  
Before the business combination with the SPAC, profitability in terms of return on invested 
capital (ROIC) excluding goodwill and other similar intangibles was increasing mainly due to 
a more efficient net working capital. 
 
In the following table are presented the most important financial indicators in the year in which 
the business combination was completed and the change of the same indicators in periods 
surrounding the acquisition, according to the model by Ignatyeva, Rauch, and Wahremburg.  
The competitor chosen to compare results is Accenture Italia S.p.A., the Italian subsidiary of 
the U.S. international company Accenture.  
It offers services and innovative solutions in strategy, consulting, digital, technology and 
operations sectors to Italian companies. It has been chosen because both SeSa and Accenture 
Italia offers, even partially, the same services (SeSa Group also offers hardware while 
Accenture doesn’t) and because they have a comparable size in terms of revenues.  
 
EXHIBIT 8 SESA: Performance             
 € thousand At acquisition 
Change 
0/+1 
Change  
-1/+1   
Change  
-2/+1 
Change  
-2/+2 
       
Revenues 832,274 115,282 135,532  201,055 313,649 
Revenues growth  13.85% 16.69%  26.9% 42.0% 
EBITDA 44,197 358 3,268  10,196 11,812 
EBITDA margin 5.31% -0.61% -0.38%  0.10% -0.25% 
EBIT 38,144 1,098 3,061  9,082 11,191 
EBIT margin 4.58% -0.44% -0.31%  0.10% -0.14% 
Net income 20,617 545 3,961  9,260 10,693 
       
Total assets 467,553 8,820 78,106   120,039 155,464 
Net financial position -12,189 -3,959 -29,314   -77,564 -84,176 
Shareholders’ equity 127,229 13,338 58,493   74,434 89,895 
       
ROIC 25.19% -5.15% -1.32%  1.30% 0.98% 
ROA adjusted 8.16% 0.08% -0.85%  -0.23% -0.38% 
ROE 16.20% -1.15% -5.90%   -2.94% -3.52% 
       
Diff. Revenues from competitor -430,549 89,948 58,340   -3,902 62,783 
Diff. Revenues growth competitor   20.89% 10.32%   8.01% 18.86% 
Diff. EBITDA from competitor -17,498 -2,829 -3,297   12,221 -8,271 
Diff. EBITDA marg. from competitor 0.42% -0.76% -0.60%   1.24% -0.59% 
Diff. ROA adjusted from competitor -1.14% 2.58% 0.80%  3.66% -0.17% 
Diff. ROE from competitor -10.56% -52.05% -200.65%   -52.97% -1.97% 
Diff. Earnings from competitor 7,812 -156,606 -207,019   -135,719 6,126 
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Considering the performance of SeSa Group, revenues are considerably increased in the years 
following the acquisition (+42% in the five years surrounding the acquisition), as well as total 
assets (+€155 million), mainly driven by new acquisitions. Profitability deteriorated after the 
merger: ROIC decreased in the year following the acquisition (-5.15%) while considering three 
and five years surrounding the acquisition it improved (+1.30% and 0.98% respectively).  
ROA excluding goodwill and other similar intangibles remained almost unchanged, as well as 
EBITDA margin and EBIT margin (-0.66% and -0.44% respectively in the year after the 
acquisition). 
 
Comparing with its competitor (Accenture Italia), at the time of the acquisition SeSa Group was 
smaller in terms of sales but its growth rate has been higher in the following year (+20.89%).  
Similarly, the difference in ROA adjusted from the competitor was -1.14% in the year of the 
acquisition but, in the following year, SeSa outperformed Accenture Italia by 2.58%.  
On the contrary, EBITDA margin was slightly higher for SeSa with respect to Accenture in 
2013 but in the following years, Accenture’s one increased more.  
 
From this analysis, it seems that there was not a single and clear cause for the company not 
being able to enter the public market directly through an IPO. However, possible causes that 
pushed the SeSa Group to be acquired by a SPAC could have been the negative market 
conditions in 2013 that could have resulted in a lower market multiple valuation (and so a lower 
acquisition price) and the scarce interest of the market for firms in that particular industry.  
 
Stock performance has always been positive, suggesting the successfulness of the deal and that 
initial shareholders of the SPAC were confident in the creation of value that it would have 
generated. Peaks of trading volume in October 2013 coincided with the entering in the main 
Italian market, MTA. Next graph shows the price and volumes of the SeSa’s stock on the left 
and, on the right side, there is the comparison between normalized movements of the stock and 
the FTSE Italia Small Cap index. It’s clear that SeSa’s stock has always outperformed the 
market. 
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EXHIBIT 9 SESA: Stock performance 
Pre-
announcement 
period 
Pre-voting 
period 
6 months 
following 
12 months 
following 
24 months 
following 
36 months 
following 
48 months 
following 
60 months 
following 
2.04% 7.50% -1.86% 5.86% 23.53% 31.16% 73.86% / 
 
 
 
INDUSTRIAL STARS OF ITALY  
The third Italian special purpose acquisition company was Industrial Stars of Italy, listed on the 
AIM Italia on 15 July 2013. 
It was founded by Attilio Francesco Arietti and Giovanni Cavallini. 
The SPAC offered 5,000,000 shares and 2,500,000 warrants (one warrant was associated with 
two shares).  Warrants gave to investors the possibility to buy at the price of €4.65 additional 
shares according to the following formula:  3456785	#9:;<=>	?6&@5	A	B;6&C5	D6&@53456785	E9:;<=>	D6&@5	A	D6&@5  , where Strike 
Price was equal to €9.30. Warrants were exercisable from one month after the effectiveness of 
the business combination and they expired five years after it or 30 days after the average 
monthly price would have been over €13.00. 
Founders received 150,000 special shares at a price of €10.00: these particular shares were not 
transferable until the business combination was completed and they didn’t carry the right to 
vote on the acquisition.  
Special shares were converted into 7 ordinary shares under the following conditions:  
- 50,000 special shares (1/3 on the total) were converted into 350,000 ordinary shares 
after 7 days from the effectiveness of the business combination; 
0
0
0
0
0
0
5 €
10 €
15 €
20 €
25 €
50
100
150
200
250
300
20
11
20
12
20
13
20
14
20
15
20
16
20
17
SESA
FTSE Italia Small Cap
Business combination 
MTA 
 82 
- 50,000 special shares were converted into 350,000 ordinary shares if, within 28 months 
from the business combination, the stock price is equal or higher €11,00 for 15 days 
over 30 consecutive days.  
- 100,000 special shares (2/3 on the total) were converted into 700,000 ordinary shares if, 
within 28 months from the business combination, the stock price is equal or higher 
€12,00 for 15 days over 30 consecutive days.  
If both conditions would be satisfied, founders obtained a total of 1,050,000 ordinary shares, 
corresponding to around 17% of the SPAC shares. After the conversion, each tranche is subject 
to a lock-up period of 12 months.  
On the contrary, if the last two conditions were not satisfied within 28 months, the remaining 
special shares would be converted into ordinary shares at the exchange ratio of 1:1.   
 
The board of directors was composed by the two founders and Matteo Tiraboschi, with the role 
of independent manager.  
Giovanni Cavallini, after an MBA at the Harvard Business School of Boston, started his career 
in 1978 at Boston Consulting Group, where he worked for ten years, founding the Italian 
subsidiary of the Group as partner. Then he was founder and CEO a large retail chain of 
bricolage products (later acquired by OBI), he was CEO of the Interpump group and 
independent member of the board of directors in Ansaldo STS and Migross T.A.S. 
Currently, he is member of the board of directors of Brembo S.p.A. and Davide Campari-
Milano S.p.A. In 2012, he was nominated ‘Cavaliere del Lavoro’ by the President of the Italian 
Republic.  
Attilio Francesco Arietti, after the MBA at the Harvard Business School of Boston, started his 
professional career as Assistant Manager at Deloitte & Touche in New York and Milan.  
In 1980, he founded Baker Tilly Consulaudit S.p.A. (now Baker Tilly Revisa), where he was 
CEO for 20 years: the company was one of the biggest not ‘big four’ accounting firms in Italy.  
In 1999, he founded Arietti & Partners S.r.l. – M&A International, an Italian company focused 
on M&A operations in the mid-market (especially cross-border M&A). 
In 2016, the Italian company along with M&A International formed in Italy Oaklins Arietti.  
Matteo Tiraboschi started his career as auditor and then as a chartered accountant. Currently, 
he is Chief Financial Officer in Brembo S.p.A., where he has worked from 2005.  
 
The same group of managers, in May 2016, also founded Industrial Stars of Italy 2, which on 
20 July 2017 effectively merged with SIT S.p.A., and Industrial Stars of Italy 3.  
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For the success of the business combination, the majority of ordinary shareholders had to vote 
positively for the approval and only 30% of owners of ordinary shares could exercise their right 
of redemption.  
In the case in which managers of Industrial Stars of Italy would not have been able to either 
identify a target firm for the business combination within 24 months after the IPO or the 
shareholders’ meeting voted against the acquisition, the SPAC had to be liquidated.  
 
The listing prospectus of the SPAC forecasted that total expenses connected to the initial public 
offering process of the company should have been €1,380,000, of which €800,000 were 
distribution fees (1.6% of the public proceeds raised) and the other €580,000 were general 
expenses for professional services and other costs for the IPO process. 
As a result, 100% of proceeds raised during the public offering was deposited in a trust. 
In the IPO of Industrial Stars of Italy were involved UBI Banca, Unipol and Banknord as joint 
global coordinator, joint bookrunner while KPMG was the auditor. UBI Banca was also the 
Nominated Advisor (NOMAD).  
 
Industrial Stars of Italy intended to focus its attention on finding non-listed Italian medium 
enterprises which operate both at national and international level.  
The SPAC, at the time of the IPO, had not identified a specific sector on which to focus its 
attention but excluded a priori sectors such as real estate, financial, insurance, renewable 
energy, along with start-ups and companies in a turnaround situation.  
Moreover, the target should have an equity value between €150 and €200 million. 
 
 
Target company: LU-VE S.p.A. 
After 18 months, on 26 January 2015, the special purpose 
acquisition company announced its target firm: LU-VE S.p.A.  
The company offers four main categories of products: heat 
exchangers (for domestic, HORECA, and industrial application, 
industrial refrigeration, mobile application and power generation), 
air-cooled equipment, close control air conditioning, glass doors 
and losing systems. 
LU-VE was founded in 1986 in Uboldo (VA), as one of the first venture capital investment in 
Italy. The company, in fact, acquired Contardo S.p.A. (a bankrupt firm) with a management 
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buy-out transaction: for this reason, it has been called LU-VE which stands for ‘Lucky 
Venture’.  
Currently, the group has ten manufacturing plant in many countries (Italy, Czech Republic, 
Poland, Sweden, China, and India) and a network of 12 sales offices in Europe, Middle East, 
and Asia. 
Focusing mostly on research and development of new products, LU-VE has been the first 
company in the world to apply leading-edge technology solutions to commercial and industrial 
refrigeration. Over the years, the company has introduced a new way of conceiving and making 
refrigeration and air-conditioning products, using avant-garde technologies which have then 
become a constant reference point for the entire industry. 
In fact, for over twenty years, the Group has collaborated with some of the most outstanding 
European and Italian Universities, in particular, the ‘Politecnico di Milano’. Currently, it works 
with 22 Universities and research institutes in 13 different countries.  
In the sector in which the company operates, it has technological leadership due to constant 
introduction of technological innovation and patents onto the market, for setting new energy 
efficiency standards in the sector and because it is the first company in the world to use 
nanotechnology in heat exchange process.  
Another strength is the R&D leadership because LU-VE has the largest research and 
development laboratory for its sector in Europe (and it’s the only one to test CO2 systems) and 
it’s the first in the industry to use ‘green’ technology/solutions.  
 
As result of the acquisition of the SPAC, LU-VE received about €50 million in cash, with would 
have been utilized to increase the growth of the company. Moreover, in the first semester 2015, 
the company re-negotiated its debt expenses in order to decrease interests paid. 
From 20 June 2017, LU-VE’s stocks trade on the main Italian market, the MTA.  
 
Next exhibits present the summarized restated income statement and balance sheet of LU-VE 
Group.  
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EXHIBIT 10 LU-VE Group: Restated Income Statement 
      
€ thousand 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Revenues 188,029 199,724 215,488 212,264 251,279 
Revenues growth  6.2% 7.9% -1.5% 18.4% 
Operating costs -128,426 -132,880 -140,441 -139,709 -167,339 
Personnel expenses -38,431 -40,002 -43,628 -46,335 -50,965 
EBITDA 21,172 26,842 31,419 26,220 32,975 
EBITDA margin 11.3% 13.4% 14.6% 12.4% 13.1% 
D&A -12,011 -11,966 -11,789 -12,340 -13,491 
EBIT 9,161 14,876 19,630 13,880 19,484 
EBIT margin 4.9% 7.4% 9.1% 6.5% 7.8% 
Net income 6,103 8,613 10,892 9,597 18,321 
 
In 2015, notwithstanding the acquisition of Industrial Stars of Italy, revenues decreased by 1.5% 
mainly for the effect of exchange rates, especially in countries most affected by commodities’ 
prices (for example Russia). In fact, in the management report of the annual report, the company 
calculated that, without the negative effect of exchange rates, the decrease in sales would only 
have been 0.4%. This problem was also reflected in a lower EBITDA.  
In 2016, the increase in revenues’ growth rates was mainly due to the consolidation of the newly 
acquired company in India, ‘Spirotech’.  This acquisition has been the biggest in the history of 
the group.  
 
EXHIBIT 11 LU-VE Group: Restated Balance Sheet 
      
€ thousand 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Net working capital 10,255 9,576 7,145 4,543 15,626 
Operating fixed capital 98,454 95,510 97,636 98,679 112,815 
Other non-current operating assets and 
liabilities -10,643 -10,414 -15,138 -10,122 -10,461 
Goodwill and other similar intangibles 20,193 18,179 29,572 29,575 48,744 
Non-operating assets 1,977 3,089 3,581 67,135 77,204 
Total funds invested 120,236 115,940 122,796 189,810 243,928 
      
Net financial position 41,088 30,813 50,301 60,707 105,597 
Debt equivalents 2,825 2,843 3,639 3,305 3,936 
Shareholders’ equity 76,323 82,284 68,856 125,798 134,395 
Total source of financing 120,236 115,940 122,796 189,810 243,928 
      
ROIC 11.34% 15.12% 18.55% 11.69% 10.02% 
ROA adjusted 5.04% 7.77% 9.97% 4.84% 6.04% 
ROE 11.72% 15.77% 16.60% 7.84% 13.82% 
 
In 2015, the company invested proceeds received by the SPAC and resulting for the 
renegotiation of its debt (€65 million) in various financial assets (most of them could be 
converted into cash quickly, for example, to make new acquisition). These investments 
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increased the total funds invested but without any impact on net income (ROIC excluding 
goodwill and other similar intangibles decreased from 18.55% in 2014 to 11.69% in 2015). 
 
To compare the result of LU-VE in the year in which the business combination was completed 
and the change of the same operating indicators in periods surrounding the acquisition, the 
competitor ‘Aermec’ was chosen.  
Aermec brand was born in 1963 in Bevilaqua (VR), created by ‘Giordano Riello’. The company 
offers air conditioning applications for residential, commercial and industrial use as well as data 
centres and public spaces. It manufactures, among others, hydronic terminals (fan coils and 
thermo-convectors), heat recovery units, chillers, heat pumps, dry coolers, and air-conditioners.  
As LU-VE, Aermec applies highly advanced technologies, implementing a continuous product 
development cycle, pursuing energy efficiency and renewable energy integration. The company 
is present with its product in Italy, France, Germany, Poland, Russia and the United Kingdom.  
 
EXHIBIT 12 LU-VE Group: Performance 
 € thousand At 
acquisition 
Change 
0/+1 
Change  
-1/+1   
Change  
-2/+1 
Revenues 212,264 39,015 35,791  51,555 
Revenues growth  18.38% 16.61%  25.8% 
EBITDA 26,220 6,755 1,556  6,133 
EBITDA margin 12.35% 0.77% -1.46%  -0.32% 
EBIT 13,880 5,604 -146  4,608 
EBIT margin 6.54% 1.21% -1.36%  0.31% 
Net income 9,597 8,724 7,429  9,708 
      
Total assets 316,107 55,056 144,680   161,411 
Net financial position 60,707 44,890 55,296   74,784 
Shareholders' equity 122,355 10,217 66,949   77,965 
      
ROIC 11.69% -1.67% -8.53%  -5.10% 
ROA adjusted 4.84% 1.20% -3.93%  -1.72% 
ROE 7.84% 5.98% -2.78%   -1.95% 
      
Diff. Revenues from competitor 33,166 22,857 2,249   15,321 
Diff. Revenues growth competitor   68.92% -4.13%   3.03% 
Diff. EBITDA from competitor 15,746 3,563 -3,241   2,329 
Diff. EBITDA marg. from competitor 6.50% -0.38% -2.97%   -1.11% 
Diff. ROA adjusted from competitor 1.08% -0.41% -6.30%  -3.69% 
Diff. ROE from competitor 3.41% 4.46% -5.80%   -3.28% 
Diff. Earnings from competitor 5,308 -7,028 4,155   7,900 
 
Since the acquisition of the SPAC was completed in 2015, there is only one annual report 
available after the merger, so it was not possible to compute the change of the main operating 
indicators the five years surrounding the acquisition as in the model of analysis conducted by 
Ignatyeva, Rauch, and Wahremburg (2013). 
However, in the year after the business combination, LU-VE’s revenues increased as well as 
total assets. The increase in sales of 2016 (due to the acquisition of ‘Spirotech’) increased also 
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the EBITDA in absolute value but, compared to the year before the acquisition, the EBITDA 
margin was slightly lower (-1.46%). 
Return on invested capital (ROIC) decreased in the year following the acquisition as well as for 
the three years surrounding the business combination (-8.53%), while ROA (calculated 
excluding goodwill and other similar intangibles from total assets) increased by 1.20% after 
one year the acquisition but worsen by 3.93% in the three years surrounding it.  
This was mainly due to the cash introduced into the firm’ assets by the SPAC that had not been 
yet utilized for operative investments. 
 
Comparing results with its closest competitor, in line with the U.S. and European literature of 
SPACs, LU-VE at the time of the acquisition was slightly bigger in term of size and was more 
profitable (+6.5%), but the profitability in terms of return of assets (excluding goodwill and 
other similar intangibles) increased more for the competitor than for LU-VE in the year 
following the business combination and especially considering the three years surrounding it (-
6.30%).  
 
The analysis of operating performance suggested that possible reasons why LU-VE entered the 
public market with a SPAC are not strictly connected with the performance of the company but 
rather with the condition of financial markets. In fact, the low interest of investors for firms 
operating in the B2B business (and so not known to the final customer) together with the not so 
positive market condition could have resulted in a lower market multiple valuation. It’s worth 
to recall that, when going public with a SPAC, the price for the acquisition (and so the valuation 
of the company) is determined by an agreement between the management of the SPAC and the 
managers of the target firm, and not by the market as in the case of an IPO. 
 
For what concerns the financial return of company’s stocks, during the first year after the 
business combination the performance was negative but, after two years the return became 
positive (+20%).  
The next graph represents, on the right side, the normalized26 LU-VE stock’s performance 
compared with the one of the FTSE Italia Small Cap index (containing similar Italian firms): 
LU-VE’s stock has followed movements of the market even if has underperformed the market.  
 
                                                
26 To normalize and compare the LU-VE and the FTSE Italia Small Cap index performances, both values were considered as 
‘100’ at the date of the company’s IPO. 
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EXHIBIT 13 LU-VE Group: Stock performance 
Pre-
announcement 
period 
Pre-voting 
period 
6 months 
following 
12 months 
following 
24 months 
following 
36 months 
following 
48 months 
following 
60 months 
following 
-3.75% 12.83% -10.79% -15.25% 20.25% N/A N/A N/A 
 
 
 
SPACE 
The special purpose acquisition company Space was founded by Gianni Mion, Sergio Erede, 
Roberto Italia, Carlo Pagliani, Edoardo Subert, Alfredo Ambrosio and Elisabetta De Bernardi.  
As others Italian SPACs, its scope was to accomplish a business combination with a firm, single 
business units or spin-offs based in Italy. It was listed on MIV on 18 December 2013.  
It offered 15,000,000 shares at the price of €10.00 which embedded two warrants every three 
market shares. As a result, total proceeds raised through the initial public offering was 
€150,000,000. Initial shareholders (founders) are given 475,000 special shares at the same price 
of ordinary shares, and with the same warrants included. Moreover, initial shares of the 
company (before the IPO), held by founders at the time of the incorporation, were converted 
into 25,000 special shares. Thus, total special shares amount to 500,000.  
To link the remuneration of founders to the performance of the SPAC, special shares would 
have been converted into 5 ordinary shares under the following conditions:  
- 175,000 special shares (35% of the total) were converted into 875,000 ordinary shares 
at the effectiveness of the business combination; 
- 125,000 special shares (25% of the total) were converted into 625,000 ordinary shares 
if, within 36 months from the business combination, the stock price is equal or higher 
€11,00 for at least 20 days over 30 consecutive days.  
0
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- 100,000 special shares (20% of the total) were converted into 500,000 ordinary shares 
if, within 36 months from the business combination, the stock price is equal or higher 
€12,00 for at least 20 days over 30 consecutive days.  
- 100,000 special shares (20% of the total) were converted into 500,000 ordinary shares 
if, within 36 months from the business combination, the stock price is equal or higher 
€13,00 for at least 20 days over 30 consecutive days.  
Thus, if all these conditions are satisfied, founders could have the ownership of about 15% of 
the special purpose acquisition company, having invested only €5 million.  
Without considering the conversion of warrants and considering the stock price at the minimum 
level for the conversion of all founders’ special shares (€13), they could have a return of about 
+550% on their initial investment.  
 
 Number of shares 
after the acquisition % Proceeds % 
Founders 2,500,000 14,4% €5,000,000 3.2% 
Investors 15,000,000 85,6% €150,000,000 96.8% 
TOTAL 17,500,000 100% €155,000,000 100% 
 
Management team was composed by Gianni Mion (chairman of the board of directors), Roberto 
Italia (CEO), Sergio Erede, Carlo Pagliani, Edoardo Carlo Maria Subert and, as independent 
managers, Maria Patrizia Grieco, Micaela Le Divelec Lemmi and Alberto Amadio Tazartes. 
Gianni Mion started his career in Peat Marwick Mitchell (now part of KPMG), working as 
auditor in Rome and Chicago. In 1973 entered as controller in Mc Quay Europa S.p.A. (now 
part of Daikin Industries Ltd) and from the following year he worked as manager in Gepi S.p.A. 
until 1983 when he became member of the board of directors of Fintermica S.p.A. 
In 1985 was Chief Financial Officer in Marzotto S.p.A. and in 1986 became CEO at Edizione 
Holding (owned by the Benetton family) where, from 2012, he is executive vice-president.  
Roberto Italia started working in STET/Telecom Italia. Then, after an MBA at INSEAD in 
Fontainebleau has started working in the private equity industry in Warburg Pincus, Henderson 
Private Capital and eventually in Cinven. He is member of the board of directors in some Italian 
companies. 
Sergio Erede, after having obtained a Master of Law at Harvard Law School in 1964, he became 
a lawyer in 1967. He started his career being associate with Hale & Dorr (now WilmerHale) in 
Boston and then with Sullivan & Cromwell in New York. From 1965 to 1969, he was general 
counsel of IBM in Italy. In 1969, he founded its independent law firm ‘Erede e Associati’, 
firstly known for M&A advisory and securities transactions. Then in 1999, his firm merged 
 90 
with other two important Italian law firm, ‘Bonelli e Associati’ (specialized in company law 
and bankruptcy) and ‘Pappalardo e Associati’ (specialized in antitrust and community law). 
Carlo Pagliani began his professional career in the Capital Market department of Hambros 
Bank, PLC, in London. In 1988, he transferred to Paribas (London) and then to Banque Paribas 
(Milan). In 1995, he became responsible for Investment Banking in Italy. After joining Morgan 
Stanley, he became Managing Director and then Senior Advisor. Currently, he is a Consultant 
for Morgan Stanley.  
Edoardo Subert started his career at Citibank where he became director of the M&A group. In 
1990, he moved to Rothschild (first in London and then in Milan) becoming partner of the team. 
Since 2013, he has been senior advisor for the investment banking department of Rothschild in 
Milan.  
Patrizia Grieco started his career in Italtel, where he became CEO after the reorganization of 
the company. Then she was CEO of Siemens Informatica, Gruppo Value Team (now NTT Data) 
and Olivetti. She also was member of the board of directors of Fiat Industrial, CNH Industrial, 
and Anima Holding. Currently, she is chairman of the board of the directors of Enel.  
Micaela Le Divelec Lemmi started her career in Ernst&Young as auditor. In 1998, she began 
working in Gucci, being controller, CFO and, currently, Executive vice-president.  
Alberto Amadio Tazartes was manager at Boston Consulting Group (in Paris and Milan). Then, 
from 1989 to 2005, he was Managing Partner of BC Partners, a private equity firm.  From 
20017, he is member of the board of directors of ‘Fondazione DeAgostini’.   
 
Ordinary shareholders had the right to approve the acquisition of the target firms proposed by 
managers: for the business combination to be successful, the majority of ordinary shareholders 
had to vote positively and shareholders representing less than 33% of outstanding shares could 
exercise the redemption right.   
If after 24 months from the IPO, managers have not yet identified any target firm, the SPAC 
would have been liquidated. In the case in which they identified a target company within 24 
months, they have additional six months to call the shareholders’ meeting for approving the 
business combination.   
 
Expenses connected to the IPO process included a 2,25% (€3,375,000) on total proceeds raised 
as underwriting fees and €1,200,000 as general and advertising costs.  
Available resources to managers for running the special purpose acquisition company were all 
€5,000,000 from special shares placement, plus 1% of proceeds raised through the IPO. As a 
result, 99% of public placement were deposited in a trust.  
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In the IPO process were involved Mediobanca and Morgan Stanley as joint global coordinator 
and Equita SIM as sponsor.  
 
From the listing prospectus, the SPAC specified that it could have acquired majority or minority 
stakes as well as other equity instruments especially of family-held firms, firms part of private 
equity funds or firms owned by multinational corporations.  
The company intended to focus on Italian sectors which are internationally recognized as 
excellences such as luxury, fashion, furniture, design, food, biomedical and advanced mechanic 
industry. Moreover, the SPAC excluded, a priori, companies operating in sectors such as real 
estates, banking, commodities and in production of weapon.  
The management team should have invested at least 67% of IPO proceeds (even if not binding) 
and could have used other source of financing, being debt or future equity increase.  
 
Target company: F.I.L.A. S.p.A. 
After about one year from the IPO, on 15 
January 2015, Space announced that its target 
company would have been ‘Fabbrica Italiana 
Lapis ed Affini S.p.A. (F.I.L.A.). 
The F.I.L.A. Group operates in the creativity 
tools market, producing colouring, design, 
modelling, writing and painting objects, such as 
pencils, crayons, modelling clay, chalk, oil colours, acrylics, watercolours, paints and paper for 
the fine arts, school, and leisure. 
With its products, F.I.L.A. is present in many countries in Europe as well as Canada, U.S., 
Mexico, Brazil, Chile, Argentina, South Africa, China, India, Indonesia, Australia, and 
Singapore.  
The company was founded in 1920 and in almost a century of innovation, it’s now one of the 
leading world groups dedicated to creative expression, with a broad range of brands and 
thousands of products.  
The most important acquisitions have been in the last twenty years: in 1994 it acquired the 
Italian Company Adica Pongo, in 2005 the U.S. group Dixon Ticonderoga, in 2008 the German 
group LYRA, in 2010 the Mexican company Lapiceria Mexicana, in 2012 the Brazilian 
company Lycin and in 2014 the Italian firm Maimeri. 
 
 92 
In 2016 the group employed approximately 7,000 individuals in 21 production facilities and 39 
subsidiaries across the globe. Its portfolio of brands comprises GIOTTO, DAS, LYRA, Canson, 
Maimeri, Daler & Rowney Lukas and Ticonderoga.  
In 2015 the special purpose acquisition company Space provided net cash flow of €64,766 
thousand. This amount, along with other bank loans, allows F.I.L.A. to acquire in 2015 the 
control of the Indian company Writefine Products Private Limited, and in 2016 of Daler-
Rowney Lukas Group, St. Cuthberts and Canson Group.  These last three companies produce 
and distribute materials and accessories on the arts & crafts market (such as the production of 
high-quality artist’s papers), with brands internationally recognized. 
 
 
EXHIBIT 14 F.I.L.A.: Restated Income Statement 
       
 € thousand 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Revenues 217,214 220,429 222,155 237,402 282,543 442,261 
Revenues growth  1.5% 0.8% 6.9% 19.0% 56.5% 
Operating costs -139,890 -142,756 -146,764 -153,554 -185,099 -303,038 
Personnel expenses -42,545 -41,325 -42,205 -48,829 -55,664 -82,399 
EBITDA 34,779 36,348 33,186 35,019 41,780 56,824 
EBITDA margin 16.0% 16.5% 14.9% 14.8% 14.8% 12.8% 
D&A -5,683 -6,099 -6,033 -5,698 -6,792 -14,910 
EBIT 29,096 30,249 27,153 29,321 34,988 41,914 
EBIT margin 13.4% 13.7% 12.2% 12.4% 12.4% 9.5% 
Net income 13,899 14,571 13,550 16,681 -16,453 21,972 
 
The increase in sales in the last two years are mainly due to external growth. In 2016 the M&A 
activity brought €133,329 thousand (which comprised, among others, €72,595 thousand from 
Daler-Rowney Lukas, €37,168 thousand from Writefine Products, €21,353 thousand from 
Canson group) while the organic growth counted for €25,723 thousand less the negative effect 
on exchange rates for €11,776 thousand.  
The Group suffered a loss in the year when it merged with the SPAC (2015) which was mainly 
due to non-recurring operating costs of €5,800 thousand, concerning legal and M&A advice on 
the merger and for €45.8 millions of financial expenses regarding the fair value measurement 
of Space S.p.A. equity.  
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EXHIBIT 15 F.I.L.A.: Restated Balance Sheet 
       
 € thousand 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Net working capital 106,578 111,196 109,080 121,349 145,852 202,595 
Operating fixed capital 38,730 39,366 35,936 38,260 93,846 221,896 
Other non-current operating 
assets and liabilities 552 7,057 5,324 5,142 4,378 2,547 
Goodwill and other similar 
intangibles 6,494 6,509 6,381 8,557 42,212 77,865 
Non-operating assets 2,797 3,484 3,506 4,620 -5,585 -26,297 
Total funds invested 155,151 167,612 160,227 177,928 280,703 478,606 
       
Net financial position 85,516 85,096 64,032 61,034 42,119 228,293 
Debt equivalent 3,548 3,541 3,847 4,926 26,857 11,343 
Shareholders' equity 66,087 78,975 92,348 111,968 211,727 238,970 
Total source of financing 155,151 167,612 160,227 177,928 280,703 478,606 
       
ROIC 14.96% 14.44% 12.44% 13.10% 13.10% 6.20% 
ROA adjusted 12.55% 13.35% 11.79% 11.37% 10.22% 6.96% 
ROE 21.32% 18.62% 14.76% 15.09% -8.76% 10.24% 
 
As already described, after the business combination with Space, the F.I.L.A. group acquired 
four companies, which were the result of the increase in total funds invested.  
To accomplish these acquisitions, it used the cash provided by the transaction and it borrowed 
€188,498 thousand from banks (Unicredit, Intesa Sanpaolo, Mediobanca and BNL) in 2015. In 
2016 the group borrowed other €92,543 thousand for the acquisition of Canson Group, €6,850 
thousand for St. Cuthberts Holding and €109,357 thousand for Daler.Rowney Lukas.  
In 2016, the year after the acquisition by the special purpose acquisition company, F.I.L.A. 
suffered a decline in profitability: ROIC and ROA (excluding goodwill and other similar 
intangibles) decreased by 6.90% and 3.27% respectively. This however is not negative: when 
a company expands and to operate its business, it needs more fixed operating capital and also 
more net working capital. As a result, invested capital increases in the year when the 
investments are made, but returns are postponed to the following years. Obviously, in the 
calculation of the return of assets were excluded goodwill and other similar intangibles in order 
not to account for the price premium paid for acquisitions.  
 
The next table exhibits the value of the most important operating indicators and ratio in the year 
of the business combination, the change of the same indicators in the following years as well 
as in the 3 and 4 years surrounding the acquisition.   
F.I.L.A. performance is compared with the one of ‘Sicad Group’, an Italian company founded 
in 1972 which produces various types of adhesive tape with the brand ‘Eurocel’.  
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The company is headquartered in Uboldo (VA), employs 700 individuals and has five affiliates 
all over the world. As reported on their website, Sicad’s values are quality, innovation, and 
safety. 
 
EXHIBIT 16 F.I.L.A.: Performance 
 € thousand At 
acquisition 
Change 
0/+1 
Change  
-1/+1   
Change  
-2/+1 
Revenues 282,543 159,718 204,859  220,106 
Revenues growth  56.53% 86.29%  99.08% 
EBITDA 41,780 15,044 21,805  23,638 
EBITDA margin 14.79% -1.94% -1.90%  -2.09% 
EBIT 34,988 6,926 12,593  14,761 
EBIT margin 12.38% -2.91% -2.87%  -2.75% 
Net income -16,453 38,425 5,291  8,422 
      
Total assets 384,451 296,050 413,998   443,778 
Net financial position 42,119 186,174 167,259   164,261 
Shareholders’ equity 187,760 26,721 103,948   122,653 
      
ROIC 13.10% -6.90% -6.90%  -6.24% 
ROA adjusted 10.22% -3.27% -4.41%  -4.83% 
ROE -8.76% 19.01% -4.85%   -4.51% 
      
Diff. Revenues from competitor 59,852 166,764 210,594   220,190 
Diff. Revenues growth competitor   278.63% 88.88%   99.12% 
Diff. EBITDA from competitor 17,705 15,703 21,933   15,440 
Diff. EBITDA marg. from competitor 3.98% -1.99% -2.13%   -5.89% 
Diff. ROA adjusted from competitor 2.42% -3.35% -6.72%  -8.86% 
Diff. ROE from competitor -14.12% 15.16% -8.47%   -11.62% 
Diff. Earnings from competitor -23,349 32,214 -862   -2,217 
 
In the year of the acquisition, F.I.L.A. was larger than its competitor Sicad in terms of revenues 
and also more profitable in terms of EBITDA margin. Return on equity was higher for the 
competitor because, in 2015, F.I.L.A. suffered a loss due to extraordinary expenses related to 
the merger with the SPAC. However, in the year following the business combination, even if 
F.I.L.A.’s sales considerably grew more, its profitability decreased respect its competitor:  
EBITDA margin -1.99% and ROA excluding goodwill and other similar intangibles -3.35%. 
These results are in line with the literature on SPACs: target firms after the acquisition uses 
proceeds received to expand their business and to make new investments rather than improving 
the profitability of the company. 
 
The company, in the four years before the acquisition by the special purpose acquisition 
company SPACE, increased revenues at a quite low growth rate (CAGR2011-2014 +3%), net 
income was almost stable, EBITDA and profitability in terms of ROIC (excluding goodwill) 
was decreasing. These factors, in addition to not so positive market conditions, pushed F.I.L.A. 
to get listed through the merger with the SPAC which ensured an enterprise value of about 
7.25x the EBITDA.      
 95 
 
From the IPO of the special purpose acquisition company, the stock price has almost never 
decreased its value. The increase in the stock price between the announcement of the target and 
the shareholders’ meeting (+16.3%) could indeed be seen as the expression of confidence by 
investors on the success of the business combination, as suggested by Jenkinson and Sousa 
(2009). The creation of value is straightforward since in only two years after the merger with 
Space, F.I.L.A.’s stock price has almost doubled.  
 
On 12 November 2015, stocks were admitted to the segment STAR of the MTA and from since 
trading volume increased. Since then, F.I.L.A. has always over-performed the FTSE Italia 
Small Cap index (next graph, on the right side).   
 
EXHIBIT 17 F.I.L.A.: Stock performance 
Pre-
announcement 
period 
Pre-voting 
period 
6 months 
following 
12 months 
following 
24 months 
following 
36 months 
following 
48 months 
following 
60 months 
following 
0.78% 16.31% 10.20% 30.31% 93.27% N/A N/A N/A 
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GREENITALY1 
Last special purpose acquisition company analysed in this thesis is GreenItaly1, founded by 
Matteo Carlotti, Idea Capital Funds SGR, and Vedogreen. As its name suggests, the SPAC 
focused its attention on targets firms operating in the green economy.  
Idea Capital Funds is a private equity and private debt investment group in Italy while 
Vedogreen is an Italian company which aim is to finance listed and not-listed green firms. 
GreenItaly1 offered to ordinary investors 3,500,000 units at a price of €10, which comprised 
one share and one warrant.  Warrants gave to investors the possibility to buy a number of 
additional shares according to the following formula:  3456785	#9:;<=>	?6&@5	A	B;6&C5	D6&@53456785	E9:;<=>	D6&@5	A	D6&@5  , where 
Strike Price was equal to €9.50 and Price was €0.10. 
Warrants were exercisable from one month after the effectiveness of the business combination 
and they expired five years after it or 30 days after the average monthly price would have been 
over €13.30 (+40% on the strike price). 
 
On the other hand, founder shareholders received 120,000 special shares for €10.00. These 
shares would have been automatically converted into 7 ordinary shares after the following 
events occurred:  
- 40,000 special shares (1/3 on the total) were converted into 280,000 ordinary shares 
after 7 days the effectiveness of the business combination; 
- other 40,000 special shares (1/3 on the total) were converted into 280,000 ordinary 
shares if, within 24 months from the acquisition, the stock price is equal or higher €12.00 
for 15 days over 30 consecutive days, or 
- 80,000 special shares (1/3 on the total) were converted into 560,000 ordinary shares if, 
within 24 months from the acquisition, the stock price is equal or higher €13.50 for 15 
days over 30 consecutive days. 
If all these conditions would have been satisfied, founders obtained a total of 840,000 ordinary 
shares, corresponding to around 19% of the SPAC outstanding shares.  
In the case in which, after 24 months from the acquisitions, these conditions are not entirely 
fulfilled, remaining special shares would have been converted into ordinary shares at the 
exchange ratio of 1:1. 
Shares resulting from the conversion of founders’ shares were subject to lock-up for 18 months 
from the effectiveness of the business combination.  
On 27 December 2013, GreenItaly1’s shares started trading on AIM Italia.  
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The management team was formed by Matteo Carlotti (chairman), Sergio Luciano Buonanno, 
Marco Giorgino, Anna Lambiase, Francesco Pintucci, Enrico Testa and Lorenzo Pozza (as 
independent manager).  
Matteo Carlotti started his career as Investment Manager of Chase Capital Partners Italia (then 
Chase Gemina Italia). Then from 1997 to 2009, we worked in Argos Soditic Italia S.p.A., where 
he covered the role of Partner, Chairman, and CEO of the company. From 2009 he is a private 
equity consultant, being non-executive director in some companies, part of private equity funds.  
He also founded other two special purpose acquisition companies, Made in Italy and Sprint 
Italy.  
Sergio Luciano Buonanno started his career in 1997 in Enel in the research and development 
division and then as investment manager in Enel Capital between 2000 and 2002. Then he was 
manager of the M&A team of the Enel group, where he dealt with companies operating in waste 
to energy sector. Currently, he is managing director in Idea Capital Funds.  
Marco Giorgino is a professor of corporate finance and global risk management at the 
‘Politecnico’ of Milan. He is also a consultant for the banking industry, institutional investors. 
Anna Lambiase founded IR Top, now the Italian leader company which provides investor 
relations, financial communication and capital markets advisory to small and medium 
capitalization public companies and private small and medium enterprises. He also founded 
Vedogreen in 2012.  
Francesco Pintucci was senior associate of Argos Soditic, company which manage closed 
funds. Then from 2009, he collaborates with Marco Carlotti as specialist in private equity for 
Swiss Merchant Corporation.  
Enrico Testa was president of Legambiente, chairman of the board of directors of ACEA 
(Azienda Comunale Energia e Ambiente of the municipality of Rome) and Enel and also 
member of the board of directors of Wind. From 2010 he is vice president of Idea Capital Funds.  
 
Forecasted expenses of the management team in running the company amounted to €250,000 
of fixed costs, mainly related to Nomad fees and audit and accounting services. However, this 
didn’t include due diligence expenses. 
Underwriting commissions amounted to €880,000 which were partially postponed by the 
Global Coordinator (Intermonte) after the effectiveness of the business combination.  
These expenses were covered by proceeds from special shares (€1,200,000) and, as a result, 
100% of proceeds raised in the public offering were deposited in a restricted account, which 
could only be used for the fulfilment of the business combination, in case of liquidation of the 
SPAC or to payback dissenting shareholders.  
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Shareholders, as in all other special purpose acquisition companies, had the right to express 
their opinion on the proposed target firm by voting at the shareholders’ meeting. Required 
conditions for the approval of the business combination were that the majority of ordinary 
shares’ owners would have voted positively and that only shareholders representing less than 
30% of ordinary shares would have exercised their right of redemption (within 15 days from 
the approval).   
In the case in which these conditions were not satisfied or if managers didn’t find a suitable 
target firm within 24 months after the IPO, the special purpose acquisition company would have 
to liquidate.  
 
According to the listing prospectus, GreenItaly1 sought a target firm operating in sectors such 
as eco-building, green chemistry, low impact lighting solutions, smart energy, waste 
management, agribusiness, eco-mobility, environmental services, water, air, noise treatment or 
white biotech. Moreover, the target firm should have an equity value of at least €100 million 
(not binding). 
According to an analysis made by VedoGreen (2013), companies operating in the green 
economy were concentrated in the north of Italy (77%), especially in Lombardy (34%), Veneto 
(14%) and Emilia-Romagna (14%). Moreover, on the total green economy firms, 36% operates 
in smart energy sector, 21% in waste management sector and 11% in eco-building sector.  
 
 
Target company: Zephyro S.p.A. 
After almost 18 months, on 25 June 2015, GreenItaly1 
announced to have found its target company: ‘Prima Vera 
S.p.A.’. On 13 January 2016, the company changed its name to Zephyro S.p.A. This company 
is an Italian operator in the energy efficiency sector and a provider of integrated energy 
management solutions for complex structures, such as large enterprises, government agencies, 
large private and public building and healthcare facilities. Integrated energy management 
comprises the design, implementation, and financing of energy requalification with high-
technological content aimed at reducing fuel consumption and pollutant emissions while 
achieving cost savings.  
 
Zephyro was founded in 2000 in Milan by the actual chairman Domenico Catanese which, in 
an interview after the announcement of the deal said: “L’operazione con GreenItaly1 permette 
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la trasformazione indispensabile nella futura proiezione di Prima Vera, con l’obiettivo di 
proseguire nel percorso di crescita in un settore strategico per il futuro del Paese e competere 
sui mercati internazionali. La SPAC rappresenta lo strumento ideale per reperire i capitali 
necessari ad accelerare il processo di consolidamento della nostra leadership e incrementare 
lo standing sul mercato, coinvolgendo nel capitale primari investitori istituzionali”. 
Zephyro has three different business units: energy, biomedical and facility management.  
The biomedical division provides the management and the maintenance of biomedical 
equipment in hospitals in Italy.  
 
The business combination consisted in Grennitlay1 acquiring a minority stake of 8.6% of Prima 
Vera for €8 million. Thus, the equity of the company was valued €93 million. 
 
 
EXHIBIT 18 Zephyro: Restated Income Statements 
        
 € thousand 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Revenues 76,419 85,265 96,992 101,412 96,113 101,196 94,616 
Revenues growth  11.6% 13.8% 4.6% -5.2% 5.3% -6.5% 
Operating costs -56,944 -64,348 -73,631 -74,691 -70,120 -75,573 -58,465 
Personnel expenses -6,467 -7,889 -9,542 -11,029 -12,881 -13,823 -12,052 
EBITDA 13,008 13,028 13,819 15,693 13,111 11,800 24,100 
EBITDA margin 17.0% 15.3% 14.2% 15.5% 13.6% 11.7% 25.5% 
D&A -1,408 -2,518 -3,635 -5,853 -6,990 -8,207 -10,757 
EBIT 11,600 10,510 10,184 9,840 6,121 3,593 13,344 
EBIT margin 15.2% 12.3% 10.5% 9.7% 6.4% 3.6% 14.1% 
Net income 7,296 6,288 6,181 6,616 3,829 2,730 13,301 
 
 
In 2015 the increase in revenues was driven mainly by new energy-efficiency management 
contracts with hospitals and new agreements in the biomedical sector.  
In 2016, the decrease in revenues was due to the delay in the signing of relevant contracts, along 
with the reduction in sales in the biomedical business unit. However, in 2016, the lower 
operating costs increased the profitability of the company, reaching an EBITDA margin of 
25.5%, respect to 11.7% in 2015. 
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EXHIBIT 19 Zephyro: Restated Balance Sheet 
        
 € thousand 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Net working capital 10,727 5,730 6,978 10,432 6,126 -4,883 8,797 
Operating fixed capital 11,525 18,773 15,313 14,449 28,350 39,586 40,352 
Other non-current operating 
assets and liabilities -5,974 -5,581 -7,730 -7,039 -868 16,732 12,845 
Goodwill and other similar 
intangibles 0 0 0 5 0 5,721 4,570 
Non-operating assets -534 -248 722 -2,654 -7,186 -7,059 -7,848 
Total funds invested 15,744 18,674 15,283 15,194 26,423 50,097 58,717 
        
Net financial position -143 -3,426 -7,535 -14,537 2,516 -11,148 -5,180 
Debt equivalent 395 635 987 1,265 1,611 1,880 1,090 
Shareholders’ equity 15,492 21,465 21,831 28,466 22,295 59,366 62,807 
Total source of financing 15,744 18,674 15,283 15,194 26,423 50,097 58,717 
        
ROIC 48.64% 41.18% 42.92% 40.27% 17.26% 9.57% 26.79% 
ROA adjusted 14.57% 11.95% 10.41% 9.85% 6.18% 2.47% 10.35% 
ROE 47.10% 29.29% 28.31% 23.24% 17.17% 4.60% 21.18% 
 
The merger between the SPAC and Zephyro improved the financial structure of the latter by 
increasing the equity and the net financial position.  
Moreover, the company increased its equity investments in other companies and, in 2016, 
Biomedicale S.r.l. was created as spin-off of Zephyro.  
It’s worth to highlight that in the years before the merger with the SPAC (2015), the company 
suffered a decreased in revenues’ growth (-5.2% in 2014) and a decrease in the profitability of 
invested capital (ROIC). 
 
Carbotermo S.p.A. was chosen as the closest competitor of Zephyro in terms of sectors and 
dimension. This company operates in the energy sector since 1951, when it was founded in 
Milan. It has a turnover of €90 million and employs over 250 individuals.    
Through its business unit ‘Engineering’, the company provides services covering the design 
and the implementation of advanced heating systems, ensuring high performance, dependability 
as well as low costs and energy efficiency.  
Next table shows the analysis of Zephyro’s operating performance in the year of the business 
combination and in the years surrounding it, as in Ignatyeva, Rauch, and Wahremburg (2013). 
 
 101 
EXHIBIT 20 Zephyro: Performance           
      
 € thousand At acquisition 
Change 
0/+1 
Change  
-1/+1   
Change  
-2/+1 
Revenues 101,196 -6,580 -1,496  -6,796 
Revenues growth  -6.50% -1.56%  -6.70% 
EBITDA 11,800 12,300 10,989  8,407 
EBITDA margin 11.66% 13.81% 11.83%  10.00% 
EBIT 3,593 9,751 7,223  3,503 
EBIT margin 3.55% 10.55% 7.73%  4.40% 
Net income 2,730 10,571 9,472  6,685 
      
TOTAL ASSETS 151,060 -17,597 34,389   33,543 
Net financial position -11,148 5,968 -7,696   9,357 
Shareholders’ equity 59,366 3,441 40,512   34,341 
      
ROIC 9.57% 17.22% 9.54%  -13.48% 
ROA adjusted 2.47% 7.88% 4.17%  0.50% 
ROE 4.60% 16.58% 4.00%   -2.06% 
      
Diff. Revenues from competitor 31,083 -5,847 10,100   7,187 
Diff. Revenues growth competitor   -18.81% 12.76%   10.07% 
Diff. EBITDA from competitor -135 10,219 11,089   9,168 
Diff. EBITDA marg. from competitor -5.36% 10.63% 9.06%   7.52% 
Diff. ROA adjusted from competitor -4.28% 6.53% 5.12%  2.54% 
Diff. ROE from competitor -6.86% 14.24% 8.44%   4.06% 
Diff. Earnings from competitor -2,654 8,432 10,076   6,562 
 
As previously described, in the year after the merger with GreenItaly1, Zephyro’s revenues 
growth was negative although the EBITDA margin increased, resulting in a higher net income.  
ROIC excluding goodwill and other similar intangibles, in the year following the acquisition 
increased by 17.22%, increasing the profitability of the company.  
Comparing the company’s performance with its competitor, even if in 2015 Carbotermo was 
more profitable, in 2016 Zephyro increased significantly the EBITDA margin with respected 
to its competitor (+10.63%) as well as ROA (calculated excluding goodwill and other similar 
intangibles (+6.53%).  
 
From the analysis of operating performance of Zephyro there are some considerations to be 
made regarding the possibility of the firm to get listed by itself through an initial public offering.  
In fact, in the 3 years before the business combination with the SPAC, the firm’s sales were 
almost unchanged (in 2013 increased but in 2014 they returned to the 2012’s level), the 
compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of EBITDA margin in the same period was -2.6% and 
the CAGR2012-2014 of ROIC was -36.6%.  
These data suggest that before the opportunity offered by the SPAC, the firm didn’t show a 
sustainable growth in its business and increasing profitability, which are substantial 
prerequisites for an IPO. However, even if data are not sufficient to judge the success of the 
deal, in the year after the business combination the Zephyro considerably increased its 
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EBITDA, ROIC and ROA (excluding goodwill and other similar intangibles), respectively by 
€12 million, 17.22% and 7.88%.  
 
On the other hand, even if the operating performance of Zephyro seemed to be positive, the 
stock performance was not so good.  Before the business combination, the stock’s return was 
only slightly positive, suggesting that maybe investors were not so confident in the success of 
the business combination. Unfortunately, at the time when this thesis was written, there were 
no long-term financial data for a more accurate analysis.  
However, the example of LU-VE suggested that is not impossible that a target firm of a SPAC 
could increase its market value after a period of reorganization and expansion. 
An important feature to take into account is the market in which the stocks trade: in fact, target 
companies which have transferred its shares to the main Italian market (MTA) typically have 
increased their market capitalization.   
The right-side graph (here below) makes clear that, even if in some period the Zephyro’s stock 
followed the market trend, it clearly performed worse than the market (FTSE Italian Small Cap 
index). 
 
EXHIBIT 21 Zephyro: Stock performance 
Pre-
announcement 
period 
Pre-voting 
period 
6 months 
following 
12 months 
following 
24 months 
following 
36 months 
following 
48 months 
following 
60 months 
following 
0.51% 1.28% -20.64% -20.75% N/A N/A N/A N/A 
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5.3. Results: operating and stock performance 
After having briefly presented the main characteristics of the first five Italian special purpose 
acquisition companies, in this final section data were summarized to provide an analysis 
following the model of Ignatyeva, Rauch and Wahrenburg (2013) and Kolb and Tykvová 
(2016).  
Firstly, operating performance is presented. To prepare the following exhibit, the most 
important indicators for all five SPACs’ target firms previously analysed were taken and the 
simple average and the median value were computed.  
The same applied for the difference of each target firm with its peer company in order to 
investigate how SPACs’ targets performed compared to their competitors. 
Peer companies, by definitions, are those which have the same characteristics, are comparable 
in terms of size, profitability and operate in the same industries of those of SPACs’ target firms. 
 
 
                                                
27 Only 2 observations. 
EXHIBIT 22 SUMAMRY STATISTICS 
 At acquisition Change 0/+1 Change -1/+1 Change -2/+1 Change -2/+227 
 € thousand Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
           
Revenues 345,215 282,543 64,447 39,015 81,784 35,791 101,760 51,555 182,715 182,715 
Revenues growth   17.45% 13.85% 26.07% 16.61% 32.20% 25.81% 30.61% 30.61% 
EBITDA 37,519 41,780 7,431 6,755 8,718 5,974 11,276 8,407 9,609 9,609 
EBITDA margin 13.09% 12.35% 2.38% -0.15% 1.53% -0.46% 1.46% -0.32% -0.71% -0.71 
EBIT 23,177 25,282 5,157 5,604 5,125 3,061 7,781 6,951 8,818 8,818 
EBIT margin 7.11% 6.54% 1.76% 0.37% 0.63% -0.31% 0.65% 0.31% 0.31% 0.31% 
Net income 495 2,730 15,874 10,571 5,929 5,291 7,185 8,422 4,168 4,168 
           
NOPLAT 19,524 24,215 2,028 3,073 4,681 1,335 6,252 3,338 7,919 7,919 
ROIC (excl. Goodwill) 14.66% 13.10% 0.86% -1.67% -0.89% -1.32% -3.86% -5.10% 1.26% 1.26% 
           
Total assets 395,174 384,451 80,586 55,056 161,698 137,317 192,908 161,411 196,316 196,316 
Net financial position 51,050 42,119 50,679 20,322 -1,565 -7,696 2,615 9,357 -103,011 -103,011 
Long-term debt 46,439 13,580 65,240 13,888 33,845 7,919 31,477 7,705 -5,889 -5,889 
Shareholders' equity 158,962 127,229 11,883 10,217 102,797 66,949 111,591 77,965 163,879 163,879 
           
ROA adjusted 6.62% 7.39% 1.09% 0.08% -1.36% -1.79% -1.70% -1.72% -1.46% -1.46% 
ROE 3.04% 4.60% 9.49% 7.04% -2.64% -3.69% -3.72% -2.94% -6.01% -6.01% 
           
Diff. from competitor of:           
Revenues  -41,278 33,166 57,895 22,857 63,940 38,418 52,777 15,321 51,076 51,076 
Revenues growth     64.7% 15.7% 24.4% 12.8% 25.2% 8.0% 15.6% 15.6% 
EBITDA  7,575 15,746 5,851 3,563 6,351 5,273 8,720 9,168 -1,201 -1,201 
EBITDA margin 1.18% 0.42% 1.44% -0.38% 0.42% -1.25% 0.29% -0.29% -0.60% -0.60% 
ROA adjusted -0.75% -1.14% 0.87% -0.41% -1.78% -1.82% -1.40% -0.63% 0.21% 0.21% 
ROE  -7.81% -10.56% -1.24% 12.01% -43.87% -8.47% -16.97% -11.62% -10.08% -10.08% 
Earnings -5,920 -2,654 -17,147 8,432 -38,802 -363 -25,567 -2,217 314 314 
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From exhibit 22 can be seen that, on average, target firms increased their revenues in the years 
following the business combination with a SPAC. The same applied to net income and 
especially to total assets. The low level of the average net income at the time of the acquisition, 
however, was due to losses suffered by IVS Group and F.I.L.A., because of higher expenses 
connected to the business combination.  
To increase their assets, analysed firms used money received by the SPACs but they also got 
new loans from banks. Total assets increased, on average, by €80 million in the year after the 
acquisition and long-term debt by €65 million in the same period. 
Moreover, these firms on averagely slightly increased the EBITDA margin (+2.38%) in the 
year following the business combination.  
On the other hand, profitability on assets excluding goodwill and other similar intangibles 
(ROIC) remained almost unchanged: 0.86% in the year after the merger with the SPAC and        
-0.89% in three years surrounding it. The same applied with ROA (adjusted by excluding 
goodwill and other similar intangibles).  
 
Thus, data on Italian target firms of special purpose acquisition companies, are in line with the 
international literature. In fact, on average they increased revenues, total assets and long-term 
debt in the years following the business combination.  
On the other hand, although international literature pointed out that target firms of SPACs were 
of lower quality and they worsen the profitability following the merger (for example Ignatyeva 
et al., 201328), in Italy the scenario was better. 
Data on Italian target firms didn’t provide a strong positive relationship between being a 
SPAC’s target and profitability but at least it’s not negative.  
This could be the effect of the investment strategy of SPACs: in fact, they typically acquire a 
minority stake in their target firms (not acquiring the control) but, from a qualitative point of 
view, they only offer the expertise of SPAC’s managers in the board of directors. As a result, 
CEO of a target firm remains the same, not compromising the original idea of the business and 
the implementation of the business plan. This implies that the CEO focuses more on business 
development (through internal and external growth) by operating in the same way as before and 
so not increasing the profitability of the firm significantly (at least in the few years analysed).  
This is in line with Dimitrova (2016), which suggested that the higher was the SPAC sponsors 
involvement as shareholders and board members, the worse the target firm performance were. 
However, SPAC sponsors’ representation in the board of directors, had a positive effect on 
performance: he found that, after two years from the acquisition, returns were at least 57% 
                                                
28 See chapter 4. 
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higher if one SPAC sponsor was appointed as a chairman of the merged company. For 
Dimitrova (2016), sponsors ‘may add value by monitoring the newly merged company, at least 
initially after the acquisition’. 
Moreover, he found evidence that the involvement of the target management also affected 
performance on average because they know better the business and, sometimes, they are also 
the founders of the target firm. 
 
Compared to their competitor, at the time of the acquisition, Italian SPACs’ target firms on 
average were smaller but the positive median value suggests the presence of an outlier (SeSa). 
Moreover, EBITDA margin for SPACs’ targets was higher on average (+1.18%) than their 
competitors.  
In the year following the acquisition target firms increased turnover considerably: on average 
+64.7% compared to their competitors. The same applied considering 3 and 5 years surrounding 
the acquisition.  
About EBITDA margin, on average target firms slightly increased profitability (+1.44% 
compared to competitors in the year after the business combination). However, the median 
result is negative (-0.38%): in fact, IVS Group, SeSa, LU-VE and F.I.L.A. suffered a decrease 
in EBITDA margin respect to competitors (even if not severe, between 0.5% and 2%) in the 
year following the acquisition while Zephyro positively improved it (+10% in the following 
year) respect to its competitor ‘Carbotermo’. 
To compare the profitability of the companies’ assets, was calculated the difference of ROA 
between each SPAC’s target firm and its competitor: in this ratio were not included goodwill 
and other similar intangibles from total assets to account for different business strategies of 
companies in the same industry (external growth generates goodwill while internal growth not). 
Thus, the average ROA adjusted of SPACs’ target firms was almost equal to those of their 
competitor at the time of the acquisition (-0.75%) as well as the change in the first years after 
(0.87%). In the three years surrounding the acquisition, competitors of SPACs’ target firms 
increased more their ROA adjusted by 1.78%.  
 
After having presented the operating performance of the first five target firms of Italian SPACs, 
it’s important to summarize the possible drivers of that pushed these firms to enter the public 
market indirectly, rather than directly with an initial public offering.  
Although there was not a single and clear cause of why the analysed target firms used a SPAC 
to get listed, some hypothesis can be suggested.  
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SPAC Target firm Business Combination Possible main causes 
Italy 1 Investment IVS Group 16-05-2012 High debt 
Made in Italy 1 SeSa 01-02-2013 Negative market condition, market probably not interest in the industry 
Industrial Stars of 
Italy LU-VE 09-07-2015 
Negative market condition, market 
probably not interest in the B2B 
industry 
Space F.I.L.A. 01-06-2015 Not great past performance, Negative market condition 
GreenItaly 1 Zephyro 23-12-2015 Poor past performance  
 
For some firms, it would have been difficult to enter into the public markets because of their 
own financial problems. For example, IVS Group was highly leveraged while F.I.L.A. and 
Zephyro experienced poor financial performance (especially the latter).   
Having an adequate financial structure, good past performance, and increasing ROIC are indeed 
substantial prerequisites to go public through an IPO. 
On the other hand, for SeSa and LU-VE the causes are not straightforward. Their financial 
statements of the years before the acquisition showed positive growth rate for revenues, 
increasing EBITDA and ROIC excluding goodwill and other similar intangibles. Moreover, 
SeSa reduced its net financial position (from €61 million in 2011 to €13 million in 2012).  
In these cases, firms probably decided to enter into agreements with a special purpose 
acquisition company because of the negative financial market conditions (in 2013 and even in 
2015) and because of the scarce interest of investors and markets for industries in which they 
operate (B2B and IT software and computers support).   
As previously explained, in periods when market conditions are not robust and are not 
favourable for new IPOs, companies are reluctant to start a costly IPO process (both in term of 
money and time) with the probability that investors could change their mind, or that the final 
companies’ valuation could be lower than their expectations, or with a possible higher 
underpricing effect.  
In these situations, SPACs can be the solution for going public, as suggested by Boyer and 
Baigent (2008). In fact, using these special companies, the valuation of their targets firms is not 
influenced by market environment but, on the contrary, it’s determined by the agreement 
between the management of the SPAC and the managers of the target firm. 
 
However, these companies are not of second quality and, maybe in other periods, they could 
have been listed directly through an IPO.  
 107 
This reasoning is also proved by the fact that, currently, four out of five firms analysed had 
successfully completed the transition to the main Italian public market (MTA) with stricter 
requisites (see paragraph 5.1). 
 
 
In the next exhibit, the stock performance of all five special purpose acquisition companies 
analysed is presented. The following data shows the difference in closing prices29 in each 
relative date.  
 
RETURN SPACs 
Pre-
announcement 
period 
Pre-
voting 
period 
+ 6 
months 
+ 12 
months 
+ 24 
months 
+ 36 
months 
+ 48 
months 
+ 60 
months 
Italy 1 Investment  -1.00% -1.31% -1.10% -36.00% -8.55% -26.05% -20.20% 26.50% 
Made in Italy 1 2.04% 7.50% -1.86% 5.86% 23.53% 31.16% 73.86% / 
Industrial Stars of Italy -3.75% 12.83% -10.79% -15.25% 20.25% / / / 
Space 0.78% 16.31% 10.20% 30.31% 93.27% / / / 
Green Italy 1 0.51% 1.28% -20.64% -20.75% / / / / 
         
AVERAGE -0.28% 7.32% -4.84% -7.17% 32.12% 2.56% 26.83% 26.50% 
MEDIAN 0.51% 7.50% -1.86% -15.25% 21.89% 2.56% 26.83% 26.50% 
VOLATILITY 2.2% 7.5% 11.6% 25.8% 43.2% 40.5% 66.5% / 
 
These data provide (partial) support for the European and international literature, suggesting 
that in the pre-announcement period stock performance should be almost zero, while in the pre-
voting period the return of SPACs’ stocks should reflect the market opinion about the ability of 
the business combination to create value. In fact, according to Jenkinson and Sousa (2009), 
market reaction in this phase predicts the future return of the stock in the long run.  
This is precisely what happened in Italy: on average, in the pre-voting period Italian SPACs’ 
investors got a return of 7.32% and, after two years, they received +32.12%.  
Unfortunately, for periods longer than two years from the business combination of Italian 
SPACs and their target firms, there were available data for only two companies (IVS Group 
and SeSa), so the results for 36, 48 and 60 months after the business combination of Italian 
SPAC are incomplete.  
However, after 24 months after the acquisition, on average target firms increased their stock 
price by 32.1%. The overall analysis provides the empirical proof that special purpose 
acquisition companies can be a possible positive investment for all investors in Italy.  
 
                                                
29 From EIKON database by Thomson Reuters. 
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As described in chapter 4, in literature there are two main studies of SPACs’ stock performance 
which differs from each other for the period of analysis and the data they used: Ignatyeva, 
Rauch and Wahremburg (2013) presented raw stock return while Kolb and Tykvová (2016) 
presented the difference of U.S. SPACs returns and a market index. 
Next exhibit shows average raw returns of the 19 European SPACs analysed between 2005 and 
2011 analysed by Ignatyeva, Rauch and Wahrenburg. 
 
 
Pre-
announcement 
period 
Pre-
voting 
period 
+ 6 
months 
+ 12 
months 
+ 24 
months 
+ 36 
months 
+ 48 
months 
+ 60 
months 
Average   0.60% 3.00% -11.00% -14.40% / / / / 
 
They suggested that the post-acquisition period of European SPACs was characterized by 
negative returns (-14.40% after one year), even if they performed better compared to U.S. 
SPACs: Jog and Sun (2007) found an annualized return of -17.34% and Jenkinson and Sousa 
(2011) found a -55% after one year.  
Compared to their analysis, after one year from the business combination, Italian SPACs 
performed better on average (-7.17%) than European and U.S. ones. 
 
From another perspective, Kolb and Tykvová compared U.S. SPACs’ target firms with the 
return of the Russell 2000 index, the U.S. index representing small-capitalization stock market.  
 
 
Pre-
announcement 
period 
Pre-voting 
period 
+ 6 
months 
+ 12 
months 
+ 24 
months 
+ 36 
months 
+ 48 
months 
+ 60 
months 
         
Difference of U.S. SPACs’ target firms return and Russell 2000 index  
AVERAGE / / -29% -46% -59% / / -102% 
MEDIAN / / -28% -46% -56% / / -90% 
 
Following this approach, the stock returns of each Italian SPAC were compared to the return of 
a comparable index in the same period. 
The best index that should be used would have been the FTSE AIM Italia index, which 
comprises all companies listed on the AIM Italia market and presumably should have the same 
risk and liquidity of SPACs listed on the same market.  
However, this index was created only on 1 March 2012, after the merger between AIM Italia 
and MAC segment of Borsa Italiana, while the first Italian SPAC got listed in 2011; therefore 
the FTSE Italia Small Cap index was used. This index contains companies with a small 
capitalization not part of the FTSE MIB and FTSE Italia Medium Cap (companies in this index 
represent 4% on the entire Borsa Italiana capitalization).  
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Next exhibit represents the average and medium return of Italian SPACs compared to the FTSE 
Italia Small Cap index. Volatility was computed as the standard deviation of the difference 
between the return of each SPAC and the return of the index in the same period. 
 
 
Pre-
announcement 
period 
Pre-voting 
period 
+ 6 
months 
+ 12 
months 
+ 24 
months 
+ 36 
months 
+ 48 
months 
+ 60 
months 
         
Difference of SPACs’ return and FTSE Italia Small Cap  
AVERAGE -1.11% 2.88% 0.93% -5.11% 8.32% -29.53% 1.21% -38.18% 
MEDIAN -0.75% 3.91% 2.45% -15.94% -0.39% -29.53% 1.21% -38.18% 
VOLATILITY 29.99%* 9.57% 10.78% 30.09% 50.62% 59.54% 56.12% / 
         
FTSE Italia Small Cap return 
AVERAGE 0.83% 4.45% -5.77% -2.06% 23.81% 32.09% 25.62% 64.68% 
MEDIAN 1.52% -2.63% -4.58% -4.81% 22.28% 32.09% 25.62% 64.68% 
VOLATILITY 28.55% 14.75% 4.44% 15.66% 8.24% 19.09% 10.39% / 
 
Results are not linear and, also considering that the number of observations was limited (only 
5 SPACs), it is not possible to suggest if there was a relation between SPACs’ returns and the 
one of the FTSE Italian Small Cap index.   
One thing to be noted is that the volatility was higher in SPACs than in the index, because of 
the high heterogeneity of the special purpose acquisition companies’ target firms.  
Moreover, volatility in the pre-announcement period is misleading because in that phase SPACs 
are considered as a free-risk investment and, comparing it with companies operating in different 
industries, for sure carries an equity risk higher than a free-risk rate.  
In any case, even if the relationship between stock performance of Italian SPACs and FTSE 
Italia Small Cap index was not linear, it was better than the relationship between U.S. SPACs 
and Russell 2000 index: after 2 years the business combination Italian SPACs on average over-
performed the market index by 8.32% while U.S. ones on average underperformed the market 
index by 59%.  
 
Concluding, results of operating and stock performances of the first five Italian SPACs 
suggested that they were able on average to increase revenues and total assets while the 
profitability of target firms remained unchanged or slightly decreased in terms of EBITDA 
margin and return on invested capital (ROIC).  
For what concerns stock performance, although in the first year after the business combination 
Italian SPACs’ target firms suffered a reduction in the stock price (probably due to the less 
liquid market where they were listed), they increased their stock price on average by 32.1% 
after 2 years from the acquisition.  
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These analyses suggested that sponsors and managers of Italian special purpose acquisition 
companies were able to identify target firms for their SPACs with hidden potential and by the 
cash and expertise provided by special purpose acquisition companies, they were able to 
increase firms’ growth and create value for shareholders.  
Using the concept of Kolb and Tykvová (2016), Italian SPACs’ managers were able ‘to turn 
frogs into prices’.  
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
After the presentation of the main characteristics of a special purpose acquisition company and 
the difference between it and an initial public offering (IPO) or a private equity fund, in this 
thesis was conducted an empirical analysis of Italian SPACs and their target firms, following 
models in literature (Ignatyeva, Rauch and Wahremburg, 2013 and Kolb and Tykvová, 2016), 
in order to understand if these special investment vehicles can increase the value of Italian 
firms. In particular, the first five Italian SPACs were analysed, identifying their operating and 
stock performances.  
The study was performed by considering some financial indicators for each SPACs’ target firm 
such as revenues, EBITDA, total assets, ROA, and ROIC excluding goodwill and other similar 
intangibles. These indicators were calculated in the year of the targets’ acquisition by SPACs 
and the change of the same indicators in the three or five years surrounding the business 
combination.  
 
Results of similar analyses in literature pointed out that firms which got listed through a SPAC 
increased revenues, total assets and debt although they suffered a worsening in profitability.  
Moreover, stock returns of companies after the business combination were negative, especially 
for U.S. SPACs’ target firms.  
In fact, according to them, only less-performing and highly leverage firms used SPACs to enter 
into public markets, while companies with a positive financial background, sustainable 
financial structure, and a good competitive advantage used the direct way to get listed, the IPO. 
 
The result of the empirical analysis is that, thanks to the new capital brought by special purpose 
acquisition companies and additional debt, Italian target firms were able, on average, to increase 
their size: in the year following the acquisition revenues grew at +17.45%, and also their assets 
increased by €80 million. In addition, they on average increased the EBITDA margin by 
+2.38%.   
On the other hand, profitability on invested capital excluding goodwill and other similar 
intangibles (ROIC) remained almost unchanged (or slightly decreased): 0.86% in the year after 
the merger with the SPAC and -0.89% in three years surrounding it. The same applied with 
ROA (adjusted by excluding goodwill and other similar intangibles from total assets).  
With respect to their competitors, although target firms were on average smaller in terms of 
revenues, they increased more in the years following their acquisition by a SPAC. Profitability 
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in terms of EBITDA and ROA (calculated excluding goodwill and other similar intangibles 
from assets) was similar to the target firms’ competitors and didn’t improve more in the year 
following the acquisition.  
This probably because management of firms focused more on growth and making new 
investments rather than increasing the profitability of their firms. Returns on new investments 
will be indeed postponed to the following years. 
 
Before the announcement of their target firm, so when Italian SPACs were only cash shell, 
stock returns were on average flat, in line with the literature. Then, in the period from the 
announcement of the target firm to the shareholders’ vote on the acquisition, the stock returns 
on average increased, suggesting that market valued the deal as value creating.  
In the first year after the acquisition, Italian SPACs suffered negative stock return (-7.17%), in 
line with European and U.S. literature but, from the second year after the business combination, 
on average, Italian SPACs performed positive stock returns with respect to the value at the 
acquisition date (+32.12%).  
 
Thus, the analysis conducted in this thesis pointed out that Italian SPACs on average performed 
well and they could be a good investment in the medium-long term.  
However, among ten SPACs which completed the business combination, for only five of them 
were available enough post-acquisition data to perform the analysis. Moreover, for three 
companies analysed were available financial statements of only one year after the business 
combination. This means that the analysis is not complete and cannot be used to provide a clear 
overview of the Italian SPAC market, but results must be confirmed in the following years. 
 
The thesis also tried to explain why these Italian firms choose these special vehicles to get listed 
into public markets rather than using a traditional IPO. For some firms, the reason of this 
decision could be the result of high debt respect to equity or for poor financial performance 
(IVS, F.I.L.A. and Zephyro), while for others, the main reasons seemed the negative financial 
market conditions and because of the scarce interest of investors and markets for industries in 
which they operate (SeSa and LU-VE). 
 
Concluding, it seems that in Italy special purpose acquisition companies succeed, on average, 
in increasing value of target firms which would have some difficulties in entering the public 
markets through a traditional initial public offering. These positive results (at least until now), 
along with a positive financial markets scenario in Italy and the favourable legislation on PIR 
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(Piani Individuali di Risparmio) for investments, pushed the creation of 7 new special purpose 
acquisition companies in Italy in 2017 (from January to October). 
However, critical will be next years, in which are expected more SPAC deals since 8 Italian 
special purpose acquisition companies are seeking an acquisition. 
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